ANALYSES …(continued)

In his reply to Dr. Abdoulaye Saine’s e-mail of April 2006 posted on
Gambia-L on July 13th, Halifa Sallah presented what is perhaps the best
document exposing the ideas behind the MoU. There certainly are many other
materials one may need to peruse in other to broaden one’s perspective on
issues such as sovereign equality, building an umbrella party, the five-year
interim term, selection process of flag-bearer, and so on. Mr. Sallah’s own
writings on these matters (representing the NADD position), speeches, and
interviews are too numerous to name and quote, and certainly impossible at
this point in time for me to attempt to research. So I had to discriminate
intentionally between materials I will be quoting in reference to what NADD
stood for as presented by Halifa Sallah. 
That discrimination also must reflect the contentious issues which led to
NADD’s breakdown. Let me be clear about this: NADD’s goal as spelled on
Article 2 of the MoU is “…to put an end to self-perpetuating rule, ensure
the empowerment of the people so that they can participate in sustainable
development”. This goal, like most of NADD’s Strategic Objectives, can only
be put in place through Constitutional amendments, such as the National
Assembly could legislate. [In principle President Jammeh (since he is now
mad, as most people seem to believe) could introduce a bill to amend the
Constitution granting presidential term limits to two five-year terms only.
In which case NADD would have to rewrite its goal]. Only two of NADD’s ten
Strategic Objectives could fall into what may be termed as tactical
objectives. These are in Article 3, Paragraph B, which deals with pulling
NADD’s resources for the elections, and Paragraph C, which reads “…launch a
five-year transitional programme in order to ensure an open democratic
society based on the promotion of national unity, freedom, peace, prosperity
and justice for all”. This is the only matter (the five-year transition)
from NADD’s objectives that also came into contention (added to the obvious
issue of leadership) while attempts at reunion were pursued.

Getting to the bottom of NADD’s breakdown, it will be most instructive if we
study issues relating to the struggle for leadership inside the alliance. 

From his reply to Dr. Saine (NADD’S POSITION ON THE CALL FOR UNITY AMONG THE
OPPOSITION), Halifa Sallah wrote:

 “…suffice it to say that if the task of the first  meeting of the leaders
was restricted to the selection of a presidential and  vice presidential
candidate from parties which had this or that percentage in  a previous
election, we would not have signed a memorandum of understanding in
unanimity despite the diversity of interests and idiosyncrasies of the
leaders. What the leaders sought to do was to enhance ownership of NADD by
all parties by advocating for the principle of sovereign equality of all
parties.  It gave equal opportunity to all members to seek the mandate of
the people on the basis of consensus or through the holding of primaries”.

Halifa Sallah continues:

“…It goes without saying that some of the critics have questioned why NADD
was 
created as an umbrella party. The answer is simple. Since no single party 
could remove the present regime the combined efforts of the parties were
deemed 
necessary to achieve that aim. Most members of NADD acknowledged that if the

combine efforts of all were to promote the candidature of one party, all the

other parties will be marginalized during the period of promoting his or her

candidature”.
Sovereign equality is a principle of international relations that
establishes the equality of countries irrespective of their geographic size,
economic or military might, or their level of social development. But the
principle does not call for the surrender of individual sovereignty to a
higher organ. The UN is the best known organisation founded on sovereign
equality. Well, NADD’s effort here is first and foremost, to establish
equality among its constituent members. It follows logically that if it is
required to establish this kind of equality at the onset, then there must
have been some presumptive element of inequality in the first place? What
else would that element be if not their sizes? So the question of size had
to be subdued from the onset so as to give “equal opportunity to all members
to seek the mandate of the people on the basis of consensus or through the
holding of primaries” and to eventually ensure that other parties are not
marginalised if one party sought to promote its own candidature! Otherwise,
there would have been no NADD! This must be true even if it is counter
argued that sovereign equality was principally desirable in order to prevent
posterior claims of organisational and political credit by one party.
True, the combined efforts of the opposition parties were required if the
dictator should be rid of through a transparent democratic process. It was
therefore inferred desirably that since no one party could dislodge the
dictatorship on its own, the credit for doing so must be shared equally by
the collective. But should that mean that the parties are equal in size,
influence, resources? Elsewhere this piece of fuzzy logic was extended to
put under contention even the numerical strengths of the parties in
question. 

Since all members are registered political parties vying for power through
the mandate of the voters any arrangement they subsequent enter into must
serve the interest of some or all of them. Obviously the only parties that
risked marginalisation are the smaller parties, and so it is no accident
that NADD split along those lines: the smaller parties on one side and the
two larger ones on the other. 
Ladies and gentlemen the first quotation of Halifa Sallah above juxtaposed
with NADD’s goal gives rise to a key question: If the overriding goal of
NADD is to put an end to self-perpetuating rule (a goal that can only be
achieved by a NADD government), why should the very EXISTENCE of the
alliance (signing of the MoU) be made contingent on the leaders’ compliance
with the principle of sovereign equality? Why? Before venturing answers to
this question allow me first to read more of Halifa Sallah:

“…At no time did any member put the issue of the percentage earned in
previous elections as a bargaining chip to contest elections. At no time did
any member call for a primary to determine candidature”.

“…It was envisaged that if each party surrenders its sovereignty to the 
umbrella party for a transition period of five years all of them will retain
their 
original size and political weight and would be guaranteed a level ground
for 
contesting the next following elections. This is when the size of a 
political party would matter”.

“…in short, before we agreed on the content of the MOU we set up a technical
committee comprising the experts of all the political parties. Your party
was represented by people of high intellectual calibre. Within the technical
committee were former permanent secretaries and people with PhD”.

The last quotation here is from an article (NADD and UDP/NRP view on Unity)
posted on Gambia-L on August 11.
One plausible, logical answer to the above key question is that everyone
accepted tacitly that leadership of NADD (because sovereign equality defined
the process of leadership selection) was more important than everything
else. An answer no one will ever agree with!
Another plausible answer is the fear of marginalisation of smaller parties.
Yet still a third plausible answer, linked to the second, is the desire to
secure a guarantee that NADD’s Goals and Strategic Objectives will be
pursued irrespective of whom is selected as flag-bearer. 

Before going any further let me assert that there was indeed a fear of
marginalisation, as well as the suspicion that one party may assume a big
brother role for its own sake and finally, fear that the Strategic
Objectives could be derailed. These are genuine concerns I believe. This was
the reason, among others, why theoretical arguments were developed, put in
print in the MoU and sealed with signatures of all the five party leaders.
So there must have been some degree of mistrust as Ousainou Darboe claimed? 
But let me quickly say that as a matter of principle it was right that these
fears were clearly spelled out, freely expressed, and consequently
recognised. So Mr. Darboe’s claims of mistrust, unless referring to some
factors other than those I mentioned, and unless debate on these matters
were conducted surreptitiously, are without merit.

So our respectable coterie of intellectuals reason this way. Place all
political parties on an equal footing from the beginning; the parties remain
undissolved but they surrender sovereignty to the umbrella party; a leader
gets selected from one of them; NADD governs for five years; during that
period the individual parties (and their supporters) are all compelled to go
underground (!), only to emerge at the end of the five years with their
sizes and all, intact and constant like all the matter in the universe! I do
not know about you, but I find this quiet baffling, and I doubt if it can
indeed pass the laugh test anywhere. But this is serious business.

That our political leaders and well educated Gambians can sign a coalition
document based on these premises seems incredible to me. This is about huge
political power; not a UN kind of thing (where we had a fabulously correct
Kofi Annan but who was in the main, quiet powerless!). Everyone knows that
the majority of Gambians do not cast their votes on account of convictions
on concrete issues, and so everyone must know that such a formula will be
untenable as soon as a leader is selected from inside NADD. The outcome
should be quite predictable. This ladies and gentlemen, is where they all
failed us. Brothers Mo Baldeh, Buharry Gassama and others, all saw that
happening. Why could Halifa Sallah and others not see it? For those
interested, read my short piece from the archives:

http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?A2=ind0601&L=gambia-l&H=1&O=D
&F=P&X=712F7E5BF4ED613618&Y=sidibeh%40adamomail.se&P=29966

They were all, without exception, beset with the idea of power. That a
seasoned lawyer and others broke agreements they signed previously, that
Hamat Bah disregarded basic principles of confidentiality in the midst of
negotiations, that there were instances of mandinka nationalism here and
there, are all largely effects of events; not their causes.
Finally, here is my explanation of Ousainou Darboe’s behaviour:

I think he went into all of this hesitantly, suspicious of the intentions of
the others, and possibly even feeling intimidated by Halifa Sallah’s
involvement. [BTW NADD members or supporters (like myself) need to recognise
that Halifa’s mere presence is intellectually intimidating for political
adversaries. The sad and very unfortunate fact that some will campaign
against his very person and put up a candidate just to secure his defeat is
an instance of intense dislike.This must be gravely considered by those who
value him so much]. After all the initial hiccups, and also realizing that
the idea of a coalition is the best chance of ridding Gambia of the
dictator, he agreed to join the coalition. I think Darboe realised the
dangers inherent in the MoU and its articles on leadership selection and
especially the interim five-year term. But he dismissed these as theoretical
matters only, hoping to renegotiate the term limit eventually. He persuaded
himself confidently that, when the chips are down, everyone else would come
to their senses and recognise that he, and no one else, ought to be flag
bearer on account of the size of the UDP.
The nomination of O.J must have shocked him, realizing that going into
primaries would be a mere formality, since unless there was internal
rebellion within some parties, the village or ward representatives will
simply vote on instigation from their leaders. With equal representation, he
could not possibly win, with PDOIS, PPP, and NDAM votes stacked against his
chances. Also, it is possible that Waa Juwara was not particularly kind to
him during their numerous EC meetings, given their history of personal
discord. He felt badly hoodwinked by the whole process. So he withdrew as
gracefully (!) as he possibly could, and time stood still.
As a lawyer of vast experience, what could he say? Having signed the MoU
willingly, he could not possibly admit that he was tricked into doing it. It
would be exceedingly humiliating. A Mandinka proverb calls it “tying
someone’s hands to a tree”. So his followers, all over the place (including
Gambia-L) remained speechless despite Joe Sambou and others pummelling them
about their lawyer-leader breaking the rules of engagement! They will remain
defenceless on that score forever. Should we accept Mr. Darboe’s behaviour
even if we understand it? Not at all.
All this has been a liberal interpretation of NADD’s breakdown. 

CONCLUSION

A progressive interpretation of what happened needs to be even more
rigorous. Reading through most of what Halifa Sallah, i.e NADD wrote on
different issues relating both to the founding of the coalition and
subsequent attempts at reunification, one cannot escape the impression that
there was a clear discrepancy between language and the existing political
reality. It is as if the nature of NADD was to be found not in its agenda
but in the language it deployed to define itself. Even though some of the
democratic questions it resolved to address were perhaps radical in content,
NADD itself is far from being a radical organisation. Its basic principles
were built on the premises to organise and agitate for reforms within the
existing political context. Progressives inside NADD (members of PDOIS and
NDAM, to be hopeful) needed to recognise the petit-bourgeois identity of the
UDP leadership and engage with them on that basis. Sprouting from the
vacuous remnants of the older PPP, GPP, and the NCP, it contained, not only
Gambia’s largest waramba community of Friday muslims, but also the party
with the broadest mass base in the entire opposition. There was hardly any
reason to doubt that the UDP was and is still interested in democratic
reforms. The key question is whether it could mobilise at will the capacity
implement these reforms.
There were present in NADD all the ingredients for a democratic revolution
(a common minimum program, and an alliance of all forces bent on bringing to
an end the excesses of a truly oppressive state) with one exception: a
strong and well-structured mass organisation. 
What then should progressives do in such a situation?

They needed first to establish a common trench with all democratic forces
and concretise the minimum programme. There should have been no issue
whatsoever about the UDP providing a flag bearer. On the other hand
negotiations needed to be centred on the composition of a NADD government.
With progressives in government, the possibilities of bringing about truly
democratic reforms would have been immeasurably enhanced. With a
theoretically equipped vanguard, student unions could be activated out of
social indifference, and the trade unions pulled out of their bureaucratic
slumber. Government could look into taking control of the peanut trade to
free our peasants from the caprices of unserious businessmen, and quickly
enforce mandatory testing of HIV/AIDS. (Recall what Thomas Sankara did in
Burkina Faso about polio during his very short time)! As we say, the
possibilities would have been almost endless. 

But what do we have left? A Titanic with a witch-doctor as captain, with the
NADD MoU tossed overboard long ago as flotsam and jetsam.

Many, many thanks

© Momodou S Sidibeh

P.S
I am exhausted and disillusioned by it all. So please if I am unable to
answer questions or argue again take it not as discourtesy from my part. I
am all too aware that I might have made mistakes here and there. Just
correct me, in that case. This is OUR history, and I am no trained
historian.I have simply tried to respond as best as I could to brother Omar
Joof's wise counsel that we should all think on our own, and also to Joe
Sambou's encouragement that my opinion may have some value after all.
Thank you.




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