Introduction

It all began with a euphoric bang. After a rickety start burdened with
doubts and hesitations, Gambia's political landscape was to be altered
forever. All the opposition parties had finally agreed to build a coalition
in order to combine their resources for contesting the 2006 and 2007
presidential, national assembly, and local government elections. After
fractured efforts to create a similar umbrella party to contest the
elections of 2001 and 2002, the efforts of a group of Diaspora Gambians
largely based in the United States finally succeeded this time, to bring the
rival parties together and broker an agreement to create such an umbrella
party. These compatriots succeeded in convincing the opposition parties that
their combined strengths, properly organised, funded, and equipped with a
common political platform, offered our suffering population the best chance
of defeating the APRC at the polls. After a period of consultations and
dialogue, all five opposition parties accepted the idea and so the NADD
umbrella party was founded in January 2005. This was an historic an epochal
milestone in post-independence Gambian politics. 

But if NADD's founding was greeted with much goodwill and excitement, it's
collapse was to produce an even greater measure of anguish and
disillusionment across the wide spectrum of opposition party members and
supporters throughout the country and within the Gambian Diaspora. Hopes to
vote the dictatorship from power were dashed and the divided opposition
returned to its old acrimonious, inter party rivalries in new realignments.
The incumbents not only consolidated their grip on power, but even
reinforced their presence in the legislative assembly, depriving the
Opposition from returning to the assembly a number of its most respected and
representative voices. 

The Opposition lost heavily in both ballots. Its division into competing,
rival alliances produced in their previously unified supporter base general
confusion, anxiety in having to redefine, question, reassess loyalties, and
despondency with politics in general; all of these reasons eventually led to
widespread apathy. The divisions amongst the leadership having degenerated
into personal differences will be even more difficult to reconcile. But the
prospects for another coalition are even more remote than formerly, largely
because ordinary opposition supporters, having lost faith after repeated
trials, and facing another term of economic and social sanctions under
Jammeh, will prove immensely difficult to mobilise for yet another season of
a weary process of coalition building.
Well, what forces lay behind the collapse of the original NADD? Who should
we hold responsible? Can we learn anything from the mistakes made in order
to move towards reconciliation within the Opposition, and eventually even
towards brokering a rapprochement before 2011? Can we in the Diaspora, still
take the lead in shaking hands, objectively debating what mistakes were
made, and resolve to apply corrective measures in our respective parties,
and initiate the process of reconciliation? 
It is in that spirit of reconciliation through introspection and
self-criticism that this contribution is made.
 
The Background

Shortly after the founding of NADD in January 2005, Dr. Ebrima Ceesay posted
an inspiring article initiating a discussion on the collective search for a
NADD flag bearer, among other things.  While Ebrima Ceesay thought that an
ideal choice would be anyone from amongst the oppositional leaders
themselves, he cautioned that should such a choice result in disharmony,
"then an Independent candidate living in The Gambia could well be the best
choice". He recommended Dr. Isatou Touray who he argued was not only
qualified to lead a five-year interim NADD government, but also possessed
the added merit of being a well educated social activist. Nonetheless, other
readers on Gambia-L contributed with names of intellectually merited
Gambians such as Dr. Ebrima Samba, Dr. Lenrie Peters, and elder statesman
Alhaji Assan Musa Camara. 

The common qualification of these able Gambians was that none of them was
openly affiliated with any of NADD's five constituent parties, and that all
of them were believed to have broad national appeal, able to put up a
formidable challenge to the APRC presidential candidate, Dr Yahya Jammeh.
Perhaps like many other compatriots, the current author assumed that the
reason most people suggested flag bearers for NADD were "outsiders" was
because of impressions conveyed from an article in the NADD Memorandum of
Understanding, Part III, Section 9, Paragraph A, which reads:
"The interim president of the republic under the Alliance shall serve for
one five year term of office only. He/She shall vacate his or her seat at
the end of his or her term and shall neither seek nor support the
candidature of any other person for the ensuing presidential election". 

Because of this clause, the author suspects, many readers assumed that it
seemed more practical for all stakeholders in NADD to select an acceptably
qualified person from the "outside"; a person who is not affiliated to any
political party, someone of impeccable character and integrity. It was
further assumed that if the flag bearer were to be chosen from any
constituent party of the Alliance, the spirit of the above clause from the
MoU could be compromised. So it was taken for granted that even the members
of the NADD executive were favourably inclined to search for a flag bearer
from outside NADD. Furthermore, the selection of Alhaji Assan Musa Camara,
former vice president of the republic, as NADD chairman, seemed to have
impressed on many that he was interim president in-waiting, in the event of
a NADD victory at the 2006 polls. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, a highly
respected elder politician, for whom the position of interim president would
grant the opportunity to preside over the implementation of NADD strategic
objectives, while steering the nation during a period of national
reconciliation after a decade of brutality, would be a fitting and graceful
exit into retirement.
But soon these speculations were laid to rest when it became apparent that
the flag bearer was to be selected from the opposition leaders in the NADD
executive. 


The Split

On January 20, 2006, The Independent reported that information reaching it
suggested that NADD was to announce its choice of flag bearer at a major
rally to be held in Brikama within a matter of days. But this was never to
occur. A few days later Pa Nderry Mbai of the Freedom newspaper reported on
what were rumoured to be divisions in the NADD executive. Following on the
heels of that report, the resignation of Mr.Ousainou Darboe from the NADD
proved to be a veritable bombshell. From that point onwards, the coalition
effort began to unravel with gathering speed. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, NADD
Chairman, some members of the PPP executive, and Hamat Bah all followed
Darboe's footsteps and left the Alliance. Official reasons given by Ousianou
Darboe for his withdrawal hinged on allegations of "hatred", "mistrust", and
"insincerity".
However, there were reports that Darboe's withdrawal had to do with his
refusing to support an O.J nomination for flag bearer. Impressions were that
Pa Nderry Mbai obtained first hand information from NADD EC meetings.
Details about differences in the NADD executive emerged especially in the
electronic media indicative of attempts by some "lobby" group supporting the
candidature of one Executive Committee member as opposed to the others.  

After the departure of these gentlemen from NADD, the remaining EC members
selected Mr. Halifa Sallah to the position of the NADD flag bearer. Those
who left NADD formed a separate alliance between the UDP and NRP and
officially labelled it the Alliance for Regime Change, (ARC). Two separate
opposition alliances emerged for the run up to the elections. Even though
both groups immediately began campaigning for their different platforms to
their supporters generally, and the voters in general, salvos of accusations
and counter-accusations of disloyalty to the agreed upon protocols of the
original NADD were also fired at rallies. It was not long before similar
differences emerged on Gambia-L and other discussion fora between supporters
of one alliance against those of the other. The blame game sometimes
degenerated into accusations of tribalism and dishonesty, and some
commentators on one side seemingly expressing total incomprehension for the
refusal of the others to acknowledge what to them were obvious travesties
committed by leaders of the opposite side. These differences are still there
and simmering. 
Despite the war of words, the leaders of the two alliances continued with
consultations to find a possible rapprochement on the divisive issues. The
dialogue was encouraged and supported by many Gambians, some publicly and
others privately. Notable amongst them were the efforts of Dr. Abdoulaye
Saine and Mr. Lamin J Darboe, both of whom offered compromise proposals to
the two camps. Other Gambians, believing that a compromise solution was
impossible, perhaps because the contentious positions were aggravated by
personality conflicts, felt it was impossible to find a solution before the
September 22 elections. 

ANALYSES

The above was a chronological synopsis of the process that led to the
unravelling of the NADD into two separate coalitions that contested the
elections on two different tickets. I presented these events as objectively
as I could in relation to what I believe to be important and at once
reflective of my own interpretations. Obviously others must have perceived
and interpreted the process differently.

Excoriating the collapse of a project as grand and historic as NADD set out
to implement on one party or its leaders, must itself qualify as a dubious
venture. While the load of opprobrium might be unevenly distributed, the
responsibility for general failure must be placed on the shoulders of all
involved, without exception. 
NADD committed its first mistake from the very beginning. Within weeks of
its formation, the NADD flag bearer, and his/her running mate ought to have
been quickly selected and presented to the general public. The coalition
would then settle into the administrative serenity required for creating and
building organisational structures, planning its campaign strategy, and
above all, allowing the executive committee members, time to gradually
cultivate mutual trust and a cordial and professional working relationship
amongst themselves; elements which are necessary if former rivals and
adversaries are to convince voters that they not only are part of a strong
team, but also that they would succeed in government. Because this most
important administrative question remained unresolved, mutual suspicion was
allowed to grow unchecked, fomenting unnecessary tension at meetings, and
enhancing the growth of a consultation syndrome.

Everyone knew that President Jammeh would not face the NADD coalition lying
down. It was only a matter of time before his hatchet men shifted their work
into search and destroy missions. Instigated by the clerk of the National
Assembly, the APRC challenged the legal bases upon which NADD was founded.
That the Supreme Court ruled in its favour produced the first glimpses of
fissures inside NADD. Apparently, Ousainou Darboe's caution not to register
NADD as a constituted umbrella party was not listened to, a fact the trained
lawyer made use of publicly. The ensuing electioneering, depriving NADD of
valuable time to concentrate on important organisational work and Hamat
Bah's loss of his seat meant not only added tension in the NADD EC but also
poor use of meagre resources.

President Jammeh became even more hysterical after the APRC suffered defeat
at the by-elections. So he ceased at every straw to discredit NADD:
threatening that NADD will never rule and calling the alliance names. His
unilateral increase of tariffs for trucks at ferry crossings sparked a
dispute with Senegal which responded by closing its borders. Opposition
leaders accused him of incompetence and corruption. So NADD suffered another
disruption in its work as a result of the arrest and subsequent detention of
Halifa Sallah, O.J and Hamat Bah. The absence of the three from the scene
for some six weeks exposed NADD's administrative difficulties, further
delaying the selection of a flag bearer.

In January, NADD could no longer postpone the naming of its presidential
candidate. Instead we all learnt, as if through dropping a bombshell, that
Ousainou Darboe left the Alliance. This was a major blow to NADD. Newspaper
reports and a write-up by Dr. Abdoulaye Saine indicated that Mr. Darboe's
withdrawal had to with his refusal to support an O.J candidature. At this
point NADD began to unravel. Ousainou Darboe's action, more than anything,
else seemed to have triggered that collapse. Here a number of questioned
need to be asked: what his action the spontaneous response to an
unacceptable candidature, or was it the final effect of a process that he
could no longer be party to? This process, even if flawed, was transparent
throughout as Halifa Sallah showed all along. Why then did the good lawyer
Darboe choose to withdraw at this point? Why could he not as a respectable
man of the law stand on his two feet and argue his case? Should we accept
his explanations of mistrust, hatred, and insincerity as solid
justifications for his exit? The questions are many and I have no answers.
But in a short while I will offer an explanation of Ousainou Darboe's
behaviour.

There was general belief that NADD could still be reconfigured if
compromises could be found. NADD mandated Halifa Sallah to represent it on
all negotiations with the ARC leadership. As mentioned earlier, notable
proposals from learned Gambians were those submitted by Lamin J Darboe,
barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court, and Dr. Abdoulaye Saine,
professor of political science.

In April 2006, Dr.Saine writing on behalf of a Committee of Concerned
Gambians, suggested that the opposition unites and present a single ticket
with Darboe/Sallah or Sallah/Darboe as presidential and vice-presidential
candidates respectively. 

In June 2006, L J Darboe wrote a memo in which he presented a number of
proposals including the suggestion that Darboe be chosen as presidential
candidate and Sallah as his running mate.
The constant in all these proposals was the recurrence of Darboe as flag
bearer or running mate. There seemed to be a realisation that a unified
coalition was hardly possible without Darboe chosen as leader, a position I
also maintained even before Darboe's withdrawal from NADD.
Furthermore, I cannot think of any other reason behind the proposals of Dr.
Saine and L J Darboe (a professed Halifa Sallah supporter) other than their
tacit recognition that Ousainou Darboe, for all intents and purposes, leads
the largest opposition party in the Gambia.
In May 2006, Mr. Ebraima Manneh, senior administrative secretary of the
UDP/NRP alliance replied to Dr. Saine's e-mail. He indicated in that reply
that the UDP/NRP alliance had already chosen Mr.Darobe as presidential
candidate and Hamat Bah as his running mate. Among other things he wrote
"...We have studied carefully your ideas and it is apparent that you have
not exhausted all the possible options. You have for example, left out Hamat
Bah and the NRP which is the second largest opposition party and which came
out third in the last presidential elections. We cannot ignore this fact in
any arrangement that has to be worked out within the opposition ranks".
Mr. Hamat Bah himself, while in the United States in May, made remarks
admitting to the committing of mistakes during the inter-party deliberations
that culminated to the signing of the MoU establishing NADD. Mr. Bah said
that they - meaning the original five constituent parties of NADD - agreed
to and acted on principles of equality when they were not equal. Mr. Bah
even held that democracy was about numbers.
It must first be noted that the tone in Mr. Manneh's e-mail was laying down
conditions suggesting the ARC's inclination to conduct negotiations with
NADD from a position of power. With such a tone deployed from the onset,
dialogue could hardly be conducted in good faith. The ARC's conditions for a
unified Opposition can be summarised thus: there must be recognition of the
proven electoral strength of the parties (from past elections) in selecting
the leader. We should recall as well that Ousainou Darboe left NADD for
reasons bordering on personality conflicts (mistrust, hatred, and
insincerity). It is therefore fair to conclude that as far as the UDP/NRP
alliance is concerned, a reunited coalition with NADD is possible if on the
one hand, due consideration is given to the size of the parties; and on the
other hand, matters relating to personal chemistries within the coalition
leadership are sufficiently addressed. We can also conclude, through
inductive reasoning, that since these are the conditions held up for a
unified coalition, they must in all likelihood, also be the major reasons
behind the split from NADD in the first place, whether or not these were
clearly stated! 

To be continued.
(While hoping to post the last and second part of this article in a couple
of days, I am extending sincere apologies for the delay).
Cheers,
Momodou S Sidibeh.




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