Understanding Empire: Hierarchy, Networks and Clients
by Prof. James Petras
Global Research, March 19, 2007
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The structure of power of the world imperial system can best be
understood through a classification of countries according to their
political, economic, diplomatic and military organization.
Introduction:
The imperial system is much more complex than what is commonly
referred to as the ?US Empire?. The US Empire, with its vast network of
financial investments, military bases, multi-national corporations and
client states, is the single most important component of the global
imperial system (1). Nevertheless, it is overly simplistic to overlook
the complex hierarchies, networks, follower states and clients that
define the contemporary imperial system (2). To understand empire and
imperialism today requires us to look at the complex and changing
system of imperial stratification.
Hierarchy of Empire
The structure of power of the world imperial system can best be
understood through a classification of countries according to their
political, economic, diplomatic and military organization. The
following is a schema of this system:
I. Hierarchy of Empire (from top to bottom)
A. Central Imperial States (CIS)
B. Newly Emerging Imperial Powers (NEIP)
C. Semi-autonomous Client Regimes (SACR)
D. Client Collaborator Regimes (CCR)
II. Independent States:
A. Revolutionary
Cuba and Venezuela
B. Nationalist
Sudan, Iran, Zimbabwe, North Korea
III. Contested Terrain and Regimes in Transition
Armed resistance, elected regimes, social movements
At the top of the imperial system are those imperial states whose
power is projected on a world scale, whose ruling classes dominate
investment and financial markets and who penetrate the economies of the
rest of the world. At the apex of the imperial system stand the US,
the European Union (itself highly stratified) and Japan. Led by the US
they have established networks of ?follower imperial states? (largely
regional hegemons) and client or vassal states which frequently act as
surrogate military forces. Imperial states act in concert to break
down barriers to penetration and takeovers, while at the same time,
competing to gain advantages for their own state and multinational
interests.
Just below the central imperial states are newly emerging imperial
powers (NEIP), namely China, India, Canada, Russia and Australia. The
NEIP states are subject to imperial penetration, as well as expanding
into neighboring and overseas underdeveloped states and countries rich
in extractive resources. The NEIP are linked to the central imperial
states (CIS) through joint ventures in their home states, while they
increasingly compete for control over extractive resources in the
underdeveloped countries. They frequently ?follow? in the footsteps of
the imperial powers, and in some cases take advantage of conflicts to
better their own position.
For example China and India?s overseas expansion focuses on
investments in extractive mineral and energy sectors to fuel domestic
industrialization, similar to the earlier (1880-1950?s) imperial
practices of the US and Europe. Similarly China invests in African
countries, which are in conflict with the US and EU, just as the US
developed ties with anti-colonial regimes (Algeria, Kenya and
Francophone Africa) in conflict with their former European colonial
rulers in the 1950? and 1960?s.
Further down the hierarchy of the imperial system are the ?semi-
autonomous client regimes? (SACR). These include Brazil, South Korea,
South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Chile and lately
Bolivia. These states have a substantial national economic base of
support, through public or private ownership of key economic sectors.
They are governed by regimes, which pursue diversified markets, though
highly dependent on exports to the emerging imperial states. On the
other hand these states are highly dependent on imperial state military
protection (Taiwan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia) and provide regional
military bases for imperial operations. Many are resource-dependent
exporters (Saudi Arabia, Chile, Nigeria and Bolivia) who share revenues
and profits with the multi-nationals of the imperial states. They
include rapidly industrialized countries (Taiwan and South Korea), as
well as relatively agro-mineral export states (Brazil, Argentina and
Chile).
The wealthy oil states have close ties with the financial ruling
classes of the imperial counties and invest heavily in real estate,
financial instruments and Treasury notes which finance the deficits in
the US and England.
On key issues such as imperial wars in the Middle East, the invasion
of Haiti, destabilizing regimes in Africa, support for global neo-
liberal policies and imperial takeovers of strategic sectors, they
collaborate with rulers from the CIS and the NEIP. Nevertheless,
because of powerful elite interests and in some cases of powerful
national social movements, they come into limited conflicts with the
imperial powers. For example, Brazil, Chile and Argentina disagree
with the US efforts to undermine the nationalist Venezuelan
government. They have lucrative trade, energy and investment relations
with Venezuela. In addition they do not wish to legitimize military
coups, which might threaten their own rule and legitimacy in the eyes
of an electorate partial to President Chavez. While structurally
deeply integrated into the imperial system, the SACR regimes retain a
degree of autonomy in formulating foreign and domestic policy, which
may even conflict or compete with imperial interests.
Despite their ?relative autonomy?, the regimes also provide military
and political mercenaries to serve the imperialist countries. This is
best illustrated in the case of Haiti. Subsequent to the US invasion
and overthrow of the elected Aristide Government in 2004, the US
succeeded in securing an occupation force from its outright client and
?semi-autonomous? client regimes. President Lula of Brazil sent a
major contingent. A Brazilian General headed the entire mercenary
military force. Chile?s Gabriel Valdez headed the United Nations
occupation administration as the senior official overseeing the bloody
repression of Haitian resistance movements. Other ?semi-autonomous?
clients, such as Uruguay and Bolivia, added military contingents along
with soldiers from client regimes such as Panama, Paraguay, Colombia
and Peru. President Evo Morales justified Bolivia?s continued military
collaboration with the US in Haiti under his presidency by citing its
?peacekeeping role?, knowing full well that between December 2006 and
February 2007 scores of Haitian poor were slaughtered during a full-
scale UN invasion of Haiti?s poorest and most densely populated slums.
The key theoretical point is that given Washington current state of
being tied down in two wars in the Middle East and West Asia, it
depends on its clients to police and repress anti-imperialist movements
elsewhere. Somalia, as in Haiti, was invaded by mercenaries by
Ethiopia, trained, financed, armed and directed by US military
advisers. Subsequently, during the occupation, Washington succeeded in
securing its African clients (via the so-called Organization of African
Unity according to the White House?s stooge, Ugandan Army spokesman
Captain Paddy Ankunda) to send a mercenary occupation army to prop up
its unpopular client Somali warlord ruler. Despite opposition from its
Parliament, Uganda is sending 1500 mercenaries along with contingents
from Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana and Malawi.
At the bottom of the imperial hierarchy are the client collaborator
regimes (CCR). These include Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States, Central
American and Caribbean Island states, the Axis of Sub-Saharan States
(ASS) (namely Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana), Colombia,
Peru, Paraguay, Mexico, Eastern European states (in and out of the
European Union), former states of the USSR (Georgia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, etc), Philippines, Indonesia, North Africa and
Pakistan. These countries are governed by authoritarian political
elites dependent on the imperial or NEIP states for arms, financing and
political support. They provide vast opportunities for exploitation
and export of raw materials. Unlike the SACR, exports from client
regimes have little value added, as industrial processing of raw
materials takes place in the imperial countries, particularly in the
NEIP. Predator, rentier, comprador and kleptocratic elites who lack
any entrepreneurial vocation rule the CCR. They frequently provide
mercenary soldiers to service imperial countries intervening,
conquering, occupying and imposing client regimes in imperial targeted
countries. The client regimes thus are subordinate collaborators of
the imperial powers in the plunder of wealth, the exploitation of
billions of workers and the displacement of peasants and destruction of
the environment.
The structure of the imperial system is based on the power of ruling
classes to exercise and project state and market power, retain control
of exploitative class relations at home and abroad and to organize
mercenary armies from among its client states. Led and directed by
imperial officials, mercenary armies collaborate in destroying
autonomous popular, nationalist movements and independent states.
Client regimes form a crucial link in sustaining the imperial powers.
They complement imperial occupation forces, facilitating the extraction
of raw materials. Without the ?mercenaries of color? the imperial
powers would have to extend and over-stretch their own military forces,
provoking high levels of internal opposition, and heightening overseas
resistance to overt wars of re-colonization. Moreover client
mercenaries are less costly in terms of financing and reduce the loss
of imperial soldiers. There are numerous euphemistic terms used to
describe these client mercenary forces: United Nations, Organization
of American States and Organization of African Unity ?peacekeepers?,
the ?Coalition of the Willing? among others. In many cases a few white
imperial senior officers command the lower officers and soldiers of
color of the client mercenary armies.
Independent States and Movements
The imperial system while it straddles the globe and penetrates deeply
into societies, economies and states is neither omnipotent nor
omniscient. Challenges to the imperial system come from two sources:
relatively independent states and powerful social and political
movements.
The ?independent? states are largely regimes, which are in opposition
to and targeted by the imperial states. They include Venezuela, Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe. What defines these regimes as
?independent? is their willingness to reject the policies of the
imperial powers, particularly imperial military interventions. They
also reject imperialist demands for unconditional access to markets,
resources and military bases.
These regimes differ widely in terms of social policy, degree of
popular support, secular-religious identities, economic development and
consistency in opposing imperialist aggression. All face immediate
military threats and /or destabilization programs, designed to replace
the independent governments with client regimes.
Contested Terrain
The imperial hierarchy and networks are based on class and national
relations of power. This means that the maintenance of the entire
system is based on the ruling classes dominating the underlying
population ? a very problematical situation given the unequal
distribution of costs and benefits between the rulers and the ruled.
Today massive armed resistance and social movements in numerous
countries challenge the imperial system.
Contested terrain includes: Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia,
Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon where armed resistance is intent on
defeating imperial clients. Sites of mass confrontations include
Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Iran where the imperial powers are
intent on overthrowing newly elected independent regimes. Large scale
social movements organized to combat client regimes and the imperial
patrons have recently emerged in Mexico, Palestine, Lebanon, China,
Ecuador and elsewhere. Inside the imperial states there is mass
opposition to particular imperial wars and policies, but only small and
weak anti-imperialist movements.
The Anomaly: Israel in the Imperial System
Israel is clearly a colonialist power, with the fourth or fifth
biggest nuclear arsenal and the second biggest arms exporter in the
world. Its population size, territorial spread and economy however are
puny in comparison with the imperial and newly emerging imperial
powers. Despite these limitations Israel exercises supreme power in
influencing the direction of United States war policy in the Middle
East via a powerful Zionist political apparatus, which permeates the
State, the mass media, elite economic sectors and civil society (3a).
Through Israel?s direct political influence in making US foreign
policy, as well as through its overseas military collaboration with
dictatorial imperial client regimes, Israel can be considered part of
the imperial power configuration despite its demographic constraints,
its near universal pariah diplomatic status, and its externally
sustained economy.
Regimes in Transition
The imperial system is highly asymmetrical, in constant disequilibrium
and therefore in constant flux ? as wars, class and national struggles
break out and economic crises bring down regimes and raise new
political forces to power. In recent times we have seen the rapid
conversion of Russia from a world hegemonic contender (prior to 1989),
converted into an imperial client state subject to unprecedented
pillage (1991-1999) to its current position as a newly emerging
imperial state. While Russia is one of the most dramatic cases of
rapid and profound changes in the world imperialist system, other
historical experiences exemplify the importance of political and social
changes in shaping countries? relationship to the world imperial
system. China and Vietnam, former bulwarks as independent, anti-
imperialist states, have seen the rise of liberal-capitalist elites,
the dismantling of the socialized economy and China?s incorporation as
a newly emerging imperialist power and Vietnam as a semi-autonomous
client regime.
The major transitions during the 1980?s ? 1990?s involved the
conversion of independent anti-imperialist states into imperial client
regimes. In the Western hemisphere, these transitions include
Nicaragua, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Jamaica and Grenada. In Africa,
they include Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Ethiopia and
Libya, all converted into kleptocratic client regimes. In Asia similar
processes are afoot in Indo-China. Because of the disastrous
consequences of imperial-centered policies administered by client
regimes, the first decade of the new millennium witnessed a series of
massive popular upheavals and regime changes, especially in Latin
America. Popular insurrections in Argentina and Bolivia led to regime
shifts from client to semi-autonomous clients. In Venezuela after a
failed coup and destabilization campaign, the Chavez regime moved
decisively from semi-autonomous client to an independent anti-
imperialist position.
Ongoing conflicts between imperial and anti-imperialist states,
between client regimes and nationalist movements, between imperial and
newly emerging imperial states, will change the structure of the
imperial system. The outcomes of these conflicts will produce new
coalitions among the principal forces, which compose the imperial
hierarchy and its adversaries. What is clear from this account is that
there is no singular omnipotent ?imperial state? that unilaterally
defines the international or even the imperial system.
Even the most powerful imperial state has proven incapable of
unilaterally (or with clients or imperial partners) defeating or even
containing the popular anti-colonial resistance in Iraq or
Afghanistan. The major imperial political successes have occurred
where the imperial states have been able to activate the military
forces of semi-autonomous and client regimes, secure a regional (OAS,
OAU and NATO) or UN cover to legitimate its conquests. Collaborator
elites from the client and semi-autonomous states are essential links
to the maintenance and consolidation of the imperial system and in
particular the US empire. A specific case is the US?, intervention and
overthrow of the Somali Islamic regime.
The Case of Somalia: Black Masks - White Faces
The recent Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (December 2006) and
overthrow of the de-facto governing Islamic Courts Union (ICU)or
Supreme Council of Islamic Courts and imposition of a self-styled
?transitional government? of warlords is an excellent case study of the
centrality of collaborator regimes in sustaining and expanding the US
empire.
From 1991 with the overthrow of the government of Siad Barre until the
middle of 2006, Somalia was ravaged by conflicts between feuding
warlords based in clan-controlled fiefdoms (3). During the US/UN
invasion and temporary occupation of Mogadishu in the mid-1990?s there
were massacres of over 10,000 Somali civilians and the killing and
wounding of a few dozen US/UN soldiers (4). During the lawless 1990?s
small local groups, whose leaders later made up the ICU, began
organizing community-based organizations against warlord depredations.
Based on its success in building community-based movements, which cut
across tribal and clan allegiances; the ICU began to eject the corrupt
warlords ending extortion payments imposed on businesses and households
(5). In June 2006 this loose coalition of Islamic clerics, jurists,
workers, security forces and traders drove the most powerful warlords
out of the capital, Mogadishu. The ICU gained widespread support among
a multitude of market venders and trades people. In the total absence
of anything resembling a government, the ICU began to provide security,
the rule of law and protection of households and property against
criminal predators (6). An extensive network of social welfare centers
and programs, health clinics, soup kitchens and primary schools, were
set up serving large numbers of refugees, displaced peasants and the
urban poor. This enhanced popular support for the ICU.
After having driven the last of the warlords from Mogadishu and most
of the countryside, the ICU established a de-facto government, which
was recognized and welcomed by the great majority of Somalis and
covered over 90% of the population (7a). All accounts, even those
hostile to the ICU, pointed out that the Somali people welcomed the end
of warlord rule and the establishment of law and order under the ICU.
The basis of the popular support for the Islam Courts during its short
rule (from June to December 2006) rested on several factors. The ICU
was a relatively honest administration, which ended warlord corruption
and extortion. Personal safety and property were protected, ending
arbitrary seizures and kidnappings by warlords and their armed thugs.
The ICU is a broad multi-tendency movement that includes moderates and
radical Islamists, civilian politicians and armed fighters, liberals
and populists, electoralists and authoritarians (7). Most important,
the Courts succeeded in unifying the country and creating some
semblance of nationhood, overcoming clan fragmentation. In the process
of unifying the country, the Islamic Courts government re-affirmed
Somali sovereignty and opposition to US imperialist intervention in the
Middle East and particularly in the Horn of Africa via its Ethiopian
client regime.
US Intervention: The United Nations, Military Occupation, Warlords
and Proxies
The recent history of US efforts to incorporate Somalia into its
network of African client states began during the early 1990?s under
President Clinton (8). While most commentators today rightly refer to
Bush as an obsessive war-monger for his wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
they forget that President Clinton, in his time, engaged in several
overlapping and sequential acts of war in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and
Yugoslavia. Clinton?s military actions and the embargoes killed and
maimed thousands of Somalis, resulted in 500,000 deaths among Iraqi
children alone and caused thousands of civilian deaths and injuries in
the Balkans. Clinton ordered the destruction of Sudan?s main
pharmaceutical plant producing vital vaccines and drugs essential for
both humans and their livestock leading to a critical shortage of these
essential vaccines and treatments (9). President Clinton dispatched
thousands of US troops to Somalia to occupy the country under the guise
of a ?humanitarian mission? in 1994 (10). Washington intervened to
bolster its favored pliant war-lord against another, against the advice
of the Italian commanders of the UN troops in Somalia. Two-dozen US
troops were killed in a botched assassination attempt and furious
residents paraded their mutilated bodies in the streets of the Somali
capital. Washington sent helicopter gunships, which shelled heavily,
populated areas of Mogadishu, killing and maiming thousands of
civilians in retaliation.
The US was ultimately forced to withdraw its soldiers as Congressional
and public opinion turned overwhelmingly against Clinton?s messy little
war. The United Nations, which no longed needed to provide a cover for
US intervention, also withdrew. Clinton?s policy turned toward
securing one subset of client warlords against the others, a policy
which continued under the Bush Administration. The current ?President?
of the US puppet regime, dubbed the ?Transitional Federal Government?,
is Abdullahi Yusuf. He is a veteran warlord deeply involved in all of
the corrupt and lawless depredations which characterized Somalia
between 1991 to 2006 (12). Yusuf had been President of the self-
styled autonomous Puntland breakaway state in the 1990?s.
Despite US and Ethiopian financial backing, Abdullahi Yusuf and his
warlord associates were finally driven out of Mogadishu in June 2006
and out of the entire south central part of the country. Yusuf was
holed up and cornered in a single provincial town on the Ethiopian
border and lacked any social basis of support even from most of the
remaining warlord clans in the capital (13). Some warlords had
withdrawn their support of Yusuf and accepted the ICU?s offers to
disarm and integrate into Somali society underscoring the fact that
Washington?s discredited and isolated puppet was no longer a real
political or military factor in Somalia. Nevertheless, Washington
secured a UN Security Council resolution recognizing the warlord?s tiny
enclave of Baidoa as the legitimate government. This was despite the
fact that the TFG?s very existence depended on a contingent of several
hundred Ethiopian mercenaries financed by the US. As the ICU troops
moved westward to oust Yusuf from his border outpost ? comprising less
than 5% of the country ? the US increased its funding for the
dictatorial regime of Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia to invade Somalia (14).
Despite the setbacks, scores of US military advisers prepared the
Ethiopian mercenaries for a large-scale air and ground invasion of
Somalia in order to re-impose their puppet-warlord Yusuf. Meles
Zenawi, the Ethiopian dictator, depends heavily on US military and
police weaponry, loans and advisors to retain power for his ethnic
?Tigrayan? based regime and to hold onto disputed Somali territory.
The Tigrayan ethnic group represents less than 10% of the Ethiopian
multi-ethnic population. Meles faced growing armed opposition form the
Oromo and Ogandese liberation movements (15). His regime was despised
by the influential Amhara population in the capital for rigging the
election in May 2005, for killing 200 student protesters in October
2006 and jailing tens of thousands (16). Many military officials
opposed him for engaging in a losing border war with Eritrea. Meles,
lacking popular backing, has become the US most loyal and subservient
client in the region. Embarrassingly parroting Washington?s imperial
?anti-terrorist? rhetoric for his attack on Somalia, Meles sent over
15,000 troops, hundreds of armored vehicles, dozens of helicopters and
warplanes into Somalia (17). Claiming that he was engaged in the ?war
against terrorism? Meles terrorized the people of Somalia with aerial
bombardment and a scorched earth policy. In the name of ?national
security? Meles sent his troops to the rescue of the encircled war lord
and US puppet, Abdullahi Yusuf.
Washington co-coordinated its air and naval forces with the advance of
the invading Ethiopian military juggernaut. As the US advised-
Ethiopian mercenaries advanced by land, the US air force bombed fleeing
Somalis killing scores, supposedly in hunting ?Al Queda; sympathizers
(18). According to reliable reports, which were confirmed later by US
and Somali puppet sources, US and Somali military forces have failed to
identify a single Al Queda leader after examining scores of dead and
captured fighters and refugees (19). Once again the pretext to invade
Somalia used by Washington and its Ethiopian client ? that the ICU was
attacked because it sheltered Al Queda terrorists - was demonstrated to
be false. US naval forces illegally interdicted all ships off the
coast of Somalia in pursuit of fleeing Somali leaders. In Kenya,
Washington directed its Nairobi client to capture and return Somalis
crossing the border. Under Washington?s direction both the United
Nations and the Organization of African ?Unity? (sic) agreed to send an
occupation army of ?peace-keepers? to protect the Ethiopian imposed
puppet Yusuf regime.
Given Meles precarious internal position, he could not afford to keep
his occupying army of 15,000 mercenaries in Somalia for long (20).
Somali hatred for the Ethiopian occupiers surged from the first day
they entered Mogadishu. There were massive demonstrations on a daily
basis and increasing incidents of armed resistance from the re-grouped
ICU fighters, local militants and anti-Yusuf warlords (21). The US
directed Ethiopian occupation was followed in its wake by the return of
the same warlords who had pillaged the country between 1991-2005 (22).
Most journalists, experts and independent observers recognize that
without the presence of ?outside? support ? namely the presence of at
least 10,000 US and EU financed African mercenaries (?peacekeepers?)
the Yusuf regime will collapse in a matter of days if not hours.
Washington counts on an informal coalition of African clients ? a kind
of ?Association of Sub-Saharan Stooges? (ASS) ? to repress the mass
unrest of the Somali population and to prevent the return of the
popular Islamic Courts. The United Nations declared it would not send
an occupation army until the ?ASS? military contingents of the
Organization of African Unity had ?pacified the country (23).
The ASS, however willing their client rulers in offering mercenary
troops to do the bidding of Washington, found it difficult to actually
send troops. Since it was transparently a ?made-in-Washington?
operation it was unpopular at home and likely to set ASS forces against
growing Somali national resistance. Even Uganda?s Yoweri Musevent,
Washington?s subservient client, encountered resistance among his
?loyal? rubber-stamp congress (24). The rest of the ASS countries
refused to move their troops, until the EU and US put the money up
front and the Ethiopians secured the country for them. Facing passive
opposition from the great majority of Somalis and active militant
resistance from the Courts, the Ethiopian dictator began to withdraw
his mercenary troops. Washington, recognizing that its Somali puppet,
?President Yusuf?, is totally isolated and discredited, sought to co-
opt the most conservative among the Islamic Court leaders (25). Yusuf,
ever fearful of losing his fragile hold on power, refused to comply
with Washington?s tactic of splitting the ICU.
The Somali Invasion: the Empire and its Networks
The Somali case illustrates the importance of client rulers, warlords,
clans and other collaborators as the first line of defense of strategic
geo-political positions for extending and defending the US empire. The
Somali experience underlines the importance of the intervention by
regional and client rulers of neighboring states in defense of the
empire. Client regimes and collaborator elites greatly lower the
political and economic cost of maintaining the outposts of empire.
This is especially the case given the overextension of US ground forces
in Iraq, Afghanistan and in their impending confrontation with the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Given the ?over-extension? of the US ground forces, the empire relies
on air and sea assaults combined with regional mercenary ground forces
to oust an independent regime with popular backing.
Without the Ethiopian invasion, the puppet Somali warlord Abdullahi
Yusuf would have been easily driven out of Somalia, the country unified
and Washington would no longer control the coastal areas facing a major
maritime oil transport route. The loss of a Somali puppet regime would
have deprived Washington of a coastal platform for threatening Sudan
and Eritrea.
From a practical perspective however, Washington?s strategic plans for
control over the Horn of Africa are deeply flawed. To secure maximum
control over Somali, the White House chose to back a deeply detested
veteran warlord with no social base in the country and dependent on
discredited warring clans and criminal warlords. Isolated and
discredited puppet rulers are a fragile thread on which to construct
strategic policies of regional intervention (military bases and
advisory missions). Secondly Washington chose to use a neighboring
country (Ethiopia) hated by the entire Somali population to prop up
its Somali puppet. Ethiopia had attacked Somali as late as 1979 over
the independence of Ogadan, whose population is close to Somalis.
Washington relied on the invading army of a regime in Addis Ababa,
which was facing increasing popular and national unrest and was clearly
incapable of sustaining a prolonged occupation. Finally, Washington
counted on verbal assurances from the ASS regimes to promptly send
troops to protect its re-installed client. Client regimes always tell
their imperial masters what they want to hear even if they are
incapable of prompt and full compliance. This is especially the case
when clients fear internal opposition and prolonged costly overseas
entanglements, which further discredit them.
The Somali experience demonstrates the gap between the empire?s
strategic projection of power and its actual capacity to realize its
goals. It also exemplifies how imperialists, impressed by the number
of clients, their ?paper? commitments and servile behavior, fail to
recognize their strategic weakness in the face of popular national
liberation movements.
US empire building efforts in the Horn of Africa, especially in
Somalia, demonstrate that even with elite collaborators and client
regimes, mercenary armies and ASS regional allies, the empire
encounters great difficulty in containing or defeating popular national
liberation movements. The failure of the Clinton policy of
intervention in Somalia between 1993-1994 demonstrated this.
The human and economic cost of prolonged military invasions with
ground troops has repeatedly driven the US public to demand withdrawal
(and even accept defeat) as was proven in Korea, Indochina and
increasingly in Iraq.
Financial and diplomatic support, including UN Security Council
decisions, and military advisory teams are not sufficient to establish
stable client regimes. The precariousness of the mercenary-imposed
Yusuf warlord dictatorship demonstrates the limits of US sponsored UN
fiats.
The Somali experience in failed empire-building reveals another even
darker side of imperialism: A policy of ?rule or ruin?. The Clinton
regime?s failure to conquer Somalia was followed by a policy of playing
off one brutal warlord against another, terrorizing the population,
destroying the country and its economy until the ascent of the Islamic
Courts Union. The ?rule or ruin? policy is currently in play in Iraq
and Afghanistan and will come into force with the impending Israeli-
backed US air and sea attack on Iran.
The origins of ?rule or ruin? policies are rooted in the fact that
conquests by imperial armies do not result in stable, legitimate and
popular regimes. Originating as products of imperial conquest, these
client regimes are unstable and depend on foreign armies to sustain
them. Foreign occupation and the accompanying wars on nationalist
movements provoke mass opposition. Mass resistance results in imperial
repression targeting entire populations and infrastructure. The
inability to establish a stable occupation and client regime leads
inevitable to imperial rulers deciding to scorch the entire country
with the after thought that a weak and destroyed adversary is a
consolation for a lost imperial war.
Faced with the rise of Islamic and secular anti-imperialist movements
and states in Africa and possessing numerous client regimes in North
Africa and the ASS grouping, Washington is establishing a US military
command for Africa. The Africa Command will serve to tighten
Washington?s control over African military forces and expedite their
dispatch to repress independence movements or to overthrow anti-
imperialist regimes. Given the expanded, highly competitive presence
of Chinese traders, investors and aid programs, Washington is
bolstering its reliable allies among the African client elites and
generals (26).
-James Petras? latest book is The Power of Israel in the United States
(Clarity Press: Atlanta). His articles in English can be found at the
website ? www.petras.lahaine.org and in Spanish at - www.rebellion.
org.
Footnotes
1. Petras, James and Morris Morley. Empire or Republic (NY:
Routledge, 1995); Petras, J. and M. Morley: ?The Role of the Imperial
State? in US Hegemony Under Siege (London? Verso Books 1990).
2. Petras, James and Morris Morley. ?The US imperial State? in James
Petras et al Class State and Power in the Third World (Allanheld,
Osmin: Montclair NJ, 1981).
3. (3A) see Petras, James The Power of Israel in the United States
(Clarity: Atlanta 2006)
3. see Andrew England ?Spectre of Rival Clans Returns to Mogadishu?,
Financial Times (London), ) December 29, 2006 p.3)
4. Financial Times January 22, 2007 p.12.
5. Financial Times December 29, 2006 p.3.
6. William Church: ?Somalia: CIA Blowback Weakens East Africa? Sudan
Tribune Feb 2, 2007.
7. (7A) The Transitional government was restricted to Baldoa, a small
town and its survival depended on Addis Abbaba. Financial Times
December 29, 2006 p.3
7. Financial Times January 31, 2007 p.2.
8. Stephan Shalom ?Gravy Train: Feeding the Pentagon by Feeding
Somalia? Z Magazine February 1993.
9. Clinton claimed the pharmaceutical plant was producing biological
and chemical weapons ? a story which was refuted by scientific
investigators.
10. Shalom ibid.
11. Mark Bowden Black Hawk Down (Signet: New York 2002)
12. FT December 31, 2006 p.2
13. FT January 5, 2007 p. 4
14. William Church ibid.
15 ?Somalia? Another War Made in the USA? interview with Mohamed
Hassan ([log in to unmask])
16 ibid
17. FT January 5, 2007 p.5; FT December 29, 2006 p. 3
18. BBC News ?US Somali Air Strikes ?Kill Many??, January 9, 2007;
aljazeera.net ?US Launches Air Strikes on Somalia? January 9, 2007
19. FT February 5, 2007 p.5 ??there has been no confirmation yet of
targeted al-Queda suspects according to Meles Zenawi, Ethiopian Prime
Minister.?
20. aljazeera.net January 23, 2007; BBC News ?More Ethiopians to Quit
Somalia? January 28, 2007.
21. aljazeera.net December 29, 2006; aljazeera.net January 6, 2007;
BBC News January 26, 2007; Aljazeere.net January 28, 2007, aljazeera.
net February 11, 2007
22. ?Looting and shooting broke out as soon as the Islamic fighters
left the crumbling capital as militias loyal to the local clans moved
on to the streets.? FT December 29, 2006
23. BBC News January 25, 2007; BBC January 30, 2007; BBC January 5,
2007/
24. People?s Daily Online ?Ugandan Parliament halts bid to rush
deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia?. February 2, 2007
25.Financial Times January 26, 2007 p.6
26.aljazeera.net February 7, 2007
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