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KOSOVO "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" FINANCED BY ORGANISED CRIME
by
Michel Chossudovsky
Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of The
Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third
World Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997.
Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1999. All rights reserved.
Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial internet sites,
provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To
publish this text in printed and/or other forms contact the author at
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Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping mission,
NATO's ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes far beyond the
breach of international law. While Slobodan Milosevic is demonised,
portrayed as a remorseless dictator, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is
upheld as a self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the
rights of ethnic Albanians. The truth of the matter is that the KLA is
sustained by organised crime with the tacit approval of the United States
and its allies.
Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion has been
carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics trade has
played a crucial role in "financing the conflict" in Kosovo in accordance
with Western economic, strategic and military objectives. Amply
documented by European police files, acknowledged by numerous studies,
the links of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to criminal syndicates in
Albania, Turkey and the European Union have been known to Western
governments and intelligence agencies since the mid-1990s.
<paraindent><param>left</param>"...The financing of the Kosovo guerilla
war poses critical questions and it sorely test claims of an "ethical"
foreign policy. Should the West back a guerilla army that appears to
partly financed by organised crime." 1
</paraindent>
While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police Organization based
in the Hague) was "preparing a report for European interior and justice
ministers on a connection between the KLA and Albanian drug gangs."2 In
the meantime, the rebel army has been skilfully heralded by the global
media (in the months preceding the NATO bombings) as broadly
representative of the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter") appointed as
chief negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become the de facto helmsman
of the peace process on behalf of the ethnic Albanian majority and this
despite its links to the drug trade. The West was relying on its KLA
puppets to rubber-stamp an agreement which would have transformed Kosovo
into an occupied territory under Western Administration.
Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia, had
described the KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher Hill, America's
chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet agreement "has also
been a strong critic of the KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs."3
Moreover, barely a few two months before Rambouillet, the US State
Department had acknowledged (based on reports from the US Observer
Mission) the role of the KLA in terrorising and uprooting ethnic
Albanians:
<paraindent><param>left</param>"...the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who
comes to the police, ... KLA representatives had threatened to kill
villagers and burn their homes if they did not join the KLA [a process
which has continued since the NATO bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment has
reached such intensity that residents of six villages in the Stimlje
region are "ready to flee." 4
</paraindent>
While backing a "freedom movement" with links to the drug trade, the West
seems also intent in bypassing the civilian Kosovo Democratic League and
its leader Ibrahim Rugova who has called for an end to the bombings and
expressed his desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Yugoslav
authorities.5 It is worth recalling that a few days before his March 31st
Press Conference, Rugova had been reported by the KLA (alongside three
other leaders including Fehmi Agani) to have been killed by the Serbs.
Covert Financing of "Freedom Fighters"
Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo is similar
to other CIA covert operations in Central America, Haiti and Afghanistan
where "freedom fighters" were financed through the laundering of drug
money. Since the onslaught of the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies
have developed a complex relationship to the illegal narcotics trade. In
case after case, drug money laundered in the international banking system
has financed covert operations.
According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing was
established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army in Laos was
funded by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's military strategy
against the combined forces of the neutralist government of Prince
Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.6
The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been replicated
in Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising curve of cocaine
imports to the US", wrote journalist John Dinges "followed almost exactly
the flow of US arms and military advisers to Central America".7
The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided covert
support, were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics into
Southern Florida. And as revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of
Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandals, there was strong
evidence that covert operations were funded through the laundering of
drug money. "Dirty money" recycled through the banking system--often
through an anonymous shell company-- became "covert money," used to
finance various rebel groups and guerilla movements including the
Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan Mujahadeen. According to a 1991 Time
Magazine report:
<paraindent><param>left</param>"Because the US wanted to supply the
mujehadeen rebels in Afghanistan with stinger missiles and other military
hardware it needed the full cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s,
the CIA operation in Islamabad was one of the largest US intelligence
stations in the World. `If BCCI is such an embarrassment to the US that
forthright investigations are not being pursued it has a lot to do with
the blind eye the US turned to the heroin trafficking in Pakistan', said
a US intelligence officer.8
</paraindent>
America and Germany join Hands
Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands in
establishing their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Their
intelligence agencies have also collaborated. According to intelligence
analyst John Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo rebel army was
established as a joint endeavour between the CIA and Germany's Bundes
Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which previously played a key role in
installing a right wing nationalist government under Franjo Tudjman in
Croatia).9 The task to create and finance the KLA was initially given to
Germany: "They used German uniforms, East German weapons and were
financed, in part, with drug money".10 According to Whitley, the CIA was,
subsequently instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.11
The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with Bonn's intent
to expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans. Prior to the onset of the
civil war in Bosnia, Germany and its Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich
Genscher had actively supported secession; it had "forced the pace of
international diplomacy" and pressured its Western allies to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia. According to the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both
Germany and the US favoured (although not officially) the formation of a
"Greater Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia.12
According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free hand among its
allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa."13
Islamic Fundamentalism in Support of the KLA
Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in triggering nationalist
liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo with the ultimate purpose of
destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter objective was also carried out "by
turning a blind eye" to the influx of mercenaries and financial support
from Islamic fundamentalist organisations.14
Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Koweit had been fighting in
Bosnia.15 And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen
mercenaries from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting
alongside the KLA in Kosovo. German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were
reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.16
According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support from
Islamic countries to the KLA had been channelled through the former
Albanian chief of the National Information Service (NIS), Bashkim
Gazidede.17 "Gazidede, reportedly a devout Moslem who fled Albania in
March of last year [1997], is presently [1998] being investigated for his
contacts with Islamic terrorist organizations."18
The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters" are the rugged
mountainous borders of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. Albania is also
a key point of transit of the Balkans drug route which supplies Western
Europe with grade four heroin. 75% of the heroin entering Western Europe
is from Turkey. And a large part of drug shipments originating in Turkey
transits through the Balkans. According to the US Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), "it is estimated that 4-6 metric tons of heroin
leave each month from Turkey having [through the Balkans] as destination
Western Europe."19 A recent intelligence report by Germany's Federal
Criminal Agency suggests that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the most
prominent group in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer
countries."20
The Laundering of Dirty Money
In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans
narcotics trade need friends in high places. Smuggling rings with alleged
links to the Turkish State are said to control the trafficking of heroin
through the Balkans "cooperating closely with other groups with which
they have political or religious ties" including criminal groups in
Albanian and Kosovo.21 In this new global financial environment, powerful
undercover political lobbies connected to organized crime cultivate links
to prominent political figures and officials of the military and
intelligence establishment.
The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder large
amounts of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the smuggling
operations per se, powerful banking interests in Turkey but mainly those
in financial centres in Western Europe discretely collect fat commissions
in a multibillion dollar money laundering operation. These interests have
high stakes in ensuring a safe passage of drug shipments into Western
European markets.
The Albanian Connection
Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started at the
beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power, headed by
President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy and cross border
trade had unfolded. A triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics had
developed largely as a result of the embargo imposed by the international
community on Serbia and Montenegro and the blockade enforced by Greece
against Macedonia.
Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into bankruptcy
following the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed on Belgrade in
1990. The embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs
were driven into abysmal poverty. Economic collapse created an
environment which fostered the progress of illicit trade. In Kosovo, the
rate of unemployment increased to a staggering 70 percent (according to
Western sources).
Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering ethnic
tensions. Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out of their Teens" from
an impoverished population, were drafted into the ranks of the KLA...22
In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since 1992 had
created conditions which favoured the criminalisation of State
institutions. Drug money was also laundered in the Albanian pyramids
(ponzi schemes) which mushroomed during the government of former
President Sali Berisha (1992-1997).23 These shady investment funds were
an integral part of the economic reforms inflicted by Western creditors
on Albania.
Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to the Italian
mafia) had become the new economic elites, often associated with Western
business interests. In turn the financial proceeds of the trade in drugs
and arms were recycled towards other illicit activities (and vice versa)
including a vast prostitution racket between Albania and Italy. Albanian
criminal groups operating in Milan, "have become so powerful running
prostitution rackets that they have even taken over the Calabrians in
strength and influence."24
The application of "strong economic medicine" under the guidance of the
Washington based Bretton Woods institutions had contributed to wrecking
Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the Albanian
economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European transnationals
to carefully position themselves. Several Western oil companies including
Occidental, Shell and British Petroleum had their eyes rivetted on
Albania's abundant and unexplored oil-deposits. Western investors were
also gawking Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel
and platinum... The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the
background on behalf of German mining interests. 25
Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have been
involved in the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the architect of the
agreement with Germany's Preussag (handing over control over Albania's
chrome mines) against the competing bid of the US led consortium of
Macalloy Inc. in association with Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).26
Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into the
privatisation programmes leading to the acquisition of State assets by
the mafias. In Albania, the privatisation programme had led virtually
overnight to the development of a property owning class firmly committed
to the "free market". In Northern Albania, this class was associated with
the Guegue "families" linked to the Democratic Party.
Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of Sali Berisha
(1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid" VEFA Holdings had been
set up by the Guegue "families" of Northern Albania with the support of
Western banking interests. VEFA was under investigation in Italy in 1997
for its ties to the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large
amounts of dirty money.27
According to one press report (based on intelligence sources), senior
members of the Albanian government during the Presidency of Sali Berisha
including cabinet members and members of the secret police SHIK were
alleged to be involved in drugs trafficking and illegal arms trading into
Kosovo:
(...) The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband
cigarettes all are believed to have been handled by a company run openly
by Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...). In the course of
1996 Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged] to had used his
office to facilitate the transport of arms, oil and contraband
cigarettes. (...) Drugs barons from Kosovo (...) operate in Albania with
impunity, and much of the transportation of heroin and other drugs
across Albania, from Macedonia and Greece en route to Italy, is believed
to be organised by Shik, the state security police (...). Intelligence
agents are convinced the chain of command in the rackets goes all the
way to the top and have had no hesitation in naming ministers in their
reports.28
The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite the
presence since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops at the
Albanian-Macedonian border with a mandate to enforce the embargo. The
West had turned a blind eye. The revenues from oil and narcotics were
used to finance the purchase of arms (often in terms of direct barter):
"Deliveries of oil to Macedonia (skirting the Greek embargo [in 1993-4]
can be used to cover heroin, as do deliveries of kalachnikov rifles to
Albanian `brothers' in Kosovo".29
The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed links with
Italy's crime syndicates.30 In turn, the latter played a key role in
smuggling arms across the Adriatic into the Albanian ports of Dures and
Valona. At the outset in 1992, the weapons channelled into Kosovo were
largely small arms including Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK
machine-guns, 12.7 calibre heavy machine-guns, etc.
The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to rapidly
develop a force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the KLA has acquired
more sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft and antiarmor
rockets. According to Belgrade, some of the funds have come directly from
the CIA "funnelled through a so-called "Government of Kosovo" based in
Geneva, Switzerland. Its Washington office employs the public-relations
firm of Ruder Finn--notorious for its slanders of the Belgrade
government".31
The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment which enables
it to receive NATO satellite information concerning the movement of the
Yugoslav Army. The KLA training camp in Albania is said to "concentrate
on heavy weapons training - rocket propelled grenades, medium caliber
cannons, tanks and transporter use, as well as on communications, and
command and control". (According to Yugoslav government sources.32
These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army were
consistent with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly, there
has been a "deafening silence" of the international media regarding the
Kosovo arms-drugs trade. In the words of a 1994 Report of the
Geopolitical Drug Watch: "the trafficking [of drugs and arms] is
basically being judged on its geostrategic implications (...) In Kosovo,
drugs and weapons trafficking is fuelling geopolitical hopes and
fears"...33
The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior to the
signing of the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered an unwholesome
"marriage of convenience" with the mafia. "Freedom fighters" were put in
place, the narcotics trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the
Kosovo conflict" with the ultimate objective of destabilising the
Belgrade government and fully recolonising the Balkans. The destruction
of an entire country is the outcome. Western governments which
participated in the NATO operation bear a heavy burden of responsibility
in the deaths of civilians, the impoverishment of both the ethnic
Albanian and Serbian populations and the plight of those who were
brutally uprooted from towns and villages in Kosovo as a result of the
bombings.
NOTES
1. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels
The Times, London, Monday, March 24, 1999.
2. Ibid.
3. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, "Shifting stance over KLA has
betrayed' Albanians", Daily Telegraph, London, 6 April 1999
4. KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs, Office of South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC, December 21, 1998; Compiled by EUR/SCE
(202-647-4850) from daily reports of the U.S. element of the Kosovo
Diplomatic Observer Mission, December 21, 1998.
5. "Rugova, sous protection serbe appelle a l'arret des raides", Le
Devoir, Montreal, 1 April 1999.
6. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia Harper
and Row, New York, 1972.
7. See John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of
Manuel Noriega, Times Books, New York, 1991.
8. "The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991, p. 22.
9. Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999; see also Michel Collon, Poker
Menteur, editions EPO, Brussels, 1997.
10. Quoted in Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999).
11. Ibid.
12. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4
13. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis", Covert Action
Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93).
14. See Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993.
15. For further details see Michel Collon, Poker Menteur, editions EPO,
Brussels, 1997, p. 288.
16. Truth in Media, Kosovo in Crisis, Phoenix, 2 April 1999.
17. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 13, 1998.
18. Ibid.
19. Daily News, Ankara, 5 March 1997.
20. Quoted in Boyes and Wright, op cit.
21. ANA, Athens, 28 January 1997, see also Turkish Daily News, 29 January
1997.
22. Brian Murphy, KLA Volunteers Lack Experience, The Associated Press, 5
April 1999.
23. See Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3, see also Barry
James, In Balkans, Arms for Drugs, The International Herald Tribune
Paris, June 6, 1994.
24. The Guardian, 25 March 1997.
25. For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, La crisi albanese,
Edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1998.
26. Ibid.
27. Andrew Gumbel, The Gangster Regime We Fund, The Independent, February
14, 1997, p. 15.
28. Ibid.
29. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3.
30. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 66, p. 4.
31. Quoted in Workers' World, May 7, 1998.
32. See Government of Yugoslavia at
<underline><color><param>0000,0000,fefe</param>http://www.gov.yu/terrorism/terroristcamps.html</color></underline>.
33. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4.
Michel Chossudovsky
Department of Economics,
University of Ottawa,
Ottawa, K1N6N5
Voice box: 1-613-562-5800, ext. 1415
Fax: 1-514-425-6224
E-Mail: [log in to unmask]
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