Hi Haruna!
Thanks. I'm glad you enjoyed the article. Some of the articles I find
are long. Maybe I can split and send them in installments in the
future. Yes indeed, Sekou Toure did have his excesses as but there were
good things about him. One of the things I commend him most for was the
role he played in the promotion of Guinean culture. Have a good day.
Buharry.
----Original Message----
From: [log in to unmask]
Date: 2008-12-30 3:05
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Subj: Re: Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization Reconsidered,
with Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa)e
Thanx Buharry for sharing. I had this report laying in my library for 5
months now and I never could bring myself to read it for its length.
However, with my newfound audio transcription (inspired by you) I was
able to read this copy quickly. It brings a pre-independence
perspective to Seku Toure' and perhaps some of what shaped his early
leadership. But for his latter extremes, he was inspirational. The
report is chock full of actionable information I might add. Thanx again
for sharing. I got a question for you: Can you only send us reams of
information or can you share shorter but equally virulent notes with
us? You're too good men.
Haruna. > Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2008 01:15:55 +0100> From: [log in to unmask]
COM> Subject: fwd: Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization
Reconsidered, with Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa)>
To: [log in to unmask]> > Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist
Mobilization Reconsidered, with > Special Reference to Guinea (French
West Africa)> ELIZABETH SCHMIDT>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> In September 1958, the people of Guinea voted for immediate >
independence from France, overwhelmingly rejecting a constitution that
> would have granted the territory junior partnership in a French->
dominated community. Throughout the vast French empire, Guinea, with a
> population of only 2.5 million people, was the only territory to vote
> "No" to the proposition offered by Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle.1
> The referendum's outcome was a major victory for the Guinean branch
of > the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a political party
with > affiliates in the fourteen territories of French West Africa,
French > Equatorial Africa, and the United Nations trusts of Togo and
Cameroon. > While every other RDA branch had fallen into line behind de
Gaulle, the > Guinean RDA, under the leadership of a charismatic young
trade unionist > named Sékou Touré, had spearheaded the drive for
complete and immediate > independence. 1 > The decision to oppose the
constitution was made two weeks before > the ref- erendum, at a
territorial conference attended by some 680 > party militants from RDA
subsections, neighborhood committees, and > village committees from
across Guinea.2 Although Sékou Touré > articulated the party's
position, he did not determine it. The final > decision was made by the
delegates attending the conference, who voted > solidly against de
Gaulle's proposition. Sékou Touré's endorsement of > the "No" vote was,
in fact, the result of massive pressure from the > grassroots.3 2 >
While the RDA position was elaborated and its victory lauded in > La
Liberté, the party newspaper read by Western-educated elites,4 >
nonliterate women celebrated their triumph in songs they had created >
for the occasion. Guinean scholar Idiatou Camara recorded one such song
> during interviews conducted in 1976?1977: > > > > Guinea says "No">
De Gaulle says "Yes"> One must vote "No"> Comrade Sékou Touré, one must
choose the "No"> Yes, one must choose the "No," Sékou Touré> In any
case, we have voted "No."5 3 > One month before the referendum, Prime
Minister de Gaulle had > traveled to Guinea in a futile attempt to sway
the vote. At the > airport, he was welcomed by Sékou Touré, president
of Guinea's recently > established local government, who was attired in
the flowing white > uniform of the RDA. Hundreds of party militants,
dressed in handmade > uniforms of cheap white percale, lined the road
for fifteen kilometers, > from the airport to the city center. As the
motorcade approached, they > cried, "Syli! Syli!" ["Elephant!
Elephant!"]?the symbol of the RDA, and > by extension of Sékou Touré
personally. Partisans waved homemade > posters emblazoned with
elephants and plastered them on buildings > throughout the capital. As
the women danced, accompanied by traditional > tam-tams, balafons, and
coras, the crowd sang, "The elephant has > entered the city!"6 In his
memoirs, de Gaulle recalled: "from the > airport to the center of the
town the crowd [was] evenly distributed in > well-drilled battalions
along both sides of the road ... The women were > lined up in front in
their hundreds, each group wearing dresses of the > same cut and color,
and all, as the procession passed by, jumping, > dancing and singing to
order."7 Later that day, Sékou Touré officially > received the French
prime minister and addressed the Territorial > Assembly, providing
colonial authorities with an advance copy of his > roneotyped speech.8
4 > This confluence of popular and elite nationalism was >
characteristic of the Guinean RDA, a broad-based ethnic, class, and >
gender alliance that incorporated Muslims, Christians, and >
practitioners of indigenous religions. The movement embraced Guinean >
speakers of Maninka, Susu, Pulaar, Kissi, Kpelle, and Loma, as well as
> those who spoke languages indigenous to other French African >
territories. As the RDA struggled to build an independent nation from >
this heterogeneous base, its message, conveyed by both masses and >
elites, was simultaneously anticolonial and nationalist. 5 > > >
Although Guinea was alone in its embrace of independence in 1958, > it
was not unique. In the post?World War II era, nationalist movements >
burgeoned across the African and Asian continents, resisting >
imperialism of diverse origins. Other African territories followed >
Guinea's lead, and by 1960, most French "possessions" had regained >
their sovereignty. The Guinean RDA was thus one among scores of African
> and Asian movements that waged successful struggles for national >
independence in the postwar period. So, why study the Guinean >
nationalist movement, and why study it now? Decades after the fact, the
> Guinean case warrants scholarly consideration for the important
lessons > it can teach us about anticolonial nationalism in the non-
Western world?> lessons with enduring relevance. What we learn from the
Guinean case > will help to push nationalist historiography in new
directions. 6 > > The study of African and Asian nationalism is not
new. In recent > years, however, there have been significant shifts in
scholarly > approach. The wave of anticolonial nationalism that swept
Africa and > Asia after World War II sparked new interest in what
previously had > been considered a uniquely European phenomenon. Many
of the first > studies approached nationalism from the perspective of
intellectual > history. Exploring the interaction of indigenous and
Western ideas, > early scholars of Asian nationalism generally focused
on religious and > secular intellectuals and political elites.9
Although the history of > ideas remains a forceful current in the field,
10 recent studies have > paid greater attention to popular mobilization
and the importance of > peasant and worker movements. While many of
these works note that > nationalist leaders focused on local grievances
and manipulated > indigenous symbols and traditions to appeal to mass
audiences, most > perpetuate the top-down perspective of their
predecessors.11 According > to this view, the masses were but
recipients of the nationalist > message. They were mobilized by the
elites; they were not a mobilizing > force. 7 > > While a number of
recent studies make reference to the generation > of mass appeal, only
a handful scrutinize the actual mechanisms of > popular mobilization.
Gail Minault and Sandria Freitag examine the ways > in which Indian
Muslim leaders used religious and cultural symbols and > events to
unite a heterogeneous Muslim population, mobilizing the > literate
classes through the vernacular press, leaflets, pamphlets, and >
poetry, and the nonliterate masses through speeches, slogans, songs, >
religious processions, and demonstrations.12 Peter van der Veer has >
made similar claims for mobilization among Indian Hindus as well as >
Muslims, while James Gelvin has investigated these issues in Syria, and
> Nels Johnson and Ted Swedenburg in Palestine.13 Some of the most >
insightful work in this area has focused not on anticolonial >
nationalism, but on internal cultural resurgence in multiethnic, >
postcolonial nation-states. Pamela Price, for instance, argues in her >
investigation of Tamil nationalism in India that the Federation for the
> Progress of Dravidians "developed a new cosmology, a vision of a new
> society and polity, which was deeply immersed in Tamil images and >
themes." Its appeal resonated more strongly among the Tamil population
> "than the more secular, pan-Indian message of Nehru or the ascetic >
image of Gandhi."14 8 > > While the majority of recent studies continue
to treat > nationalist mobilization as a one-way street, there are
striking > exceptions to this trend. Israel Gershoni points out that
most works > that focus on the dissemination of nationalist ideas from
elites to > women and "subaltern socioeconomic strata such as the lower
middle > classes, the working classes, and various levels of the
peasantry" tell > us very little about the receptivity of these groups
to nationalist > ideas. We remain ignorant of "the modes in which
women, the poor, and > the illiterate?constituting the overwhelming
majority of the societies > in question?reacted to the radicalized
upper middle stratum's struggle > against the Westernized `ancien
régime.'" Gershoni argues that future > studies "must encompass the
strains of nationalism from below > percolating upward as a supplement
to the research on [educated urban > elite]-driven nationalism
trickling downward."15 9 > > The nationalist historiography of Africa,
like that of Asia, has > changed dramatically in recent years. Since
the early 1950s, scholars > of Africa have investigated nationalist
movements and nation-building > endeavors that were both heir to the
European revolutionary and liberal > traditions of 1789 and 1848 and
the product of indigenous grassroots > movements.16 The earliest
studies emphasized the leadership role of > Western-educated elites who
organized political movements grounded in > Western concepts of
democracy and national self-determination. To be > successful, these
movements had to be able to generate mass support, > which they did by
mobilizing around preexisting grievances and > promising to resolve
them through the attainment of national > independence.17 While
acknowledging the critical nature of mass > involvement, pioneers in
this field, like their counterparts in Asia, > generally focused on the
political leadership.18 10 > > In the late 1960s, as social history
gained prominence in the > discipline, scholars of African nationalism
began to shift their focus > to "the role of ordinary ... Africans."
John Lonsdale, an eminent > member of this group, argued that
"scholarly preoccupation with élites > will only partially illumine the
mainsprings of nationalism."19 He > claimed that "the pressures of the
peasantry at the periphery were at > least as important in breaking
down the colonial governments' morale as > the demands of the élite at
the centre."20 In the post?World War II > era, increased government
intrusion into the lives of ordinary Africans > "resulted in a national
revolution coalescing from below, co-ordinated > rather than instigated
by the educated élite." According to Lonsdale, > it was the grassroots
that "provided much of [the nationalist > movement's] dynamism and
direction."21 11 > > It was left for later generations to show how
"ordinary Africans" > accomplished this spectacular feat. In her
pathbreaking work on > nationalism in colonial Tanzania, Susan Geiger
focused on the role of > nonliterate women. She argued that these women
did not "learn > nationalism" from the Western-educated male elites who
dominated party > politics. Instead, women without formal education
brought to the party > "an ethos of nationalism already present as
trans-ethnic, trans-tribal > social and cultural identity. This ethos
was expressed collectively in > their dance and other organizations,
and reflected in their families of > origin as well as in marriages
that frequently crossed ethnic > divisions."22 Such women were "a major
force in constructing, > embodying, and performing Tanzanian
nationalism."23 Thus, Tanzanian > women were a driving force behind a
movement in which African and > European ideas interacted to form a new
synthesis, one that was > uniquely suited to the African context.
Geiger's work on Tanzanian > women inspires similar questions about the
role of other grassroots > actors. What part did military veterans,
urban workers, and rural > agriculturalists play in shaping nationalist
movements from the bottom > up? 12 > > The importance of mass
mobilization to the Guinean nationalist > endeavor has been noted by
several scholars. However, few have examined > the popular aspects of
the movement in detail. Ruth Schachter > Morgenthau, Jean Suret-Canale,
Claude Rivière, Victor Du Bois, and L. > Gray Cowan have commented on
the popular foundations of the Guinean > RDA, but their primary focus
has been on colonial reforms, electoral > politics, and male party
leaders. Their works do not explore the > mechanisms by which people
were mobilized or the ways in which the rank > and file influenced
party methods and programs.24 Guinean historian > Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta
has written the most comprehensive, if largely > uncritical, account of
the Guinean nationalist movement. His two-volume > study devotes
considerable attention to elite electoral politics, and > some to the
movement's popular roots. However, the specific tactics of > mass
mobilization are not scrutinized. The central role of women is >
mentioned, but the dynamics of their participation are not explored in
> depth. 25 Although some other works remark upon the crucial nature of
> women's involvement, few offer an analysis of women's motivations, >
methods, and visions of a transformed society or discuss their role in
> shaping the nationalist movement and defining the terms of the debate.
> 26 A notable exception is Idiatou Camara's unpublished undergraduate
> thesis, which demonstrates the ways in which urban women helped to >
construct Guinea's nationalist movement and were critical to its >
success. Unfortunately, this unique work, preserved in Guinea's >
national archives, is available only in that country.27 13 > > If the
focus on popular mobilization is one trend in recent > nationalist
scholarship, criticism of the negative qualities of > nationalism is
another. In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalism in Africa > and Asia was
associated positively with anticolonialism and popular > liberation.28
A generation later, however, following the disintegration > of the
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and internal > struggles
in a number of African and Asian countries, nationalism > acquired a
highly negative connotation. Ethnic chauvinism and > ethnically
motivated atrocities overwhelmed the positive > characteristics
associated with earlier nationalist movements. > Increasingly,
nationalism was deemed a negative force, promoting > ethnic,
linguistic, and religious homogeneity, brutally excluding?or >
eliminating?those considered outsiders.29 These illiberal, >
counterrevolutionary forces had much in common with the right-wing >
nationalisms of Europe in the "Age of Empire" (1880?1914), when, in the
> words of E. J. Hobsbawm, "ethnicity and language became the central
... > or even the only criteria of potential nationhood." In the case
of > Europe, and later Africa and Asia, "a concept associated with >
liberalism and the left [mutated] into a chauvinist, imperialist and >
xenophobic movement of the right, or more precisely, the radical right."
> 30 In Guinea, the RDA was forced to confront these narrow, ethnically
> exclusive tendencies, both within its own ranks and in those of the >
ethnic associations promoted by the colonial government and its African
> supporters. 14 > > Nationalism thus remains a hotly debated topic
with undeniable > relevance to the contemporary world. We revisit the
case of Guinea, a > small West African nation that won its independence
from France in > 1958, because its local lessons enhance our
understanding of global > trends. While earlier studies have
reevaluated particular aspects of > the African nationalist experience,
none has attempted to integrate > these parts into a fully
reconceptualized whole. Building upon these > works, this article
elaborates a new framework in which to consider the > nationalist
movement of postwar Guinea. It raises theoretical and > methodological
issues that fundamentally alter the way in which we > understand
anticolonial nationalism in the non-Western world. 15 > > An
examination of the Guinean case leads to three theoretical >
conclusions. First, anticolonial nationalism, in many instances, >
embraces heterogeneous populations that are ethnically and religiously
> diverse. As such, it belongs to a progressive political tradition
that > one might call "inclusive nationalism."31 Second, while
anticolonial > nationalist movements have been led by educated elites,
often inspired > by European ideals, elites did not instigate the
anticolonial protests. > Rather, they built their base among popular
groups already engaged in > struggle against the colonial state. They
identified issues around > which the masses were already mobilizing and
incorporated them into the > nationalist agenda. These agendas were
successful largely because they > were deeply rooted in mass concerns,
rather than imposed from above or > outside. Third, conceptualizing the
nation was a two-way street. Masses > as well as elites had an impact
on the ideas, objectives, strategies, > and methods of the nationalist
leaders. While elites brought European > ideas and models of
nationalism to the table, the nonliterate majority > brought others
that were embedded in indigenous histories, practices, > and beliefs.32
16 > > Finally, an assessment of the Guinean case leads to an important
> observation about mobilizing methods. It shows us how people were >
mobilized?the mechanisms and processes by which mass mobilization >
occurred. While some indigenous cultural practices and images were co->
opted by elites and presented to the populace, the people themselves >
brought others to the movement. Again, we see that the masses were not
> simply an "audience" for elite-inspired nationalism, nor the >
"transmitters" of a message formulated for them.33 The songs and >
slogans employed by nonliterate people to communicate the nationalist >
message were not composed by party leaders on their behalf. Rather, >
people without formal education created these devices to communicate >
among themselves, to transmit their own messages to the elites, and to
> interpret elite messages in terms meaningful to themselves. 17 > >
The postwar Guinean movement, spearheaded by the RDA, was not > only
vehemently anticolonial, but also nationalist and inclusive. It > was
the conscious struggle to bridge ethnic, class, and gender >
differences that made the Guinean movement so effective and placed it >
squarely in the progressive political tradition of the European >
revolutionary era (1789?1848).34 Much of the Guinean population shared
> a precolonial history. A large proportion shared a religion. All had
> mutually understood experiences and grievances resulting from French
> colonialism. Together, these formed a common basis that allowed a >
nation to be forged from a multilingual, ethnically heterogeneous >
population. 18 > > While the movement's leadership was composed of
Western-educated > elites whose views of democracy and national self-
determination were > derived largely from European models, its strength
lay in its solid > support among peasants, workers, veterans, and
women. The Guinean > nationalist movement was successful because it
built its base among > these groups, which were already engaged in
anticolonial protest. It > was their grievances that drove the
nationalist agenda and their > energies that were harnessed in the
struggle for national independence.> 35 19 > > If grassroots activists
shaped Guinea's nationalist agenda, they > also influenced its form.
Indigenous cultural practices were adapted?by > elites and nonelites
alike?to transmit the new nationalist message. > While print media
contributed to the spread of nationalist ideas in > nineteenth-century
Europe, books and newspapers were less significant > in Guinea, where
mass education had yet to be realized. Mobilizing the > largely
nonliterate population required new methods of communication, > notably
songs, symbols, and uniforms. The majority of songs were > composed by
nonliterate women, who sang their nationalist message at > public water
taps, taxi stands, and marketplaces.36 Symbols and > uniforms also had
popular origins that spoke to mass sentiments and > were integral to
grassroots organizing efforts. 20 > > If nationalist historiography has
undergone a major transformation, so, > too, has the meaning of "the
nation." In 1882, the French philosopher > Ernest Renan contested the
nineteenth-century German romantic notion of > the nation as a
primordial, ethnically and culturally bound entity. The > nation is not
based upon race, ethnicity, language, or religion, he > wrote, but
rather on a shared past and a vision of a common future.37 > More than
a century later, Miroslav Hroch built upon these ideas, > arguing that
the nation is not an "eternal category, but ... the > product of a long
and complicated process of historical development" > that cannot be
reduced to an ethnicity or language group. Rather, Hroch > claims, the
nation is "a large social group integrated not by one but > by a
combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, >
political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical),
> and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness."38 >
Similarly, Benedict Anderson describes the nation as "an imagined >
political community" that is sovereign and contained within defined >
territorial boundaries. The community is "imagined" because most of its
> members are strangers to one another, yet they consider themselves >
bound together in emotional solidarity as well as in a sovereign >
political entity.39 21 > > According to these definitions of "the
nation," broader and more > nuanced than some that had previously
prevailed, Guinea in the postwar > period was unquestionably a nation-
in-the-making. More than any other > Guinean party, the RDA consciously
and successfully shaped a national > rather than an ethnic identity.40
Although characterized by its > opponents as a party of Malinke and
Susu with strong anti-Peul > undercurrents, the Guinean RDA prided
itself on its multiethnic > membership and its particular appeal to the
lower classes of all ethnic > groups. The party's allure for Néné
Diallo is a case in point. A low-> status cloth-dyer, Diallo was among
the first Peul women to join the > RDA. "The RDA welcomed everyone,"
she claimed. "It treated everyone > like family. It did not
discriminate against the downtrodden or the > poor." While many of her
family members joined opposing parties such as > the Bloc Africain de
Guinée and Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée, both > of which were led by
Peul notables, Diallo was adamant in her support > for the RDA.
Likening members of her ethnic group to family, Diallo > contended, > >
It all depended upon who helped me. The other ones did nothing for me >
... Diawadou [leader of the Bloc Africain de Guinée] is my kin. Barry >
III [leader of the Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée] is my kin ... Even
> if they were my mother, I would not support them ... Sékou worked for
> us. Allah and his Envoy are my witness. He told us he had no material
> things to offer, but he stood up for us and respected us. That is why
> we followed him ... Although Sékou did not give us anything, he cared
> for us.41 22 > > To build an inclusive nation, the Guinean RDA, under
the > leadership of Western-educated elites, constructed a broad
ethnic, > class, and gender alliance that was heir to a long European,
and > particularly French, tradition. With its emphasis on individual
rights > and liberties and government by the governed, it was, in part,
a > product of the European Enlightenment. As a mass movement for "the
self-> determination of peoples," popular sovereignty, and citizenship,
led by > an aspiring intellectual elite against an oppressive,
hierarchical > state, it was also an outgrowth of the French Revolution
and influenced > by subsequent European nationalist movements.42 Rather
than rejecting > the modern nation-state as an alien institution
imposed on African > society by colonial rule, nationalist leaders
charged that the state > had failed because its work was incomplete.
The colonial state was, in > Partha Chatterjee's words, "restricting
and even violating the true > principles of modern government" by
denying inalienable rights to > colonized peoples.43 23 > > The
presence of European ideas in African political thought was a > product
of French colonialism?the unintended outcome of French >
assimilationist policies. When Guinea was colonized in 1891, the >
colonial administration, along with its missionary assistants, embarked
> upon a self-described "civilizing mission" with the goal of >
transforming an elite corps of Africans into "Black Frenchmen." This >
small group of assimilated Africans, or évolués, would serve as >
intermediaries between the government and the populace and work in >
European-owned enterprises. With a strong emphasis on "practical" >
education, especially in the poorly funded, lower-echelon rural >
schools, the African curriculum was designed to be devoid of subjects >
that might develop thought and hone analytical skills. However, some >
European ideas infiltrated the curriculum, as colonial educators >
denigrated African cultures, deplored African customs, and ignored >
African history?in favor of that which was French.44 24 > > While many
évolués embraced French civilization, some of the most > assimilated
challenged French cultural hegemony with their own. As >
schoolchildren, they had been prohibited from speaking their own >
languages and denied the opportunity to explore their own pasts. The >
most successful among them were rewarded with higher education abroad.
> On the eve of World War II, an elite group of African and Caribbean >
intellectuals in Paris rebelled against their growing sense of >
rootlessness and alienation. Under the leadership of Léopold Senghor of
> Senegal and Aimé Césaire of Martinique, they launched the Négritude >
movement. While Europeans championed Western civilization as the >
epitome of human achievement, practitiotioners of Négritude pointed to
> the West's legacy of brutality, exploitation, and alienation. In >
contrast, they posited African cultures, which, they claimed, promoted
> peace, harmony, and community.45 Through poetry, essays, novels, and
> plays, these cultural nationalists stressed a common African essence,
a > system of shared values and beliefs that laid the foundations for >
nationalist movements in the political realm.46 25 > > Although few
Guineans achieved the educational qualifications > necessary to study
in France, the ideas of Négritude reached elites in > Guinea through
Senghor's literary and scholarly journal, Présence > Africaine.
Published simultaneously in Dakar and Paris, the journal was >
circulated among Western-educated intellectuals in Guinea.47 While the
> ideas promoted by Senghor and his colleagues certainly influenced
some > Guinean nationalists,48 proponents of class analysis, including
Sékou > Touré and interterritorial RDA leader Gabriel d'Arboussier,
rejected > the racially based theories of Négritude, claiming that they
obscured > the socioeconomic roots of oppression and distracted the
masses from > the class struggle.49 26 > > On the eve of World War II,
Négritude was joined by other > critiques of colonialism that had
germinated on African soil. These, > too, were influenced by European
ideas. Just as African intellectuals > in France challenged the
premises of assimilation, French intellectuals > in Africa defied the
mandate to only partially educate their African > charges. During the
Popular Front government of 1936?1938, a growing > number of French
teachers pushed the boundaries of the African > curriculum, extolling
the republican principles of liberty, equality, > and fraternity and
championing the universal rights of man. Moving onto > terrain
considered dangerous by both previous and subsequent > governments,
they taught the history of the French Revolution along > with practical
skills and the elements of literacy.50 27 > > The belief in the
universal rights of man, as embodied in French > civilization, was the
cornerstone of French assimilationist policies. > The 1789 "Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" promoted > radical ideas that
bolstered the Guinean nationalist cause. Those > exposed to the text
learned that "Men are born free and remain free and > equal in rights."
In striking contrast to their experience under French > colonialism,
they read that "The aim of all political association is > the
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man," >
including "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression."
> While their people were ruled by governmental decree, Guinean
students > learned that "Law is the expression of the general will.
Every citizen > has a right to take part personally or through his
representative in > its formation."51 Thus, the rows of African
schoolchildren who > dutifully chanted, "Nos Ancêtres les Gaulois"
imbibed revolutionary > lessons as well.52 Embracing the notion of
French universalism, African > elites incorporated many of its tenets
into their nationalist ideology. > African trade unionists and military
veterans, who seized upon French > claims of universalism to demand
equal treatment, were a critical > component of the Guinean nationalist
movement.53 28 > If the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789
laid the > foundations for European nationalist endeavors, the
continent-wide > revolutions of 1848 resulted in the widespread
building of modern > nation-states based on liberal republican ideals.
Struggling against > the tyranny of monarchs ruling over large
multiethnic empires, > proponents of European nationalism supported
their claims for national > independence by asserting that "no people
ought to be exploited and > ruled by another." While concurring that
certain fundamental features > distinguished one people from another,
they contended that those > differences were not reducible to ethnic or
linguistic traits.54 > According to Hobsbawm, "French nationality was
French citizenship: > ethnicity, history, the language or patois spoken
at home, were > irrelevant to the definition of `the nation.'"55 It was
assumed that > small ethnic groups would necessarily be joined into
larger, > economically and politically viable territorial states. It
was this > broad-based, multiethnic nationalism that took root in
Guinea a century > later. In Guinea, as in France, nationality was
equated with > citizenship, rather than ethnicity or language.56 29 > >
The foundations laid by the European Enlightenment and subsequent >
revolutions were built upon by French Communists. Because their >
opposition to imperialism resonated strongly with African >
intellectuals, members of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) had a >
tremendous influence on African elites educated during the 1930s and >
1940s.57 Since the establishment of the Popular Front government in >
1936, French Communists had worked in French West and Equatorial Africa
> as teachers, technicians, and military officers. They had taught at
the > prestigious federal school École Normale William Ponty in
Senegal, and > at the upper primary and vocational schools in Conakry
and other major > cities.58 They had helped to establish a number of
Groupes d'études > Communistes (GECs), where African intellectuals
studied Marxist-> Leninist theories and applied them to the political,
economic, and > social conditions of their own territories.59
Leadership and > organizational training were also provided by the
Communist-affiliated > trade union movement, the Confédération Générale
du Travail (CGT).60 > Numerous RDA stalwarts, including Sékou Touré,
emerged from the GEC/CGT > milieu, which deeply influenced their
organizing skills, strategies, > and ideology.61 They consciously
modeled the RDA's structure and > orientation on those of the PCF.62 It
was to French Communists, as much > as to nineteenth-century
nationalists, that the RDA owed the notion of > a broad-based
nationalist alliance forged from a heterogeneous, > sometimes divided,
population. 30 > > The construction of an inclusive nationalist
alliance was the product > of struggle. Guinea in the 1950s was
anything but a homogeneous > society. It was multilingual and
multiethnic and included people of > diverse religious backgrounds.
Despite the nation-building efforts of > party leaders, the battle to
forge an ethnic, class, and gender > alliance was fraught with tensions
and marred by setbacks. Female > emancipation, regional and ethnic
inclusiveness, and the growing role > of Western-educated elites were
heavily contested at the grassroots. > While RDA leaders remained
deeply committed to inclusive nation-> building, they struggled to
convince the swelling grassroots membership > on this point.63 While
tensions sometimes percolated to the surface, > there existed in Guinea
what Karl Deutsch calls a "wide complementarity > of social
communication," which allowed Guineans to "communicate more >
effectively" among themselves than with others who might speak the same
> languages and belong to the same ethnic groups.64 31 > > The
"complementarity of social communication" in Guinea was > predicated on
the territory's shared history. Parts of Guinea had been > incorporated
into multiethnic political, economic, religious, and > cultural systems
long before European conquest. For centuries, Malinke > trading
networks and their associated Muslim communities had connected >
diverse parts of what would become modern Guinea. Jallonke (Susu, >
Limba, Landuma, Baga, Bassari) and Fulbe (Peul and Tukulor) residents >
of the Futa Jallon traded extensively with coastal peoples.65 In the >
eighteenth century, the Fulbe jihads brought the Futa Jallon under >
unified political and religious control.66 In the nineteenth century, >
the politico-religious empires of the Tukulor leader, El-Hadj Umar b. >
Said Tall, and the Malinke leader, Samori Touré, brought together vast
> expanses of territory that included much of modern Guinea and its >
neighbors.67 Many Guineans had, in Hobsbawm's words, "the consciousness
> of ... having belonged to a lasting political entity."68 This legacy
of > political, economic, religious, and cultural interaction linked >
Guineans to one another and to peoples in neighboring territories.69 >
32 > > Precolonial African political leaders, particularly those who
had > resisted French conquest, were championed by the postwar
nationalist > movement?their subjugation and enslavement of African
peoples > minimized, if not erased from historical memory.70 Samori
Touré was > particularly revered for his seventeen-year conflict with
the French, > which had staved off colonial rule for nearly two decades.
71 To > Guineans during the nationalist period, Samori was promoted not
as a > Malinke leader, but as a common ancestor who belonged to all
Guineans.> 72 33 > > The Guinean RDA skillfully used the history of
resistance to > colonial conquest to rally people to the leadership of
its secretary-> general, Sékou Touré, a great-grandson of Samori Touré,
and to inspire > renewed resistance to colonial rule.73 Making a veiled
reference to > Samori's enslavement of conquered peoples, the RDA
noted, "If Samory > Touré can make you slaves, Sékou Touré can make you
free."74 The party > also promoted other historic resisters,
consciously selecting > representatives from Guinea's major regions and
ethnic groups.75 Among > the most prominent were rival Peul politico-
religious leaders from the > Futa Jallon, Almamy Bokar Biro Barry of
Timbo and Chief Alfa Yaya > Diallo of Labé; N'Zébéla Togba Pivi, a Loma
war chief from the forest > region; and Cerno Aliou, the Wali of Gumba,
a Peul religious leader > whose egalitarian Islamic movement attracted
the lower classes and was > crushed by the colonial administration.76
34 > > If a common past was one unifying factor in Guinea, shared >
religion?at least by a substantial majority?was another. Nearly three->
quarters of the Guinean population was Muslim, while a significant >
minority was Christian.77 Christian missionaries had attracted some >
converts among the Baga (subsequently incorporated into the Susu) in >
the coastal areas. They had had some success in the forest region, >
which, apart from Malinke trading communities, Islam had failed to >
penetrate. However, they had made little headway among devout Muslims >
in Upper Guinea and the Futa Jallon. Other Christians in Guinea >
included civil servants from diverse parts of the French empire, along
> with their descendants. Apart from Muslims and Christians, a minority
> of the population, particularly in the coastal and forest regions, >
continued to practice indigenous religions.78 35 > > Despite the fact
that the colonizers were largely Christian, the > nationalist movement
did not assume an anti-Christian fervor. Rather > than lashing out at
Christian infidels, RDA leaders, like others in > Africa and Asia,
stressed the positive attributes of Islam and their > compatibility
with the nationalist program.79 An article in the Guinean > RDA
newspaper, La Liberté, noted "the total identity of the RDA's >
programme of emancipation with the liberating principles of justice and
> hope in Islam."80 A regular attendee at Friday religious services, >
Sékou Touré frequented a different mosque each week, widely publicizing
> his relationship with Islam. During Friday prayers, worshipers were >
reminded of the commonalities between adherents of Islam and the RDA. >
Prayers such as the following drew parallels between the struggles of >
the two communities: > > God is great> It is hard> To bring
unbelievers> Into the brotherhood of believers> But we need the die-
hards> To spur us on.> Verses from the first chapter of the Qurn (the
fatiha) were commonly > recited at RDA meetings and for workers during
highly politicized > strikes. 81 Islamic practices?including Qurnic
readings, the daily > regimen of prayers, and religious festivals and
holy days?provided the > common symbols, rituals, and collective
practices that, in Hobsbawm's > words, gave "a palpable reality to
otherwise imaginary community." 82 > 36 > > If some of these practices
were initiated by RDA leaders, others > clearly emanated from the
grassroots. In a manuscript based largely on > interviews with female
militants, Idiatou Camara notes that at baptisms > and other
gatherings, RDA women recited verses from the fatiha to > "curse the
traitors of the fatherland" and to bind loyalists to the > party.
Whenever a member of a rival party was converted to the RDA, he > or
she ate the "bread of fatiha," over which those assembled had > intoned
Qurnic verses "to express their firm conviction and faith in > the
RDA." 83 37 > > The close association of Sékou Touré's work with
Allah's Will was > another politico-religious practice of local origin.
Grassroots > activists readily linked the names of Sékou Touré, Allah,
and Mohammed. > Recalling the day she was recruited into the RDA,
Aissatou N'Diaye > reminisced that she and Mafory Bangoura had been
called to a meeting > with Sékou Touré: > > Upon our arrival, he asked
us to help him mobilize women ... He also > said that he had nothing
material, not money or gold, to offer in > return. If the women would
help him, they would do it for the love of > Allah, his Envoy, and
their cause ... He asked us to do this work in > the name of Allah and
his Prophet, Mohammed.84> Similarly, police reports describe groups of
RDA members crisscrossing > the capital city, "singing praises to the
Blessed of Allah, Sékou > Touré."85 In one song, women beseeched Allah
to bless Sékou Touré, > "savior of the orphans and the Muslims."86 In
another, party members > proclaimed that both God and his Prophet
favored the elephant?the > emblem of both Sékou Touré and the RDA: > >
> > God wants the elephant> Muhammad the Prophet wants the elephant>
You went to Paris> You returned from Paris> Your face shows> That even
the people of Paris> Want the elephant.87> At the funeral of M'Balia
Camara, the RDA's first woman martyr, party > officials were followed
by a procession of men, women, and children > singing RDA songs and
chanting verses of the Qurn mingled with the name > of Sékou Touré. 88
38 > > If Islam was a binding force, so too were pre-Islamic religious
> practices. Grassroots activists, rather than party leaders, first >
associated indigenous religious beliefs and symbols with the >
nationalist cause. 89 Numerous accounts link the RDA to Bassikolo, a >
spirit represented by a sacred tree in the Conakry neighborhood of >
Tumbo. Revered as the guardian of women and children, Bassikolo was >
believed to grant them wishes, to protect them from illness, and to >
ensure women's fertility. Just as some women read from the Qurn to >
convene RDA and trade union meetings, others began by asking for >
Bassikolo's assistance. They also sought his help during electoral >
campaigns, beseeching him to aid in the party's triumph. 90 After >
sweeping electoral victories in 1956, for instance, the RDA >
neighborhood committee in Tumbo organized a dance in Bassikolo's honor.
> Before a crowd of some two thousand people, speakers thanked the
spirit > for helping the party realize its electoral goals and
requested his > continued assistance in the future. 91 39 > > According
to Fatou Khimely, women who invoked Bassikolo > customarily assumed
male garb and social roles. To call forth the > spirit for the new
political endeavor, women also "wore trousers and > cursed the enemies
of the RDA."92 Women's assumption of male clothing > and gender roles
in times of crisis was rooted in precolonial cultural > practices. In
the forest region, for instance, women historically took > collective
action against men who abused their wives and failed to mend > their
ways. Dressed as male warriors and armed with sharp knives they >
called "penis cutters," women surrounded the offending parties' homes.
> While the women pounded on the buildings with clubs, no man dared to
> show his face.93 This precolonial gender practice, and its extension
to > the political realm under colonial rule, bears a striking
resemblance > to that of Igbo women in southeastern Nigeria, where,
Judith Van Allen > notes, "making war" or "sitting on a man" was
women's "ultimate > sanction."94 40 > > If many Guineans shared a
precolonial history and religious and > cultural practices, all were
bound by the common history of French > colonialism. Even before
Guinea's colonization, Renan recognized that > "suffering in common
unifies more than joy does." He noted that shared > grievances are the
critical constituent of national memories because > "they impose
duties, and require a common effort." In fact, he claimed, > a nation
is "a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of > the
sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is >
prepared to make in the future."95 41 > > Despite Renan's prescient
words, French officials failed to > recognize the uniunifying power of
shared suffering under colonialism. > To the government, "Guinea" was
merely an "administrative unit," with > no natural claim to nation-
statehood.96 From the perspective of > ethnicity, linguistics, and
geography, its borders were arbitrary. > Historically, the logic of its
boundaries corresponded with nothing > more than the extent of imperial
conquest and "effective occupation," > legitimized by the General Act
of the 1884?1885 Berlin Conference.97 > However, Hobsbawm writes, "The
unity imposed by conquest and > administration might ... produce a
people that saw itself as a > `nation.'"98 Such was the case in Guinea.
42 > > The people of Guinea experienced French colonialism as Guineans?
> not as Malinkes, Susus, or Peuls. They were subjected to taxation, >
forced labor, military conscription, and the arbitrary "justice" of the
> indigénat as Africans, not as members of particular ethnic groups.99
As > Guineans, they participated in the same political and economic
systems, > within geographic boundaries created by the colonial power.
Despite > their variety in language and ethnicity, they shared symbols,
memories, > and historical experiences that permitted them to
communicate more > effectively with other Guineans than with outsiders.
Increasingly > during the 1950s, this shared experience was reflected
in their > collective consciousness of themselves as Guineans.100 43 >
> The Guinean RDA was by no means the only postwar African movement >
to promote national over regional and ethnic identity and to root >
national identity in shared suffering under colonialism. However, it >
was among the first. Kevin Dunn's observations concerning the >
nationalist ideology of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba are apt for >
the Guinean RDA, which led Guinea to independence nearly two years >
before the Congo achieved its own. Influenced by the anticolonial, >
nationalist, and Pan-African ideas that prevailed at the All-African >
People's Conference convened by Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, and others
> in December 1958, Lumumba emphasized national over ethnic and
regional > identity, accepting "the colonially constructed space of the
Congo" as > the basis of an independent nation-state.101 While his
rivals > "privileged smaller, fragmented spaces bound by ethnicity,
language, or > regional memories, Lumumba tied Congolese identity to
the larger > colonially demarcated space of the Congo." In an effort to
create a > unified identity for people of diverse ethnic origins from
all parts of > the territory, Lumumba "ground[ed] Congolese identity in
the collective > social memories of suffering at the hands of Belgian
colonizers."102 In > Guinea, the RDA had promoted a similar inclusive
nationalist > philosophy. 44 > > If the shared history of the Guinean
people was rooted in the > precolonial past and strengthened by the
common experience of > colonialism, the identity of Guinea as a nation
was still developing in > the late colonial period. France, like other
colonial powers, > maintained control through policies of divide and
rule. Existent social > cleavages were reinforced, and new ones
created, through colonial > policies. Layers of African intermediaries?
government-appointed chiefs, > colonial soldiers, and police?became the
focal point of popular anger, > diverting attention from the Europeans
at the reins of power. It was > the task of Guinea's nationalist
leaders to shift the focus and > demonstrate common cause.103 45 > >
Although Guinea had the makings of a nation-state, the postwar >
anticolonial movement was not automatically a nationalist one. Rather,
> it was consciously molded as such. Nation-building was a long,
arduous > process that began during the anticolonial struggle and
continued after > political independence. According to John Breuilly,
"the nation" was > not only "a body of citizens claiming independence
on the basis of > universal human rights," it was also "a project, a
unity to be > fashioned out of the fight for independence and in the
new era of > freedom."104 It was the conscious struggle to bridge
ethnic, class, and > gender divisions?and the ultimate success of that
endeavor?that made > the nationalist movement in Guinea so
extraordinary. 46 > > Who were the actors in this remarkable movement
of masses and elites? > Guinea's nationalist leaders, who articulated
the broad-based > progressive nationalism of revolutionary Europe, were
the product of > French assimilation policies, as well as a colonial
educational system > that was limited in both scope and substance.
Graduates of programs > designed to create an elite cadre?rather than a
mass?of "Black > Frenchmen," they belonged to a select, almost
exclusively male, > fraternity. While most went no further than primary
school in their > home regions, those who progressed to more advanced
schooling in the > capital found peers of diverse ethnic origins from
across the > territory. As new friendships were cemented through the
new vernacular > (French), ethnic barriers were weakened and cast
aside. These new > Western-educated elites increasingly thought of
themselves as Guinean, > rather than Malinke, Susu, or Peul.105 47 > >
In postwar Guinea, formal education remained the luxury of a few, > and
that education was rudimentary. There was no schooling beyond lower >
primary (sixth grade) in most parts of the country, and no education >
beyond upper primary (ninth grade) anywhere in the territory. The >
largest administrative districts were equipped with lower primary >
schools (écoles primaires élémentaires), which provided a maximum of >
six years of schooling to those who could afford it. Possession of a >
lower primary school certificate, certificat d'études primaires >
élémentaires (CEP), was sufficient for employment in the cadre >
subalterne, the lowest rung of the French civil service. Another three
> years of education were provided by the upper primary school (école >
primaire supérieure [EPS]) in the capital city. EPS graduates joined >
the middle-level government cadres (cadres moyens or cadres locaux). At
> the end of World War II, Guinea possessed only one upper primary
school > and one vocational school, both in Conakry. In 1945, with a
population > of just over two million, Guinea had only 7,900 pupils in
upper and > lower primary and vocational schools. Of the total, 7,417
were in the > lower primary grades, and only 606 of these were girls.
106 Thus, at the > end of World War II, the number of Guinean évolués
was minuscule?and > virtually all of them were male. 48 > > Students
seeking education beyond the primary grades had to leave > Guinea. Each
year, a small number of EPS graduates won the right to > attend one of
the highly selective federal schools, which drew the best > and the
brightest from all the territories of French West Africa. The > most
prestigious of the federal schools was the école Normale William >
Ponty, located near Dakar, Senegal.107 Ponty students were trained to >
be teachers, assistant doctors, and assistant pharmacists, and for >
other civil service posts in the cadre commun secondaire. Although they
> constituted the elite among African civil servants, Ponty graduates >
could never rise to the top of the civil service system. Their diplomas
> had no equivalence outside French West Africa. Thus, they could not >
accede to the cadre supérieur, reserved for those with French diplomas.
> 108 With its relatively undeveloped educational system, postwar
Guinea > boasted very few Ponty graduates. In 1948, for instance, only
eleven > new Guinean students were admitted to the school.109 49 > >
Given the paucity of private investment, discrimination by > European-
owned enterprises, and obligations stemming from state-> subsidized
studies, most Western-educated Africans joined the colonial >
bureaucracy. They served in a wide range of civil service positions, as
> teachers, clerks, and accountants; postal, telegraph, and telephone >
workers; and assistant doctors, pharmacists, and veterinarians.110 >
Because they were invested in the colonial system?and risked their >
livelihoods if they contested state policies?many civil servants, >
especially those in the highest ranks, joined officially sanctioned >
regional and ethnic parties and supported government directives. Most >
Ponty graduates fell within this category.111 Hence, Morgenthau notes,
> Guinean RDA leaders frequently "accused the Ponty graduates of >
betraying the masses, and called them the valets of the administration."
> 112 50 > > The relatively privileged position of federal school
graduates in > the colonial system was one reason that they were
generally hostile to > the RDA. Class snobbery was another. Many
considered the Guinean RDA > leader, Sékou Touré, to be beneath them.
113 Sékou Touré had attended > Qurnic school, lower primary school, and
the vocational school in > Conakry. When he entered the civil service,
he became a postal clerk. > Continuing his studies by correspondence,
he ultimately qualified to > work as an accountant in the Treasury. 114
Despite his comparatively > advanced level of education, Sékou Touré
was derided by his more > credentialed rivals as an "illiterate," or at
most a man with "a sixth-> grade education." Even among his supporters,
there was sometimes a note > of disdain. A Peul aristocrat, Ponty
graduate, and teacher, Bocar Biro > Barry was unusual in his support
for the RDA. 115 When he discussed > Sékou Touré, however, his
assessment was tinged with elitism: "Sékou > was practically
illiterate. He only had the CEP ... [His rivals] said, > `Sékou, who is
that? That's an illiterate. He doesn't know anything.' > Because,
effectively, he was self-taught. You know, as a diploma, he > only had
the certificat d'études [primaires élémentaires]." 116 51 > > Although
some Ponty graduates joined the RDA, most Guinean RDA > leaders were
the product of lower state schools. Equipped with only > primary school
certificates, they staffed the lower echelons of the > colonial
bureaucracy. Accorded a modicum of privilege that > distinguished them
from the nonliterate masses, but not enough to > render them equal to
Frenchmen, this class of intended collaborators > grew increasingly
frustrated by their unequal treatment and inability > to rise above the
lowest ranks of government service.117 Commenting on > the uncertain
loyalty of these lower-level elites, the governor of > Guinea observed,
"The most dubious elements are found among the semi-> évolués, who
sometimes have a fault-finding, duplicitous attitude, and > who are on
the lookout for any occasion to criticize and make demands."> 118 It
was these angry intellectuals who first agitated for a greater > voice
in political affairs and then spearheaded opposition to colonial >
rule. 52 > > If elites are the first to imagine a nation, they cannot
make their > vision a reality without the support of a mass movement.
The > nationalist program, by its very nature, requires an alliance of
> divergent interests?an "imagined community" of comrades that masks
any > exploitation and inequality within it.119 In Guinea, the RDA's
success > was due to its ability to form a formidable ethnic, class,
and gender > alliance. It was this broad-based alliance that made the
Guinean RDA a > mass movement and permitted it to trump rivals that
were constrained by > their narrow ethnic, regional, and elite male
focus. 53 > > While the nationalist movement in Guinea was led by
intellectual > elites with their own vision of "the nation," it was
first and foremost > a movement of the masses?of peasants, workers,
veterans, and women. The > RDA did not introduce these actors to
politics. Rather, during World > War II and its aftermath, these groups
instigated a panoply of > anticolonial actions. Here I take issue with
Breuilly, who contends > that nationalist leaders generally "forge
links with large parts of the > population hitherto uninvolved in
politics," and Tom Nairn, who asserts > that the emergence of modern
nationalism "was tied to the political > baptism of the lower classes."
120 I argue instead that the Guinean RDA > targeted social groups
already engaged in struggle against the colonial > state: military
veterans and urban workers fighting for equality with > their
metropolitan counterparts; male and female peasants burdened by > the
war effort and the demands of government-appointed chiefs; and > urban
women unable to provide for their families during the postwar >
economic crisis. Embracing the particular causes of these social >
groups, the RDA harnessed their energies and enticed them into the >
broader nationalist movement.121 54 > > Key to the RDA's success was
its focus on groups that had already > mobilized themselves. It forged
an unlikely alliance through consistent > focus on areas of common
interest determined by the groups involved: > forced labor in the rural
areas; abuses by government-appointed chiefs; > racial discrimination
in wages, benefits, and social services; and the > promotion of health,
sanitation, and educational programs and > facilities. While other
political parties concentrated on so-called > "traditional" elites?
chiefs, notables, and their allies?the RDA > consciously focused on the
majority of the population, polling their > grievances and channeling
their discontent. 55 > > In the case of labor, active opposition to
state demands began > during the war, when thousands of forced laborers
resisted the > impositions of the war effort by deserting their
workplaces.122 When > forced labor was officially abolished in April
1946, tens of thousands > of rural workers vacated their stations en
masse. Official records > reveal an extraordinary picture of labor
unrest throughout the > territory.123 This rural-based labor activity
predated the trade union > organizing that swept the urban areas in the
late 1940s and early > 1950s. While they focused on the urban rather
than the rural areas, > trade unions attempted to harness the popular
discontent of workers > that emanated from the grassroots. The RDA, in
turn, built a powerful > base in the urban working class. 56 > >
Likewise, it was the rural populace, rather than RDA leaders, who >
initiated popular resistance to the colonial chieftaincy. Serving as >
local agents of the colonial administration, canton and village chiefs
> forcibly recruited labor and military conscripts, requisitioned cash
> crops, and exacted onerous taxes from the rural population. They >
frequently abused their powers for personal ends, extorting labor, >
cash, crops, and livestock for their own use. Rural women, who were >
forced to perform much of the chiefs' unpaid labor and frequently were
> subjected to sexual abuse, were among the most vociferous and active
> opponents of the chieftaincy. So, too, were returning military >
veterans. Forcibly conscripted from the rural areas, these men had >
suffered devastating wartime experiences and postwar deprivations. >
Inspired by anti-fascist and anti-Nazi rhetoric, angered by their >
unequal treatment in comparison to their French counterparts, many >
veterans were deeply resentful of colonial authorities?be they European
> or African.124 57 > > For the most part, colonial chiefs staunchly
opposed the RDA, > which seriously undermined their power base. With
significant coercive > powers at the local level, they were the primary
obstacle to RDA > expansion in the rural areas. Capitalizing on
preexisting rural > sentiment, the RDA helped to articulate grievances
against the chiefs > and coordinate the spontaneous actions of the
population. Although it > was the RDA, within the framework of limited
self-government, that > abolished the institution of the chieftaincy in
1957, it was a decade-> long popular revolt that made that action
possible.125 Had the > institution survived, the referendum that
brought national independence > in 1958 might well have had a different
outcome.126 58 > > The first Guinean leaders to understand the
importance of mass > politics and the necessity of building a popular
base were not the > Ponty-educated intellectuals. Rather, they were
trade union leaders, > whose lives were closely linked to those of the
nonliterate masses. Few > of these men had advanced beyond lower
primary or technical school. > Even fewer had had opportunities to
study outside of Guinea. The most > prescient of these leaders was
Sékou Touré. In 1945, Sékou Touré, then > a young postal clerk, helped
to establish a trade union for African > postal, telegraph, and
telephone workers.127 The following year, he > organized the Union des
Syndicats Confédérés de Guinée, which brought > together all the
Guinean affiliates of the French Communist Party?> linked CGT. The CGT
unions united workers of various ethnicities and > civil service
rankings, as well as previously neglected "auxiliaries," > who had no
permanent civil service status.128 In 1948, Sékou Touré > toured the
territory, making contact with skilled and unskilled workers > and
Western-educated civil servants. He instigated the establishment of >
CGT branches in most of the major administrative districts.129 By 1952,
> the Guinean CGT boasted some three thousand members in twenty >
affiliated unions.130 59 > > While the CGT unions included Western-
educated civil servants, > they were dominated numerically by
nonliterate workers. It was the deep > involvement of Sékou Touré with
the latter that distinguished him from > many of his peers. According
to Bocar Biro Barry, Sékou Touré "created > his trade union from the
illiterates." He organized domestic servants, > dock workers,
laundrymen, and orderlies. Gradually, he added low-level > government
clerks. The CGT unions, in turn, served as the base for his > political
organizing. According to Barry, > > It was in this way that he created
his trade union. It was in this way > that he created his party. He
found the elements of his party through > the trade union?because the
party was created from domestic servants, > dock workers, and orderlies
... He first put himself at the level of > the lowliest people in order
to try to climb ... He was much smarter > than [his opponents]. He
began with nothing. He said, "We are the poor. > I am with the poor.
The teachers, they are bourgeois. The doctors, they > are bourgeois.
They are the big intellectuals. They speak a language > that you don't
understand. I come, we speak in Susu. We speak in > Maninka. We
understand one another." This is how, little by little, he > won the
little man of the streets. He launched his party from his trade > union.
131> The Guinean RDA, like the CGT, was built from a mass base. Despite
> periodic internal struggles stemming from conflicting interests
brought > together in a single alliance, the party remained united
throughout the > preindependence period. 60 > > Although the masses
were rallied to the nationalist cause by > intellectual elites, the
process was not unidirectional. Masses as well > as elites
conceptualized and mobilized the nation. Nairn is correct in > his
claim that common people were "the ultimate recipients of the new >
message"?and responsible for much of its content.132 Their languages >
had to be spoken, their cultural forms respected, and their grievances
> addressed, or intellectual appeals would fall on deaf ears. Unlike >
rival parties, the Guinean RDA attained its strength by addressing >
preexisting popular grievances and promoting solutions for them. Thus,
> it was local-level actors who determined many of the basic claims on
> the nationalist agenda. 61 > > Just as the concerns of the African
masses influenced the demands > of the African elites, nationalist
thought was transformed on African > soil. Africans did not simply
import European concepts and adopt them > as their own.133 Like its
European counterpart, African nationalism was > rooted in indigenous
"cultural systems" that predated the nationalist > struggle.134 On both
continents, indigenous "cultural and political > traditions," as well
as "memories, myths, symbols and vernacular forms > of expression,"
were harnessed to the nationalist agenda.135 Obviously, > those in
Africa differed significantly from those in Europe. 62 > > African
models diverged from European in other ways as well. > Hobsbawm,
Anderson, and Ernest Gellner stress the importance of mass > education
and "print capitalism" to the success of European nationalist >
movements.136 During the "Age of Revolution" (1789?1848), Europe >
experienced a dramatic growth in popular education. Books and >
newspapers increasingly were written in vernacular languages, rather >
than foreign tongues understood by only a tiny minority.137 According >
to Anderson, the widespread availability of printed material?and >
people's ability to read it?"made it possible for rapidly growing >
numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves >
to others, in profoundly new ways." These phenomena generated large >
literate populations who could imagine new kinds of communities, along
> with the technical means to mobilize them.138 63 > > Critiquing
Anderson, Anne McClintock contends that "mass national > commodity
spectacle," rather than print capitalism, has been modern >
nationalism's driving force. Nationalism is "invented and performed" >
through spectacle, she argues. It "takes shape through the visible, >
ritual organization of fetish objects" such as flags, uniforms, >
anthems, and mass rallies?in other words, "the myriad forms of popular
> culture." It is this mass spectacle that creates "a sense of popular,
> collective unity."139 64 > > McClintock's analysis is particularly
apt for the colonized > world, where print capitalism and mass
education were significantly > less important than in Europe. In the
case of Guinea, party tracts and > newspapers, written exclusively in
French, were not widely circulated > outside the urban areas. Yet the
population was predominantly rural-> based and non-French-speaking.
Moreover, the percentage of the > population that could actually read
was minute?and overwhelmingly male. > Grievances, demands, and calls
for popular mobilization, while > articulated in the party press, had
to be carried to the masses through > other, largely aural and visual,
means.140 65 > > Mass spectacle was a critical feature of Guinean
nationalism. > Party elites and nonliterate militants constructed a
vision of national > unity through enormous rallies and intensive
campaigning in the rural > areas. Party slogans, symbols, uniforms,
and, most importantly, song > were the critical means by which the
population communicated the > anticolonial message and created an
imagined political community. The > party color (white) was sported at
large public rallies, which often > numbered two thousand or more.
Speakers appealed to popular sentiment > through culturally rooted
images, anecdotes, and parables.141 In order > to promote unity between
people of diverse socioeconomic and ethnic > backgrounds, the Guinean
RDA adopted a uniform.142 It selected as its > party symbol Syli, the
powerful elephant "who does not forget," the > mighty king of the
beasts.143 The elephant was featured in countless > songs, and on RDA
women's bracelets, necklaces, and wrappers. Posters > sporting hand-
drawn elephants were plastered on walls and waved in >
demononstrations. Ballot designs were also aimed toward the nonliterate
> population, the white RDA ballot emblazoned with an elephant.144 66 >
> While Gellner, Anderson, and Anthony D. Smith imply that it was > the
party elites who devised popular means to appeal to the masses,145 >
evidence from Guinea indicates that the nonliterate population created
> as well as received the nationalist message. Local activists inspired
> the party color and produced the uniforms and songs. Former RDA >
militants Léon Maka and Mira Baldé contend that the party color and >
uniform were primarily popular in origin. Maka attributed them to the >
RDA women's leader, Mafory Bangoura?a cloth-dyer and seamstress without
> formal schooling?and to rank-and-file members of the RDA women's >
committees; the role of Sékou Touré's wife was only tertiary.146 >
Uniforms brought people together and strengthened their sense of >
collective identity, Maka claimed. How ever, because RDA members were >
generally from the lower classes, they could not afford expensive >
material. "There was no money. Cloth cost a lot," Maka recalled. "RDA >
women?market women?wore inexpensive cloth, while our adversaries wore >
large boubous made from luxury cloth, like silk." Since RDA women could
> not afford silk?or large quantities of any material?Maka observed, >
> Andrée Touré and Mafory Bangoura made blouses that went just to the >
waist. These were called temuray. They were made out of percale, an >
inexpensive cloth. The wrapper was dyed in the fashion of the country.
> The [women] cloth-dyers did this with indigo. They gathered the
indigo > leaves in the bush and beat them with pestles. It was the
women who > decided that the blouse should be white. When the men saw
that the > women had adopted white, they, too, automatically began to
wear it. > Eventually, it became the national color of the RDA.
Everyone wore it > on public occasions. This was not done by decree
from above. No, it was > the people who decided to do it.> Mira Baldé
concluded, "And white was easy, because it was common. > Percale was
white. It did not cost much. So it was easy for the masses > to obtain."
147 67 > > Grassroots actors brought ideas, practices, and methods to
the > nationalist movement that dramatically reshaped the whole. As the
above > example illustrates, African women were central to this
process. While > women's formative influence on African nationalist
movements has been > the subject of some scholarly inquiry, these
studies have had little > impact on nationalist theory more generally.
148 As McClintock notes, > "theories of nationalism have tended to
ignore gender as a category > constitutive of nationalism itself."149
And yet nationalisms emerge > "through social contests that are ...
always gendered."150 Proposing a > feminist theory of nationalism,
McClintock advocates "bringing into > historical visibility women's
active cultural and political > participation in national formations."
151 68 > > Making women's participation visible requires a shift in
focus > from the literate elite to the nonliterate base, where women
were the > preeminent creators and performers of mass national
spectacle. As > Geiger demonstrates for the nationalist movement in
colonial Tanzania, > "women's work" included the creation and
performance of nationalism > through song and dance.152 Similarly, in
Guinea, RDA women proudly wore > their party uniforms as they sang and
danced the nationalist message. > Oral transmission of information was
crucial to the success of the RDA, > which targeted the large mass of
Guineans who had little or no formal > education. As traditional
storytellers and singers, women were deemed > the best sloganeers. They
were the practiced creators of ideas, images, > and phrases that
appealed to the nonelite population.153 69 > > Most significantly, it
was nonliterate women who composed the > songs that spread the
nationalist message throughout the territory.154 > "The women composed
these songs," claimed Fatou Kéïta, a Susu > seamstress. "They did it
spontaneously. There was not one author. When > somebody found a song,
they sang it. The next person heard it and sang > it, and so on. It
spread like that."155 Néné Diallo, a Peul cloth-dyer, > agreed: "There
were countless songs Day after day, songs were made up. > Everyone sang
songs. We repeated the songs of others as they did ours."> 156 Fatou
Diarra, a former militant of Malinke and Senegalese descent, > recalled
precisely how women mobilized through song: > > Women went to the
markets every day If there was a new song, all the > women learned it
and sang it in the taxis, teaching one another. When > there was an
event, the leader went to the market with the song to > teach it to the
other women.> After the 1954 elections, women sang at the markets that
the > colonial authorities had rigged the elections. "You women who go
up, > You women who go down. The other party has stolen our votes,
Stolen the > votes of Syli." All the women sang this song, so by the
time they heard > the election results, they already knew that they had
been cheated, > that the election had been rigged.157 70 > > The June
1954 National Assembly elections, which pitted Sékou > Touré against
Barry Diawadou, were deemed fraudulent by independent > outside
observers. The official pronouncement of Barry Diawadou as the > winner
fueled public anger against the state.158 The message of > betrayal?and
steadfast adherence to the people's choice?was spread > through song.
Aissatou N'Diaye, an RDA activist of Tukulor-Senegalese > ancestry,
remembered the intense local reaction to the official > results: > >
When it was said that Sékou had lost, there was a popular revolt ... >
Sékou was not in Conakry; he was campaigning in the interior ... We >
prepared songs for his return. We gathered at Fanta Camara's to prepare
> the songs. We asked the crowd to make up a song that would be sung
... > He came at dusk or late afternoon ... By then the song was known
to > everyone in town, even to vagabonds. The song went like this:> > >
> The saboteurs said they were the leaders> Whereas Mr. Touré said he
is not the leader> But he gets to lead the country> Look, people, at
the RDA> Look, people, at the RDA> RDA women, unite> Laugh with me,
Touré> Laugh with me, Touré.159> Another song composed for the
occasion, which was punctuated by mooing > cows, derided Barry
Diawadou's alleged victory as a fraud effected by > inflated voter
rolls. Vote rigging was deemed particularly notorious in > the Futa
Jallon, the candidate's home and bastion of the Peul > aristocracy.
Swaying and mooing like a cow, N'Diaye demonstrated how > the people
had sung: > > > > Look, people, at Barry Diawadou> Look, people, at
Barry Diawadou> The cows have voted for you in the Futa> "Mbu, mbe," we
don't want you.160> When Sékou Touré arrived in Conakry, a crowd of
some 30,000 supporters > received him, crying, "Syli! Syli!" and
singing: > > > > The elephant has entered the city> Yes, the elephant
has arrived> The city is full> Because the elephant has arrived.161>
Women sang and danced all night in front of Sékou Touré's home, >
informing the world that despite the official results, Sékou Touré?the
> mighty elephant?was the people's choice.162 71 > > With song as their
chosen medium, RDA women praised the party, > ridiculed the opposition,
and commented on recent political events. The > songs' idiom and
content provide a window into the popular culture that > sustained the
nationalist movement. Sexually charged lyrics were > common. Some were
meant to shame political laggards, others to mock > political rivals.
Publicly disgracing hesitant or retrograde men, women > humiliated them
through songs that questioned their virility.163 Police > reports
describe RDA women, in groups of a hundred or more, parading > through
the capital city, carrying banners, singing political songs, > and
casting aspersions on Sékou Touré's chief rival, Barry Diawadou. >
Diawadou frequently was derided as being cowardly and uncircumcised?a >
mere boy rather than a real man.164 In one such song, he was accused of
> having fled from the capital city, an RDA stronghold, to the relative
> safety of the interior: > > > > Barry Diawadou left Conakry> To go to
Upper Guinea> Because he found> That Syli is always in the lead> Barry
was slapped like a dog> The penis of Barry> Is circumcised this time!
165> Although their political content was new, songs that ridiculed the
> virility of their male targets were in keeping with long-standing >
practices among Susu women. Historically, Susu women had used sexually
> explicit songs and dances to publicly humiliate and sanction men who
> had abused their wives. Party leaders?generally Western-educated male
> elites?were embarrassed by these practices and tried, unsuccessfully,
> to discourage them.166 The popular origin of this critical means of >
communication is thus beyond dispute. 72 > > The waves of anticolonial
protest that swept the African and Asian > continents in the postwar
decade were an amalgamation of elite and > popular politics. Manifold
acts of anticolonial resistance contributed > to the development of
full-fledged movements for national self-> determination and
independence. Many of these movements belonged to the > progressive
political tradition of "inclusive nationalism," in which > ethnically
and religiously diverse peoples were mobilized into a single >
nationalist movement. The product of both European and indigenous >
ideals, the nationalist movements were led by educated elites, but they
> were firmly grounded in the urban and rural populace. Only those >
movements that generated mass support were successful in bringing about
> national independence. Their leaders focused on population groups >
already engaged in anticolonial resistance and mobilized around >
grievances that these groups had previously identified. The momentum >
galvanized by the grassroots was thus directed toward the nationalist >
cause. While the lower classes responded to elite appeals, they also >
brought their own ideas and objectives to the anticolonial struggle. >
They employed strategies and methods that spoke to their concerns and >
images that resonated with their cultures. Thus, nationalist >
mobilization was neither top down nor bottom up. It was, unequivocally,
> both. 73 > > Guinea's postwar nationalist movement, led by the
Rassemblement > Démocratique Africain, was emblematic of these trends.
The Guinean RDA > strove to build a nation from a population that was
ethnically and > linguistically heterogeneous. Party leaders focused on
that which was > common to the largest number of people: a shared
precolonial history, > religion, and experience of French colonialism.
From this common past, > a future as one nation was imagined, and the
struggle to realize it was > launched. Although they were mobilized by
elites into the nationalist > movement, "ordinary Guineans" were not
passive recipients of ideas > instilled from above. They brought their
own ideas and experiences to > the table, informing the ways in which
nationalism was understood. The > methods of mobilization, like the
contents of the message, were > influenced by the grassroots. Lower
classes as well as elites adapted > indigenous cultural forms for new
purposes and made imported ones their > own. 74 > > Why revisit the
case of Guinea nearly five decades after its > independence? Because
Guinea's postwar nationalist movement provides > the raw material that
allows us to better understand the interaction > between leaders and
the rank and file in imagining and creating a > nation. It helps us to
construct a new theoretical and methodological > framework for
nationalist mobilization throughout the colonized world. > In this
regard, Guinea's significance far outstrips its size. 75 > > > > I
would like to thank Mark Peyrot for urging me to write this article, >
and the Research and Sabbatical Committee at Loyola College for >
providing financial support. I am grateful to Timothy Scarnecchia, my >
colleagues in the Loyola College History Department, and anonymous AHR
> reviewers for their extremely helpful comments. Unless otherwise >
indicated, all translations from French language sources are mine, and
> I conducted all interviews, in collaboration with Siba N. Grovogui. I
> transcribed and translated the interviews that were conducted in >
French; those conducted in Susu and Malinke were transcribed and >
translated by Siba N. Grovogui.> > Elizabeth Schmidt is Professor of
History at Loyola College in > Maryland. She received her Ph.D. from
the University of Wisconsin-> Madison in 1987. Her books include
Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, > Ethnicity, and Class in the
Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939?1958 > (2005); Peasants, Traders,
and Wives: Shona Women in the History of > Zimbabwe, 1870?1939 (1992);
and Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. > Business Support for
Apartheid (1980). Her 1992 book was a finalist for > the African
Studies Association's Herskovits Award and was named an > Outstanding
Academic Book for 1994 by Choice. Schmidt is currently > working on a
book entitled Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946?> 1958, which
examines the decade-long struggle between grassroots > activists and
nationalist leaders for control of the political agenda, > in the
context of Cold War repression. Her research on Guinea has been >
supported by the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social >
Science Research Council, and the Fulbright program.> > > Notes> 1
Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880?1985 (New York, >
1988), 148?149; Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-
> Speaking West Africa (Oxford, 1964), 400.> > 2 Centre des Archives
d'Outre-Mer, Archives Nationales (de France) > (CAOM), Carton 2181,
dos. 6, Gouverneur, Guinée Française, Conakry, à > Ministre, F.O.M.,
Paris, "Discours Prononcé par le Président Sékou > Touré, le 14
Septembre 1958," September 15, 1958, #0191/CAB; Carton > 2181, dos. 6,
Gouverneur, Guinée Française, Conakry, à Ministre, F.O.> M., Paris,
"Motion du Parti Démocratique de la Guinée en Date du 14 > Septembre
1958," September 15, 1958, #0191/CAB; Carton 2181, dos. 6, >
Gouverneur, Guinée Française, Conakry, à Ministre, F.O.M., Paris, >
"Nouvelles Locales Reçues de l'A.F.P. en Date du 19 Septembre 1958," >
September 19, 1958, #2276/CAB; "La Résolution," La Liberté, September >
23, 1958, 2; Georges Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets de la >
Décolonisation, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967), 2: 204, 206; Morgenthau, >
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 219.> > 3 Interview
with Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, January 21, 1991. In his > September 14
address, Sékou Touré made reference to the proindependence > positions
already taken by trade union, student, and youth > organizations. CAOM,
Carton 2181, dos. 6, "Discours Prononcé par le > Président Sékou Touré,
le 14 Septembre 1958." See also "Unanimement le > 28 Septembre La
Guinée Votera NON," La Liberté, September 23, 1958, 1?> 2. Former
university student leader Charles Diané also claims that > Sékou Touré
opted for the "No" vote in the eleventh hour?pushed by the > student
movement. Charles Diané, La F.E.A.N.F. et Les Grandes Heures du >
Mouvement Syndical étudiant Noir (Paris, 1990), 128?129.> > 4 See, for
instance, "Unanimement le 28 Septembre," 1?2; "Les Résultats > du
Scrutin," La Liberté, October 4, 1958, 5.> > 5 Archives de Guinée (AG),
AM-1339, Idiatou Camara, "La Contribution de > la Femme de Guinée à la
Lutte de Libération Nationale (1945?1958)," > Mémoire de Fin d'études
Supérieures, IPGAN, Conakry, 1979, 111.> > 6 Camara, "La Contribution
de la Femme," 108; Chaffard, Les Carnets > Secrets, 2: 177, 193?194,
196; Lansiné Kaba, Le "Non" de la Guinée à De > Gaulle (Paris, 1989),
80?86; Pierre Messmer, Après Tant de Batailles: > Mémoires (Paris,
1992), 234; Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: > Renewal and Endeavor,
trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York, 1971), 55.> > 7 De Gaulle, Memoirs
of Hope, 55.> > 8 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 2: 194.> > 9 See, for
instance, Sylvia G. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An > Anthology
(Berkeley, Calif., 1962); Patrick Seale, The Struggle for > Syria: A
Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945?1958 (New Haven, Conn., > 1965);
Ray T. Smith, "The Role of India's `Liberals' in the Nationalist >
Movement, 1925?1947," Asian Survey 8, no. 7 (July 1968): 607?624; David
> G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885?1925 (Berkeley, Calif., >
1971).> > 10 Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, "Alternative to Partition:
Muslim > Politics between the Wars," Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 3
(1981): 415?> 454; Farzana Shaikh, "Muslims and Political
Representation in Colonial > India: The Making of Pakistan," Modern
Asian Studies 20, no. 3 (1986): > 539?557; Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab
History and the Nation-State: A > Study in Modern Arab Historiography,
1820?1980 (New York, 1989); > Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism?A
History: Nation and State in > the Arab World (Malden, Mass., 2000);
David E. F. Henley, > "Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in
Anticolonial Nationalism: > Indonesia and Indochina," Comparative
Studies in Society and History > 37, no. 2 (April 1995): 286?324;
Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between > Islam and the Nation-State,
3rd ed. (New York, 1997); Robert H. Taylor, > The Idea of Freedom in
Asia and Africa (Stanford, Calif., 2002).> > 11 Rajat Ray, Urban Roots
of Indian Nationalism: Pressure Groups and > Conflict of Interests in
Calcutta City Politics, 1875?1939 (New Delhi, > 1979); Nasir Islam,
"Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan > and Bangladesh,"
International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 1 > (February
1981): 55?72; Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: > The
Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920?1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1987); >
Dilip M. Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Communism in South India: >
Malabar, 1900?1948 (Cambridge, 1994); Sanjay Seth, "Rewriting Histories
> of Nationalism: The Politics of `Moderate Nationalism' in India, 1870?
> 1905," AHR 104, no. 1 (February 1999): 95?116; Hanna Batatu, Syria's
> Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their >
Politics (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Taj-ul-Islam Hashmi, "Peasant >
Nationalism and the Politics of Partition: The Class-Communal Symbiosis
> in East Bengal, 1940?1947," in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, eds.,
> Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the >
Subcontinent (New York, 1999), 6?41.> > 12 See Gail Minault, "Urdu
Political Poetry during the Khilafat > Movement," Modern Asian Studies
8, no. 4 (October 1974): 459?471; Gail > Minault, "Islam and Mass
Politics: The Indian Ulama and the Khilafat > Movement," in Donald E.
Smith, ed., Religion and Political > Modernization (New Haven, Conn.,
1974), 168?182; Gail Minault, The > Khilafat Movement: Religious
Symbolism and Political Mobilization in > India (New York, 1982);
Sandria B. Freitag, "The Roots of Muslim > Separatism in South Asia:
Personal Practice and Public Structures in > Kanpur and Bombay," in
Edmund Burke, III and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., > Islam, Politics, and
Social Movements (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), 115?> 145.> > 13 Peter van
der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in > India
(Berkeley, Calif., 1994); James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: >
Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire >
(Berkeley, Calif., 1998); Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics of >
Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism (Boston, 1982); Ted Swedenburg, "The
> Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936?1939),"
in > Burke and Lapidus, Islam, Politics, and Social Movements, 169?203.
> > 14 Pamela Price, "Revolution and Rank in Tamil Nationalism,"
Journal of > Asian Studies 55, no. 2 (May 1996): 365.> For the use of
indigenous cultural and religious symbols and > practices by resurgent
Asante nationalists in independent Ghana, see > Jean M. Allman, "The
Youngmen and the Porcupine: Class, Nationalism and > Asante's Struggle
for Self-Determination, 1954?1957," Journal of > African History 31,
no. 2 (1990): 263?264, 272, 274?277; Jean Marie > Allman, The Quills of
the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent > Ghana (Madison,
Wis., 1993), 6, 9?10, 16?17, 19, 28, 41?46, 49, 62, 65, > 97, 131, 140,
160, 183?184; Pashington Obeng, "Gendered Nationalism: > Forms of
Masculinity in Modern Asante of Ghana," in Lisa A. Lindsay and >
Stephan F. Miescher, eds., Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa >
(Portsmouth, N.H., 2003), 203?206.> > > 15 Israel Gershoni, "Rethinking
the Formation of Arab Nationalism in > the Middle East, 1920?1945," in
James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, > eds., Rethinking Nationalism in
the Arab Middle East (New York, 1997), > 25.> > 16 See, for instance,
James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical > Africa," American
Political Science Review 48, no. 2 (June 1954): 404?> 426; James S.
Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, > Calif., 1958);
Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New > York, 1957);
David Apter, Ghana in Transition (Princeton, N.J., 1963); > Robert I.
Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The > Making of
Malawi and Zambia, 1873?1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Robert > I.
Rotberg, "African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?" Journal of >
Modern African Studies 4, no. 1 (May 1966): 33?46; Carl G. Rosberg, >
Jr., and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya >
(Stanford, Calif., 1966); John Lonsdale, "The Emergence of African >
Nations: A Historiographical Analysis," African Affairs 67, no. 266 >
(1968): 11?28; J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East >
Africa," Journal of African History 9, no. 1 (1968): 119?146.> > 17
See, for instance, Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," 407?>
408; Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," 119?120, >
140?141, 146; Lonsdale, "Emergence of African Nations," 11, 25.> > 18
Coleman, for instance, maintained that "the student of political >
nationalism is concerned mainly with the attitudes, activities, and >
status of the nationalist-minded Western-educated elite." Coleman, >
"Nationalism in Tropical Africa," 425.> > 19 Lonsdale, "Some Origins of
Nationalism in East Africa," 146.> > 20 Lonsdale, "Emergence of African
Nations," 25; see also Lonsdale, > "Some Origins of Nationalism in East
Africa," 119.> > 21 Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East
Africa," 140?141, > 146.> > 22 Susan Geiger, "Tanganyikan Nationalism
as `Women's Work': Life > Histories, Collective Biography and Changing
Historiography," Journal > of African History 37, no. 3 (1996): 468?469.
> > 23 Susan Geiger, TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of >
Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955?1965 (Portsmouth, N.H., 1997), 14, 66.> >
24 See Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, >
219?254; Jean Suret-Canale, La République de Guinée (Paris, 1970), 141?
> 146, 159?172; Claude Rivière, Guinea: The Mobilization of a People, >
trans. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), 51?>
82; Victor D. Du Bois, "Guinea," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. >
Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in >
Tropical Africa (Berkeley, Calif., 1970), 186?215; L. Gray Cowan, >
"Guinea," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., African One-Party States >
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), 149?236. Other well-known works perpetuate the >
top-down approach of earlier scholars. Yves Person, for example, >
conflates the Guinean RDA with the person of Sékou Touré, erroneously >
assuming that the party leader had "autocratic power" in the >
preindependence period and that he imposed his will on the party. >
Sylvain Soriba Camara and 'Ladipo Adamolekun present grand narratives >
of events, once again focusing on governing and party structures, >
policies, and leaders. Yves Person, "French West Africa and >
Decolonization," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., The
> Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940?1960 (New Haven, >
Conn., 1982), 141?172; Sylvain Soriba Camara, La Guinée Sans La France
> (Paris, 1976); 'Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Road to Independence in
French > Tropical Africa," in Timothy K. Welliver, ed., African
Nationalism and > Independence (New York, 1993), 66?79; 'Ladipo
Adamolekun, Sékou Touré's > Guinea: An Experiment in Nation Building
(London, 1976).> > 25 Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, Le P.D.G.: Artisan de
l'Indépendance Nationale > en Guinée (1947?1958), 2 vols. (Conakry,
1978). Unfortunately, Kéïta's > two-volume work has not been circulated
widely outside of Guinea.> > 26 See, for instance, Margarita Dobert,
"Civic and Political > Participation of Women in French-Speaking West
Africa" (Ph.D. > dissertation, George Washington University, 1970);
Claude Rivière, "La > Promotion de la Femme Guinéenne," Cahiers
d'études Africaines 8, no. 31 > (1968): 406?427. Dobert does not focus
exclusively on Guinea or the > postwar nationalist period. Rivière
focuses primarily on Guinea's > postindependence period.> > 27 Camara,
"Contribution de la Femme."> > 28 Studies of Muslim-Hindu violence and
the partition of India are > notable exceptions to this generalization.
> > 29 See, for instance, Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest
for > Understanding (Princeton, N.J., 1993); Michael Ignatieff, Blood
and > Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, 1994);
Michael > Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern
Conscience > (New York, 1998).> > 30 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, > Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
1992), 102, 121; E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age > of Empire, 1875?1914 (New
York, 1987), 143, 146; E. J. Hobsbawm, The > Age of Capital, 1848?1875
(New York, 1975), 84, 89. See also Partha > Chatterjee, Nationalist
Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative > Discourse? (Minneapolis,
1993), 9.> > 31 Henley refers to this phenomenon as "integrative," as
opposed to > "inclusive," nationalism, which he contrasts with
"exclusive" > nationalism. See Henley, "Ethnogeographic Integration,"
286, 289?290.> > 32 These themes are expanded upon in my recent book.
See Elizabeth > Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and
Class in the > Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939?1958 (Portsmouth, N.
H., 2005).> > 33 Geiger, TANU Women, 14.> > 34 See E. J. Hobsbawm, The
Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789?1848 > (London, 1962).> > 35 For an in-
depth discussion of this subject, see Schmidt, Mobilizing > the Masses.
> > 36 For further elaboration, see Elizabeth Schmidt, "`Emancipate
Your > Husbands!' Women and Nationalism in Guinea, 1953?1958," in Jean
Allman, > Susan Geiger, and Nakanyike Musisi, eds., Women in African
Colonial > Histories (Bloomington, Ind., 2002), 282?304; Schmidt,
Mobilizing the > Masses, chap. 5.> > 37 First delivered as a lecture in
1882, this essay has been published > in English as Ernest Renan, "What
Is a Nation?" in Geoff Eley and > Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming
National: A Reader (New York, 1996), > 42?55.> > 38 Miroslav Hroch,
"From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: > The Nation-
Building Process in Europe," in Eley and Suny, Becoming > National, 61;
Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival > in Europe: A
Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of > Patriotic Groups
among the Smaller European Nations, trans. Ben Fowkes > (Cambridge,
1985), 4?5. See also Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism > since 1780, 87.
> > 39 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin > and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York, 1991), 6?7. See
also > Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in the Third World: The
Western > State and African Nationalism (New York, 1983), 6.> > 40
Guinea is a classic example of Breuilly's "idea of the nation as a >
project, a unity to be fashioned out of the fight for independence." >
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1994), 7.>
> 41 Interview with Néné Diallo, Conakry, April 11, 1991. When
discussing > party policies or initiatives, informants frequently
attributed them > personally to Sékou Touré, secretary-general of the
Guinean branch of > the RDA.> > 42 Hobsbawm, Age of Revolution, 145;
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism > since 1780, 18?19; Thomas Hodgkin,
African Political Parties: An > Introductory Guide (Gloucester, Mass.,
1971), 163?164.> > 43 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments:
Colonial and > Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, N.J., 1993), 10, 26,
74.> > 44 Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa,
1900?1945, > trans. Till Gottheiner (New York, 1971), 383, 391. See
Sékou Touré's > critique of African education under French colonialism:
Sékou Touré, > "Le Leader Politique Considéré Comme le Représentant
d'une Culture," > Présence Africaine, nos. 24?25 (February?May 1959):
104?115; Sékou > Touré, "L'élite Africaine Dans Le Combat Politique,"
Discours > Enregistré du Président Sékou Touré Adressé aux Membres du
Congrès des > Hommes de Culture Noire, March 26, 1959, in Sékou Touré,
L'Action > Politique du Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Paris, 1959), 161?
176.> > 45 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham
(New > York, 2000), 31?78; Sékou Touré, "L'élite Africaine Dans Le
Combat > Politique," 161?176; Eileen Julien, "African Literature," in
Phyllis M. > Martin and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Africa, 3rd ed.
(Bloomington, Ind., > 1995), 297?298; Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan
Africa, 110, 179; > Smith, State and Nation in the Third World, 55;
Hodgkin, African > Political Parties, 163.> > 46 Sékou Touré, "L'élite
Africaine Dans le Combat Politique," 161?176; > Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 11, 14, > 137?138, 144?146;
Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 110, 179; > Hodgkin,
Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 172, 174?176; Smith, State and > Nation
in the Third World, 54?55.> > 47 Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS),
2G47/121, Guinée Française, > Affaires Politiques et Administratives,
"Revues Trimestrielles des > événements, 3ème Trimestre 1947," December
5, 1947, #389 APA; Manning, > Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 3, 179.>
> 48 While studying in France in 1952, Fodéba Kéïta established Les >
Ballets Africains, which consciously borrowed dance forms and themes >
from all the Guinean ethnic groups, blending them into a new "Guinean"
> whole. Kéïta was also an accomplished playwright and poet in the >
Négritude tradition. In 1960, Guinean scholar D. T. Niane committed to
> writing the legendary oral epic "Sundiata," which celebrated the >
founding of the thirteenth-century Mali empire. See Muriel Devey, La >
Guinée (Paris, 1997), 290; Aly Gilbert Iffono, Lexique Historique de la
> Guinée-Conakry (Paris, 1992), 98; Morgenthau, Political Parties in >
French-Speaking West Africa, 14, 251; Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan
> Africa, 176; D. T. Niane, Soundjata, ou l'Epopée Mandingue (Paris, >
1960).> > 49 Gabriel d'Arboussier, "Une Dangereuse Mystification de la
Théorie de > la Négritude," La Nouvelle Critique, no. 7 (June 1949): 34?
47; Peter S. > Thompson, "Negritude and a New Africa: An Update,"
Research in African > Literatures 33, no. 4 (2002): 143, 146, 148; R.
W. Johnson, "Sekou > Touré and the Guinean Revolution," African Affairs
69, no. 277 (October > 1970): 351. After independence, Sékou Touré
developed his own theories > of African socialism and the African
personality?and continued his > vehement critique of Négritude. See,
for instance, Sékou Touré, "Le > Leader Politique Considéré Comme le
Représentant d'une Culture," 104?> 115; Sékou Touré, "L'élite Africaine
Dans Le Combat Politique," 161?> 176; Sékou Touré, "The Republic of
Guinea," International Affairs 36, > no. 2 (April 1960): 169; Ahmed
Sékou Touré, Revolution, Culture and > Panafricanism (Conakry, 1978),
11, 13, 71, 97, 175?177, 190?191, 196?> 204.> > 50 Suret-Canale, French
Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 380?382, 387, > 391, 487; Morgenthau,
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, > 14?15, 23, 85;
Cowan, "Guinea," 153?154, 157?158. See also Anderson, > Imagined
Communities, 115?116, 140.> > 51 "The Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen (1789)," in > John A. Maxwell and James J. Freidberg,
eds., Human Rights in Western > Civilization: 1600 to the Present
(Dubuque, Iowa, 1991), 26.> > 52 Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in
Tropical Africa, 387, 391; > Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-
Speaking West Africa, 14; ANS, > 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de
Police, Kankan, "Renseignements > A/S Conférence Publique du R.D.A. du
30 Oct. 1954," November 5, 1954, > #2894/1119, C/PS.2. See also
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 118, 140?> 141; Smith, State and Nation
in the Third World, 31; Hodgkin, > Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 170;
Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and > States: An Enquiry into the Origins of
Nations and the Politics of > Nationalism (Boulder, Colo., 1977), 328?
330, 436.> > 53 For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see
Frederick Cooper, > Decolonization and African Society: The Labor
Question in French and > British Africa (New York, 1996); Myron
Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: > The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French
West Africa, 1857?1960 > (Portsmouth, N.H., 1991); Nancy Ellen Lawler,
Soldiers of Misfortune: > Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II (Athens,
Ohio, 1992); Catherine > Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Nationalité et
Citoyenneté en Afrique Occidentale > Français\[e\]: Originaires et
Citoyens dans Le Sénégal Colonial," > Journal of African History 42,
no. 2 (2001): 285?305; Schmidt, > Mobilizing the Masses, chaps. 2 and 3.
> > 54 Hobsbawm, Age of Capital, 85.> > 55 Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780, 88.> > 56 Hobsbawm, Age of Capital, 84?86, 88?
89; Hobsbawm, Age of Empire, > 144, 146?147; Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780, 19?20, 33, > 63, 87?88, 102. See also Anderson,
Imagined Communities, 135.> > 57 ANS, 21G13, "état d'Esprit de la
Population," December 1?15, 1950; > Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 233.> > 58
Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 14?15, >
85.> > 59 Ibid., 23, 25?26; Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 169, 233; Cooper,
Decolonization > and African Society, 159.> > 60 Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 227.> > 61 AG, 2Z27, "Syndicat
Professionnel des Agents et Sous-Agents > Indigènes du Service des
Transmissions de la Guinée Française," > Conakry, March 18, 1945;
Personal Archives of Joseph Montlouis: Letter > from Joseph Montlouis,
Conakry, to Jean Suret-Canale, Conakry, April 5, > 1983; interviews
with Mamadou Bela Doumbouya, Conakry, January 26, > 1991, and Joseph
Montlouis, Conakry, March 3 and 6, 1991; Kéïta, P.D.> G., 1: 176, 180,
186; Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking > West Africa,
229; Johnson, "Sekou Touré and the Guinean Revolution," > 351?353.> >
62 ANS, 17G573, "Les Partis Politiques en Guinée, 1er Semestre 1951"; >
17G573, Gendarmerie, A.O.F., "En Guinée Française," September 12, 1951,
> #174/4; 17G573, Guinée Française, Services de Police, Conakry,
"Rapport > de Quinzaine du 1er au 15 Octobre 1951," #1847/1019, C/PS.2;
17G573, > Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Revue Trimestrielle,
3ème > Trimestre 1951," November 24, 1951; 17G573, Comité Directeur, P.
D.G., > "Analyse de la Situation Politique en Afrique Noire et des
Méthodes du > R.D.A. en Vue de Dégager un Programme d'Action," ca.
January 14, 1952; > Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 241?242; Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-> Speaking West Africa, 26, 98; Hodgkin, Nationalism
in Colonial Africa, > 147.> > 63 See Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses,
chaps. 5, 6, and 7. For a more > general discussion of this phenomenon,
see Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and > Subject: Contemporary Africa and the
Legacy of Late Colonialism > (Princeton, N.J., 1996), 183?217.> > 64
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry >
into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1966),
> 97. See also Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed >
Nation," 61.> > 65 Walter Rodney, "Jihad and Social Revolution in Futa
Djalon in the > Eighteenth Century," Journal of the Historical Society
of Nigeria 4, > no. 2 (June 1968): 269?274. The Malinke
(Mandinka/Mandinga/Mandingo) > are part of the greater Mande social
formation. Their language is > called Maninka. The Fulbe are sometimes
referred to as "Fulani," a > Hausa term, or "Fula," a Mande term. In
Guinea, the Fulbe are divided > into Tukulor, originally from the Futa
Toro (Senegal), and Peul, from > the Futa Jallon (Guinea). The term
"Peul" is a French corruption of the > word "Pullo" (singular form of
"Fulbe"), which is the term used by the > people to describe
themselves. The language of the Fulbe is Fulfulde; > that of the Peul
is Pulaar. The term "Jallonke," or "men of the > Jallon," refers to the
people of a region, rather than an ethnic group. > The Jallonke trace
their roots to several populations. The Susu, part > of the greater
Mande group, settled in the Futa Jallon in the > thirteenth century.
They displaced or absorbed most of the original > inhabitants,
including the Limbas, Landumas, Bagas, and Bassaris. The > resulting
population was referred to collectively as the Jallonke. See > Andrew
F. Clark, From Frontier to Backwater: Economy and Society in the >
Upper Senegal Valley (West Africa), 1850?1920 (Lanham, Md., 1999), 41,
> 44?47; Jacques Richard-Molard, Afrique Occidentale Française (Paris,
> 1952), 93; Rodney, "Jihad and Social Revolution," 270.> > 66 Rodney,
"Jihad and Social Revolution," 269?284.> > 67 Umar Tall's mid-
nineteenth-century empire extended eastward from > French military
bases on the lower Senegal River to the ancient city of > Timbuktu on
the Niger River. His capital, Dinguiraye, was in the Futa > Jallon.
Some decades later, Samori Touré built an empire that included > Upper
Guinea and the forest region and extended eastward to modern > Ghana.
See Rodney, "Jihad and Social Revolution," 269?284; A. S. Kanya->
Forstner, "Mali-Tukulor," in Michael Crowder, ed., West African >
Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation (New York, >
1971), 53?79; Yves Person, "Guinea-Samori," trans. Joan White, in >
Crowder, West African Resistance, 111?143; Daniel R. Headrick, The >
Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth
> Century (New York, 1981), 119?120; Philip Curtin, Steven Feierman, >
Leonard Thompson, and Jan Vansina, African History: From Earliest Times
> to Independence, 2nd ed. (New York, 1995), 343?351.> > 68 Hobsbawm,
Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 73. Duara makes > similar claims
for premodern China, India, and Japan; see Prasenjit > Duara,
"Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and > When," in
Eley and Suny, Becoming National, 152.> > 69 Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 234; > see also Lonsdale,
"Emergence of African Nations," 28.> > 70 For a general discussion of
this tendency, see Renan, "What Is a > Nation?" 52?53; Geoff Eley and
Ronald Grigor Suny, "Introduction," in > Eley and Suny, Becoming
National, 8; Duara, "Historicizing National > Identity," 164?165;
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 161; Lonsdale, > "Some Origins of
Nationalism in East Africa," 143. For alternative, > more critical
readings of precolonial African political leaders, see > Jean Suret-
Canale, "La Fin de la Chefferie en Guinée," Journal of > African
History 7, no. 3 (1966): 459?493; Martin Klein, Slavery and > Colonial
Rule in French West Africa (New York, 1998).> > 71 Person, "Guinea-
Samori," 112; Headrick, Tools of Empire, 119?120; > interview with
Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, January 21, 1991. For more > critical views
of Samori Touré, see the following papers, which were > presented on
the panel "Samori Toure One Hundred Years On: Exploring > the
Ambiguities," Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, >
Philadelphia, Pa., November 13, 1999: David C. Conrad, "Victims, >
Warriors, and Power Sources: Portrayals of Women in Guinean Narratives
> of Samori Toure"; Saidou Mohamed N'Daou, "Almamy Samory Toure:
Politics > of Memories in Post-Colonial Guinea (1958?1984)"; Emily
Osborn, "Samori > Toure in Upper Guinea: Hero or Tyrant?"; Jeanne M.
Toungara, > "Kabasarana and the Samorian Conquest of Northwestern Cote
d'Ivoire."> > 72 Smith notes that ethnicity "is more about cultural
perceptions than > physical demography." What is at issue is not actual
descent, but "the > sense of ancestry and identity that people
possess." Anthony D. Smith, > "The Origins of Nations," in Eley and
Suny, Becoming National, 117, > 122. See also Hroch, "From National
Movement to the Fully-Formed > Nation," 65; Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-Speaking West > Africa, 234?235.> > 73 Morgenthau,
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 234?> 235; Sidiki
Kobélé Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou Touré: L'Homme et son Combat Anti-> Colonial
(1922?1958) (Conakry, 1998), 22?24, 28?29; Hodgkin, African > Political
Parties, 30; Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 174; > Smith,
"Origins of Nations," 121.> > 74 Quoted in Morgenthau, Political
Parties in French-Speaking West > Africa, 235. The orthography of
African names was inconsistent during > the colonial period. While
"Samori" is now the preferred spelling, > "Samory" is an accepted
variant.> > 75 Historic "resisters" at times collaborated with the
colonial > administration, usually to forge alliances against rival
African > rulers. This more complicated reality was rarely acknowledged
by the > RDA. For a discussion of the ambiguous roles played by Bokar
Biro Barry > and Alfa Yaya Diallo, see Suret-Canale, "Fin de la
Chefferie en > Guinée," 465?467; Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 147?
148.> > 76 Interview with Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, January 21, 1991;
Siba N. > Grovogui, personal communication, April 26, 1999; Suret-
Canale, "Fin de > la Chefferie en Guinée," 464?471; Klein, Slavery and
Colonial Rule, 46, > 143, 147?148, 189; Iffono, Lexique Historique de
la Guinée-Conakry, 19, > 119?120, 134?136, 171?172; Thomas E. O'Toole,
Historical Dictionary of > Guinea (Republic of Guinea/Conakry), 2nd ed.
(Metuchen, N.J., 1987), > 16, 30.> > 77 Morgenthau, Political Parties
in French-Speaking West Africa, 235; > O'Toole, Historical Dictionary
of Guinea, 34.> > 78 Interviews in Conakry with Léon Maka, February 20,
1991, and Joseph > Montlouis, February 28, 1991; Siba N. Grovogui,
personal communication, > 1991.> > 79 For similar trends elsewhere, see
Minault, Khilafat Movement; Burke > and Lapidus, Islam, Politics, and
Social Movements; Gelvin, Divided > Loyalties.> > 80La Liberté,
December 28, 1954, quoted in Morgenthau, Political > Parties in French-
Speaking West Africa, 235.> > 81 Morgenthau, Political Parties in
French-Speaking West Africa, 236?> 237. See also Camara, "La
Contribution de la Femme," 61; ANS, 17G586, > Guinée Française,
Services de Police, "Renseignements Objet: Réunion > Publique R.D.A. à
Conakry et ses Suites," September 8, 1954, #2606/942, > C/PS.2; 17G586,
Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements > Objet: Fêtes
Musulmanes à Conakry," May 26, 1955, #1054/439, C/PS.2; > Hodgkin,
African Political Parties, 136.> > 82 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism
since 1780, 71.> > 83 Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme," 61.> > 84
Interview with Aissatou N'Diaye, Conakry, April 8, 1991. See also >
interview with Néné Diallo, Conakry, April 11, 1991.> > 85 ANS, 17G586,
"Fêtes Musulmanes," May 26, 1955. See also Hodgkin, > Nationalism in
Colonial Africa, 162?163.> > 86 ANS, 17G573, Guinée Française, Services
de Police, "Renseignements > Objet: Incidents à Conakry," October 26,
1954, #2850/1094, C/PS.2.> > 87 Quoted in Hodgkin, African Political
Parties, 138.> > 88 ANS, 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de Police,
"Renseignements > Objet: Suite aux Incidents de Tondon," February 18,
1955, #389/160, > C/PS.2. M'Balia Camara, an officer of the RDA women's
committee and > wife of the RDA president in Tondon (Dubréka circle),
was killed by a > canton chief during a rampage against RDA supporters.
The day she was > struck, February 9, 1955, was subsequently
commemorated by the RDA and > set aside to honor women's role in the
struggle for national > emancipation. "Incidents Graves à Tondon,
Canton de Labaya, Cercle de > Dubréka," La Liberté, February 15, 1955,
1; "Les Grandioses Obsèques de > Camara M'Ballia," La Liberté, March 1,
1955, 1; Camara, "La > Contribution de la Femme," 132; interview with
Aissatou N'Diaye, > Conakry, April 8, 1991.> > 89 For similar use of
indigenous symbols by Asante nationalists in > colonial Ghana, see
Allman, "Youngmen and the Porcupine," 263?264, 267, > 272, 274?277;
Allman, Quills of the Porcupine, 6, 9?10, 16?17, 19, 28, > 41?46, 49,
62, 65, 97, 131, 140, 160, 183?184.> > 90 Camara, "La Contribution de
la Femme," 59?60; ANS, 17G613, Guinée > Française, Services de Police,
Conakry, "Renseignements A/S Situation > en Guinée, à la Veille du
Dépot des Listes aux élections Cantonales du > 31 Mars Prochain," March
9, 1957, #555/247, C/PS.2; 17G613, Guinée > Française, Services de
Police, Conakry, "Renseignements A/S Réunions > Diverses tenues à
Conakry," May 29, 1957, #1223/480, C/PS.2.> > 91 ANS, 17G613, Guinée
Française, Services de Police, Conakry, > "Renseignements A/S Fête R.D.
A. Donnée en l'Honneur de Bassikolo dans > la Nuit du 26 au 27 Janvier
1957," n.d., #235/107, C/PS.2; 17G613, > "Situation en Guinée," March
9, 1957. See also 17G586, "Fêtes > Musulmanes," May 26, 1955.> > 92
Quoted in Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme," 60. See also ANS, >
17G613, "Situation en Guinée," March 9, 1957.> > 93 Siba N. Grovogui,
personal communication, October 1991.> > 94 Judith Van Allen, "`Aba
Riots' or Igbo `Women's War'? Ideology, > Stratification, and the
Invisibility of Women," in Nancy J. Hafkin and > Edna G. Bay, eds.,
Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic > Change (Stanford,
Calif., 1976), 60?62, 71?73. For a similar practice > among Ga women in
colonial Ghana, see John Parker, Making the Town: Ga > State and
Society in Early Colonial Accra (Portsmouth, N.H., 2000), 52, > 60?61.>
> 95 Renan, "What Is a Nation?" 53.> > 96 See Anderson, Imagined
Communities, 52?53, 113?114; Smith, State and > Nation in the Third
World, Preface.> > 97 "General Act of the Conference of Berlin (1885),"
in Bruce Fetter, > ed., Colonial Rule in Africa: Readings from Primary
Sources (Madison, > Wis., 1979), 38.> > 98 Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780, 138. See also Smith, > State and Nation in the
Third World, 27.> > 99 Selecting names and regions associated with
particular ethnic > groups, RDA leader Moricandian Savané wrote, "The
misery which kills > TOGBA of Macenta is the same as that of Samba of
Upper Guinea, Soriba > of lower Guinea, or Diallo of the Fouta
Djallon." Moricandian Savané, > La Liberté, August 18, 1954, quoted in
Morgenthau, Political Parties in > French-Speaking West Africa, 233.> >
100 See Smith, "Origins of Nations," 107, 113, 116; Hobsbawm, Nations >
and Nationalism since 1780, 20, 33, 63; Breuilly, Nationalism and the >
State, 6.> > 101 Kevin C. Dunn, Imagining the Congo: The International
Relations of > Identity (New York, 2003), 75?76.> > 102 Ibid., 76.> >
103 For a more general discussion of these issues, see Hobsbawm, >
Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 136?137; Mamdani, Citizen and >
Subject, 21?25, 33, 37?61.> > 104 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State,
7.> > 105 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa,
20. > See also Anderson, Imagined Communities, 121?122. Anderson makes
the > crucial point that imperial languages become the new vernaculars
of > colonized peoples. In Guinea, the common vernacular was French. It
was > the sole language of education, beginning in primary school. For
the > educated elite, speaking in French was second nature. Anderson, >
Imagined Communities, 113, 133?134, 138; Suret-Canale, French >
Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 341, 380?382, 487; Morgenthau, >
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 11, 39; Kéïta, P.D.>
G., 1: 73.> > 106 ANS, 2G43/109, Guinée Française, Chef du Service de
l'Enseignement, > "Rapport Statistique Annuel sur l'Enseignement, Année
Scolaire 1942?> 1943," Conakry, August 1943; 2G45/131, Guinée
Française, Chef du > Service de l'Enseignement, "Rapport de Rentrée,
Année Scolaire, 1944?> 1945," Conkary, January 13, 1945. See also AG,
5B47, Guinée Française, > Gouverneur, Conakry, à Ministre, F.O.M.,
Paris, October 25, 1947, > #711/APA; Morgenthau, Political Parties in
French-Speaking West Africa, > 10?13, 20, 219; Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou
Touré: L'Homme et son Combat, 11, 30?> 31; Suret-Canale, République de
Guinée, 147; Manning, Francophone Sub-> Saharan Africa, 100?101.> > 107
Suret-Canale, République de Guinée, 147; Morgenthau, Political >
Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 12?23; Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou >
Touré: L'Homme et son Combat, 11, 30.> > 108 Suret-Canale, République
de Guinée, 142, 147; Suret-Canale, French > Colonialism in Tropical
Africa, 373?374, 377?378, 388; Morgenthau, > Political Parties in
French-Speaking West Africa, 11?13, 15; Manning, > Francophone Sub-
Saharan Africa, 80, 81, 84, 101.> > 109 Suret-Canale, République de
Guinée, 147.> > 110 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking
West Africa, 12?13"> >> > 111 Suret-Canale, République de Guinée, 142?
143; Morgenthau, Political > Parties in French-Speaking West Africa,
20, 251; ANS, 17G573, "Rapport > Général d'Activité 1947?1950,"
presenté par Mamadou Madéïra Kéïta, > Secrétaire Général du P.D.G. au
Premier Congrès Territorial du Parti > Démocratique de Guinée (Section
Guinéenne du Rassemblement Démocratique > Africain), Conakry, October
15?18, 1950. For a more general discussion > of this phenomenon, see
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 48. > Notable RDA adversaries
among Ponty alumni in Guinea included several > members of the French
parliament: National Assembly deputies Yacine > Diallo, Mamba Sano, and
Barry Diawadou and Council of the Republic > senator Fodé Mamadou
Touré. Another Ponty graduate was Framoï Bérété, > president of the
anti-RDA ethnic association Union du Mandé, and a > member of the
equally hostile Comité d'Entente Guinéenne. The > vehemently anti-RDA
secretary-general of the Guinean teachers' union, > Koumandian Kéïta,
was a graduate of école Normale de Katibougou, the > Ponty equivalent
in the French Soudan. Morgenthau, Political Parties in > French-
Speaking West Africa, 222, 224?225; R. W. Johnson, "The Parti >
Démocratique de Guinée and the Mamou `Deviation,'" in Christopher Allen
> and R. W. Johnson, eds., African Perspectives: Papers in the History,
> Politics and Economics of Africa Presented to Thomas Hodgkin >
(Cambridge, 1970), 368; interviews in Conakry with Bocar Biro Barry, >
January 21, 1991; Léon Maka, February 20, 1991; and Fodé Mamdou Touré,
> March 13, 1991.> > 112 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-
Speaking West Africa, 20?> 21.> > 113école Normale de Katibougou
graduate Koumandian Kéïta, an arch-rival > of the RDA and secretary-
general of Guinea's powerful African teachers' > union, was a case in
point. The deep antipathy that he and Sékou Touré > shared was both
personal and political. ANS, 2G53/187, Guinée > Française, Secrétaire
Général, "Revues Trimestrielles des événements, > 1953: 3ème
Trimestre," September 12, 1953, #862/APA; 2G55/150, Guinée > Française,
Gouverneur, "Rapport Politique Mensuel, Août 1955," > September 28,
1955, #487/APAS/CAB; 2G57/128, Guinée Française, Police > et Sûreté,
"Synthèse Mensuelle de Renseignements Novembre 1957," > Conakry,
November 25, 1957, #2593/C/PS.2; AG, 2D297, Guinée Française, >
Secrétaire Général du Comité de Coordination des Syndicats de >
l'Enseignement Primaire Public de l'A.O.F., Conakry, à Gouverneur, >
Conakry, October 11, 1954, #1/CCE; interview with Bocar Biro Barry, >
Conakry, January 21, 1991.> > 114 Suret-Canale, République de Guinée,
147; Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou Touré: > L'Homme et son Combat, 24, 29, 32, 36;
Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou > Touré: L'Homme du 28 Septembre 1958,
2nd ed. (Conakry, 1977), 29, 31; > B. Ameillon, La Guinée: Bilan d'une
Indépendance?(Paris, 1964), 49; AG, > 1E41, Guinée Française, Services
de Police, "Fiche de Renseignements > Biographiques Relative à M. Sékou
Touré," January 2, 1956.> > 115 Bocar Biro Barry is a grandson of
Almamy Bokar Biro Barry. However, > he spells his first name
differently.> > 116 Interview with Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, January
21, 1991; Kéïta, > Ahmed Sékou Touré: L'Homme et son Combat, 10?11, 30;
Suret-Canale, > République de Guinée, 142. Morgenthau contends that
strains between the > more and less educated Guinean elites were
comparable to those that > existed in colonial Ghana. Basil Davidson
writes that those who > mobilized for the Convention People's Party,
which ultimately became > the ruling party of independent Ghana, were
derisively referred to by > more educated opponents as "Standard VII
Boys" or, in reference to > homeless youths who organized for the party
by night and slept on > porches, "verandah boys, hooligans, flotsam and
jetsam, town rabble." > Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-
Speaking West Africa, 20?21; > Basil Davidson, Black Star: A View of
the Life and Times of Kwame > Nkrumah, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo., 1989),
68, 70. See also Apter, Ghana > in Transition, 167, 207?208; Hodgkin,
African Political Parties, 30?31.> > 117 Suret-Canale, République de
Guinée, 142?143; Morgenthau, Political > Parties in French-Speaking
West Africa, 12, 20, 251. See also Breuilly, > Nationalism and the
State, 48?49; Hobsbawm, Age of Empire, 151; > Coleman, "Nationalism in
Tropical Africa," 412.> > 118 AG, 5B49, Guinée Française, Secrétaire
Général chargé de > l'Expédition des Affaires Courantes, pour le
Gouverneur, Conakry, à > Haut Commissaire, Dakar, "Revue des événements
du Quatrième Trimestre > 1947," February 17, 1948, #35/APA.> > 119
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. See also Hroch, "From National >
Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation," 67.> > 120 Breuilly, Nationalism
and the State, 19?20; Tom Nairn, The Break-up > of Britain: Crisis and
Neo-Nationalism (London, 1977), 41.> > 121 For further elaboration, see
Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses.> > 122 ANS, 2G43/25, Guinée Française,
"Rapport de Tournée Effectuée du 27 > Janvier au 9 Février par M.
Chopin, Administrateur des Colonies, > Inspecteur du Travail, dans les
Cercles de Conakry-Kindia-Forécariah," > Conakry, April 2, 1943;
2G43/25, Guinée Française, Gouverneur, "Rapport > sur le Travail et la
Main d'Oeuvre de la Guinée Française Pendant > l'Année 1943," Conakry,
July 24, 1944, #994/IT; 2G46/50, Guinée > Française, Inspecteur des
Colonies (Pruvost), Mission en Guinée, > "Rapport sur la Main d'Oeuvre
en Guinée," Conakry, July 13, 1946, > #116/C; 2G46/50, Guinée
Française, Inspecteur du Travail, "Rapport > Annuel du Travail, 1946,"
Conakry, February 15, 1947, #66/IT.GV.> > 123 ANS, 2G46/50, "Rapport
sur la Main d'Oeuvre," July 13, 1946; > 2G46/50, "Rapport Annuel du
Travail, 1946." See also Virginia Thompson > and Richard Adloff, French
West Africa (New York, 1969), 492.> > 124 See Schmidt, Mobilizing the
Masses; ANS, 2G41/21, Guinée Française, > "Rapport Politique Annuel,
1941"; 2G42/22, Guinée Française, "Rapport > Politique Annuel, 1942";
2G46/50, "Rapport sur la Main d'Oeuvre," July > 13, 1946; 2G47/121,
"Revues Trimestrielles des événements, 3ème > Trimestre 1947"; AG,
1E42, Guinée Française, "Renseignements," Cercle > de Kankan, January
26, 1945, #66/C/APAN/31/1/46; 1E37, Guinée > Française, Cercle de
Gaoual, Subdivision Centrale, "Rapport Politique > Annuel, Année 1947";
Suret-Canale, "Fin de la Chefferie en Guinée," > 462, 464, 467, 470,
479?480; Suret-Canale, République de Guinée, 95?98, > 137?139; Suret-
Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 80, 322?> 325, 327, 341?
342; Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 87?88, 99?102, 331; Klein, Slavery > and
Colonial Rule, 212?213; Babacar Fall, Le Travail Forcé en Afrique->
Occidentale Française (1900?1945) (Paris, 1993), 279.> > 125 For
further discussion of rivalry between "traditional" and > "modern"
elites in African nationalist movements, see Seton-Watson, > Nations
and States, 328?329, 341, 437.> > 126 Suret-Canale, "Fin de la
Chefferie en Guinée," 459?460, 492; Kéïta, > P.D.G., 2: 147; interview
with Mamadou Bela Doumbouya, Conakry, January > 26, 1991.> > 127 AG,
2Z27, "Syndicat Professionnel des Agents et Sous-Agents > Indigènes du
Service des Transmissions de la Guinée Française," > Conakry, March 18,
1945; interviews with Joseph Montlouis (assistant > secretary-general,
postal, telegraph, and telephone workers' union), > Conakry, March 3
and 6, 1991; Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou Touré: L'Homme du 28 > Septembre, 41.>
> 128 Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 180.> > 129 ANS, 17G573, Guinée Française,
Services de Police, "Renseignements > A/S Activité de Certains
Africains R.D.A.," February 24, 1948, #229/76 > C; AG, 1E38, Guinée
Française, Cercle de Kankan, "Rapport Politique > Annuel, Année 1948";
1E38, Guinée Française, Cercle de N'Zérékoré, > "Rapport Politique
Annuel, Année 1948." See also AG, 5B49, Guinée > Française, Inspecteur
des Affaires Administratives, pour le Gouverneur, > Conakry, à Haut
Commissaire, Dakar, September 11, 1948, #596/APA.> > 130 ANS, 17G529,
Guinée Française, "Liste des Organisations > Professionnelles," 1952;
17G271, Gouverneur de Guinée Française, > Conakry, à Haut Commissaire,
Dakar, "A/S Activité Syndicale," February > 25, 1952, #85/APA;
Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking > West Africa, 414.> >
131 Interview with Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, January 21, 1991.> > 132
Tom Nairn, "Scotland and Europe," in Eley and Suny, Becoming >
National, 84?85; see also Nairn, Break-up of Britain, 100; Anthony D. >
Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, 1995), 40.>
> 133 See Chatterjee's critique of Anderson in this regard. Chatterjee,
> Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 19?22; Chatterjee, Nation
> and Its Fragments, 4?5. See also Anderson, Imagined Communities, 67,
> 113, 116, 135, 140?141.> > 134 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 12.
See also Smith, "Origins of > Nations," 111, 124.> > 135 Smith, Nations
and Nationalism in a Global Era, 40, 47. See also > Ernest Gellner,
Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983), 49.> > 136 Hobsbawm, Age
of Revolution, 135?136; Gellner, Nations and > Nationalism, 63, 89;
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 36?40.> > 137 Hobsbawm, Age of
Revolution, 133, 135?136; Hobsbawm, Nations and > Nationalism since
1780, 59.> > 138 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24?25, 36?37, 40.> >
139 Anne McClintock, "`No Longer in a Future Heaven': Women and >
Nationalism in South Africa," in Eley and Suny, Becoming National, 260,
> 273?274. See also Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 64, 67?68.> >
140 See Anderson, Imagined Communities, 23. For a discussion of these >
issues in Africa more generally, see Hodgkin, African Political >
Parties, 134?139.> > 141 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-
Speaking West Africa, 238?> 239, 243?244; interview with Léon Maka and
Mira Baldé (Mme. Maka), > Conakry, February 20, 1991; ANS, 17G586,
Guinée Française, Services de > Police, Kankan, "Renseignements A/S
Arrivé Kankan, Sékou Touré et > Conférence Publique du 9 Novembre
1954," November 13, 1954, #2936/1142, > C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée
Française, Services de Police, Kindia, > "Renseignements A/S Passage à
Kindia du DéputéDiallo Sayfoulaye et > Compte-Rendu de Mandat de ce
Parlementaire," July 17, 1956, #1396/503, > C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée
Française, Services de Police, Mamou, > "Renseignements A/S Visite
Parlementaire à Mamou," July 23, 1956, > #1444/512, C/PS.2; 17G586,
Guinée Française, Services de Police, > Conakry, "Renseignements A/S
Réunion Publique d'Informations tenue le > Jeudi 30 Août 1956, par le
DéputéDiallo Saï foulaye, à Conakry, Salle > de Cinéma `VOX,'" August
31, 1956, #1761/619, C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée > Française, Services de
Police, Conakry, "Renseignements A/S Conférence > Publique
d'Information, tenue le 16 Septembre 1956 par le P.D.G.-R.D.A. > au
Cinéma `VOX' à Conakry," September 17, 1956, #1907/658, C/PS.2. See >
also Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 150, 159; Hodgkin, >
African Political Parties, 134?139; Thompson and Adloff, French West >
Africa, 60.> > 142 Interviews in Conakry with Léon Maka and Mira Baldé,
February 20, > 1991; Fatou Kéïta, April 7, 1991; and Aissatou N'Diaye,
April 8, 1991. > See also Barbara A. Moss, "Clothed in Righteousness
and Respect: The > Use of Uniforms within Zimbabwean Women's Ruwadzano
in the Methodist > Church," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of
the African Studies > Association, Atlanta, Ga., November 3, 1989.> >
143 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 238;
> Hodgkin, African Political Parties, 36, 38; Messmer, Après Tant de >
Batailles, 234.> > 144 ANS, 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de
Police, "Renseignements > Réunion Privée des Femmes R.D.A. à Conakry,"
October 7, 1954, > #2765/1033, C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée Française,
Services de Police, Labé, > "Renseignements Objet: Situation Politique
à Labé dans la Première > Quinzaine de Novembre 1954," November 23,
1954, #2999/1180, C/PS.2; > Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme," 77;
Chaffard, Les Carnets > Secrets, 2: 177; Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, Le
Multipartisme en Afrique > de l'Ouest Francophone Jusqu'aux
Indépendances: La Période Nationaliste > (Paris, 1998), photograph 29,
following 230; Kéïta, Ahmed Sékou Touré: > L'Homme et son Combat,
photograph "Carte de Voeux 1955 de Sékou Touré," > following 136.> >
145 See Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 49; Smith, Nations and >
Nationalism in a Global Era, 40, 47; Smith, "Origins of Nations," 120;
> Anderson, Imagined Communities, 140.> > 146 Interview with Léon Maka
and Mira Baldé, Conakry, February 20, > 1991. For Mafory Bangoura's
background, see "Les Femmes s'Organisent," > La Liberté, August 18,
1954, 4; Kéïta, P.D.G., 1: 340, 345; Camara, "La > Contribution de la
Femme," 43?44; interviews in Conakry with Bocar Biro > Barry, January
29, 1991; Léon Maka, February 20, 1991; Aissatou > N'Diaye, April 8,
1991.> > 147 Interview with Léon Maka and Mira Baldé, Conakry, February
20, > 1991. See also interview with Aissatou N'Diaye, Conakry, April 8,
1991.> > 148 See Geiger, "Tanganyikan Nationalism as `Women's Work'";
Geiger, > TANU Women; LaRay Denzer, "Constance A. Cummings-John of
Sierra Leone: > Her Early Political Career," Tarikh 7, no. 1 (1981): 20?
32; LaRay > Denzer, "Women in Freetown Politics, 1914?61: A Preliminary
Study," > Africa 57, no. 4 (1987): 439?456; Cheryl Johnson, "Grassroots
> Organizing: Women in Anti-Colonial Activity in Southwestern Nigeria,"
> African Studies Review 25, no. 2 (September 1982): 137?157; Cheryl >
Johnson, "Madam Alimotu Pelewura and the Lagos Market Women," Tarikh 7,
> no. 1 (1981): 1?10; Nina Emma Mba, Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's
> Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900?1965 (Berkeley, Calif.,
> 1982); Cora Ann Presley, Kikuyu Women, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and >
Social Change in Kenya (Boulder, Colo., 1992); Timothy Scarnecchia, >
"Poor Women and Nationalist Politics: Alliances and Fissures in the >
Formation of a Nationalist Political Movement in Salisbury Rhodesia, >
1950?6," Journal of African History 37, no. 2 (1996): 283?310; Cherryl
> Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (London, 1982). Many >
studies emphasize women's contributions to male-dominated nationalist >
movements?rather than their fundamentally formative roles. In the case
> of Guinea, Margarita Dobert's 1970 doctoral dissertation skims the >
surface of women's anticolonial activities. Far more insightful and >
analytical is Idiatou Camara's unpublished undergraduate thesis, "La >
Contribution de la Femme de Guinée à la Lutte de Libération Nationale >
(1945?1958)." See Dobert, "Civic and Political Participation of Women";
> Camara, "Contribution de la Femme."> > 149 Quoted in Eley and Suny,
Becoming National, 259.> > 150 McClintock, "`No Longer in a Future
Heaven,'" 260.> > 151 Ibid., 261.> > 152 Geiger, "Tanganyikan
Nationalism as `Women's Work,'" 467, 469, 471?> 472; Geiger, TANU
Women, 162. For further discussion of women's > involvement in the
"ideological reproduction of the collectivity" and > of women as
"transmitters of its culture," see Nira Yuval-Davis and > Floya
Anthias, "Introduction," in Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, > eds.,
Woman-Nation-State (London, 1989), 7, 9?10.> > 153 Camara, "La
Contribution de la Femme," 65; Mamadou Tounkara, > "Autour d'une
Musique," La Liberté, November 9, 1954, 3; interview with > Fatou
Diarra, Conakry, March 17, 1991.> > 154 See Camara, "La Contribution de
la Femme," 80; Schmidt, Mobilizing > the Masses, chap. 5; Schmidt,
"`Emancipate Your Husbands!'"; interviews > in Conakry with Léon Maka,
February 20, 1991; Fatou Diarra, March 17, > 1991; Néné Diallo, April
11, 1991; Fatou Kéïta, May 24, 1991.> > 155 Interviews with Fatou
Kéïta, Conakry, April 7 and May 24, 1991. See > also interview with
Léon Maka, Conakry, February 20, 1991.> > 156 Interview with Néné
Diallo, Conakry, April 11, 1991.> > 157 Interview with Fatou Diarra,
Conakry, March 17, 1991. See also > Camara, "La Contribution de la
Femme," 80.> > 158 Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Africaine
(CRDA), Claude > Gerard, "Incidents en Guinée Française, 1954?1955,"
Afrique > Informations, no. 34 (March 15?April 1, 1955): 5?7;
Morgenthau, > Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 103,
106, 240.> > 159 Interview with Aissatou N'Diaye, Conakry, April 8,
1991.> > 160 Ibid. See also interviews with Fatou Kéïta, Conakry, April
7 and > May 24, 1991.> > 161 CRDA, Gerard, "Incidents en Guinée
Française, 1954?1955," 9; > Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme," 78.
See also interview with > Fatou Kéïta, Conakry, May 24, 1991.> > 162
Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme," 79.> > 163 Interviews in Conakry
with Léon Maka, February 20, 1991; Léon Maka > and Mira Baldé, February
25, 1991; Fatou Kéïta, April 7, 1991; ANS, > 17G586, Guinée Française,
Services de Police, "Renseignements," > September 8, 1954. For similar
use of song elsewhere in Africa, see > Shirley Ardener, "Sexual Insult
and Female Militancy," in Shirley > Ardener, ed., Perceiving Women
(London, 1975), 29?30, 36?37; Caroline > Ifeka-Moller, "Female
Militancy and Colonial Revolt: The Women's War of > 1929, Eastern
Nigeria," in Ardener, Perceiving Women, 132?133; Van > Allen, "`Aba
Riots' or Igbo `Women's War'?" 60?61; Mba, Nigerian Women > Mobilized,
150; Geiger, "Tanganyikan Nationalism as `Women's Work,'" > 473. Asante
and Ga women in colonial Ghana also challenged men they > deemed
cowardly?and thus effeminate?in the face of British colonialism; > see
Obeng, "Gendered Nationalism," 193, 202?204; Parker, Making the > Town,
52, 71. The feminization of colonized males, and women's ridicule > of
them, is discussed in Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, 69?71.> >
164 ANS, 17G586, "Réunion Publique R.D.A. à Conakry," September 8, >
1954; 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements A/S
> R.D.A. Conakry," April 19, 1955, #811/332, C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée >
Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements Objet: RDA à Conakry," >
April 27, 1955, #867/353, C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de
> Police, "Renseignements Objet: Incidents en Guinée," June 3, 1955, >
#1095/463, C/PS.2; 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de Police, >
"Renseignements Objet: R.D.A. à Conakry," June 6, 1955, #1106/469, C/PS.
> 2. See also 17G573, Guinée Française, Services de Police, >
"Renseignements A/S Attroupement R.D.A. devant le Commissariat de >
Police de Mamou, le 15 Mai 1956," May 19, 1956, #929/324, C/PS.2; AG, >
1E41, Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements A/S >
Conférence Publique tenue le Lundi 14 Janvier 1957 à Conakry, Salle du
> Cinéma `VOX,' par le P.D.G.-R.D.A.," January 15, 1957, #89/50/C/PS.2.
> > 165 ANS, 17G586, Guinée Française, Services de Police,
"Renseignements > Objet: R.D.A. Conakry," June 14, 1955, #1158/490,
C/PS.2. The Susu song > was transcribed and translated into French by
the police. The English > translation is mine.> > 166 Siba N. Grovogui,
personal communication, 1991.> >
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