Folks:

I am going to take the liberty of sending communication between STGDP and the coalition leaders, to give perspective to the analysis. After sharing these letters and appeals between us and the parties, I will attempt to tell truth and nothing but the truty why NADD failed to stay together.

Please read on:

Dear Mr. Darboe:

After eleven years of the Jammeh presidency, Gambians are absolutely certain that change is needed, and we want it now. Two years after Gambia found itself under tutelage of tyranny, we turned to you. Out of the political ashes a new party/hope was born called the United Democratic Party (UDP).  A whole nation came to you, not because of your political credentials, or that you have demonstrated any ambition of power. In you the country saw a man who is committed to justice, respected as a father, and in the final analysis will only be driven by what is in the interest of The Gambia. STGDP has gotten to know you over the years. We have never had any illusion to the journey all of you have taken, and the challenges and the sacrifices to be encountered. At this critical juncture of the journey, STGDP found it very important to communicate and to dismiss any miscommunication, and to make the push to make sure that all of our efforts will not go in vain. We refuse to allow our adversari
es, especially the dictator himself to water down our accomplishment into sound bites: these leaders are engaged in power struggle driven by selfish ambitions.

Sir, back in the 2003, we reached out to all of you knowing fully well that it only through a coalition of parties that we can bring an end to tyranny. STGDP can unequivocally say that we have never made any deal, demonstrated in any way and agenda or objective to propel anyone to lead this collation. If there was one thing that STGDP was concerns with from the get go was that the selection of the leader may pose some threat to sustain the partnership. We have had series of telephone conferences with the entire leadership, and we can say without a doubt that we have urged all of you to take care of the leadership affair so that we will not find our selves in the present situation. STGDP, like NADD  is tied with the same umbilical cord, our members are supporters of different political parties, and we came together knowing fully well that it is only by working together honestly and fairly will we be able to bring together a coalition of parties that will defeat Jammeh come 2006. The
refore, it would be counter productive for us to engage in deal making, or having an agenda for a specific leader or political party... In some cases perceived members of STGDP will make statements that we are uncomfortable with, and we go the extra mile in a form of a press release to correct the perceived problem. STGDP will be setting ourselves to fail, if we in anyway are perceived fairly or unfairly engaged in taking sides in this national effort. We are only interested in supporting a NADD that is comprised of NRP, UDP, PPP, PDOIS, NDAM, and not a fragmented NADD. Finally, we will never engage in pointing fingers, or engage in a blame game that will only undercut the sincererity and relationships that we have build over the years.

We are appealing to you to open the lines of communication and to ponder all the possibilities before walking away from the dream that all of us have worked so hard to put together. Sir, the party you have led over the years came into being for a sole purpose, and one of the fundamental reasons is to bring back the very democratic credentials we have had in the past, and to build a new era and hope for all Gambians. Your leadership is not an accident of history, but what you have demonstrated in our country. We are confronted with tough decisions and a whole nation is at stake, whatever decision you make will have a huge impact to a whole nation and to generation to come. Please, do not rush to any decisions and let us sought for all possibly and breaking away is not an option. STGDP would like to work with you and the entire coalition partners to find a common ground that will ameliorate the problems. For the sake of our fathers and heritage, let us all make the tough decisions th
at will give us a chance to bring an end to the Jammeh tyranny. If we fail to do that, History will judge us harshly, and no blame game or shifting of responsibility will suffice. The headlines will stay with us for the rest of our lives: the coalition partners went on their separate ways because of their inability to select a leader. We are looking forward to your immediate response, and together we will find away out.

Your sincerely

STGDP








 -------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Momodou S Sidibeh <[log in to unmask]>
> Introduction
> 
> It all began with a euphoric bang. After a rickety start burdened with
> doubts and hesitations, Gambia's political landscape was to be altered
> forever. All the opposition parties had finally agreed to build a coalition
> in order to combine their resources for contesting the 2006 and 2007
> presidential, national assembly, and local government elections. After
> fractured efforts to create a similar umbrella party to contest the
> elections of 2001 and 2002, the efforts of a group of Diaspora Gambians
> largely based in the United States finally succeeded this time, to bring the
> rival parties together and broker an agreement to create such an umbrella
> party. These compatriots succeeded in convincing the opposition parties that
> their combined strengths, properly organised, funded, and equipped with a
> common political platform, offered our suffering population the best chance
> of defeating the APRC at the polls. After a period of consultations and
> dialogue, all five opposition parties accepted the idea and so the NADD
> umbrella party was founded in January 2005. This was an historic an epochal
> milestone in post-independence Gambian politics. 
> 
> But if NADD's founding was greeted with much goodwill and excitement, it's
> collapse was to produce an even greater measure of anguish and
> disillusionment across the wide spectrum of opposition party members and
> supporters throughout the country and within the Gambian Diaspora. Hopes to
> vote the dictatorship from power were dashed and the divided opposition
> returned to its old acrimonious, inter party rivalries in new realignments.
> The incumbents not only consolidated their grip on power, but even
> reinforced their presence in the legislative assembly, depriving the
> Opposition from returning to the assembly a number of its most respected and
> representative voices. 
> 
> The Opposition lost heavily in both ballots. Its division into competing,
> rival alliances produced in their previously unified supporter base general
> confusion, anxiety in having to redefine, question, reassess loyalties, and
> despondency with politics in general; all of these reasons eventually led to
> widespread apathy. The divisions amongst the leadership having degenerated
> into personal differences will be even more difficult to reconcile. But the
> prospects for another coalition are even more remote than formerly, largely
> because ordinary opposition supporters, having lost faith after repeated
> trials, and facing another term of economic and social sanctions under
> Jammeh, will prove immensely difficult to mobilise for yet another season of
> a weary process of coalition building.
> Well, what forces lay behind the collapse of the original NADD? Who should
> we hold responsible? Can we learn anything from the mistakes made in order
> to move towards reconciliation within the Opposition, and eventually even
> towards brokering a rapprochement before 2011? Can we in the Diaspora, still
> take the lead in shaking hands, objectively debating what mistakes were
> made, and resolve to apply corrective measures in our respective parties,
> and initiate the process of reconciliation? 
> It is in that spirit of reconciliation through introspection and
> self-criticism that this contribution is made.
>  
> The Background
> 
> Shortly after the founding of NADD in January 2005, Dr. Ebrima Ceesay posted
> an inspiring article initiating a discussion on the collective search for a
> NADD flag bearer, among other things.  While Ebrima Ceesay thought that an
> ideal choice would be anyone from amongst the oppositional leaders
> themselves, he cautioned that should such a choice result in disharmony,
> "then an Independent candidate living in The Gambia could well be the best
> choice". He recommended Dr. Isatou Touray who he argued was not only
> qualified to lead a five-year interim NADD government, but also possessed
> the added merit of being a well educated social activist. Nonetheless, other
> readers on Gambia-L contributed with names of intellectually merited
> Gambians such as Dr. Ebrima Samba, Dr. Lenrie Peters, and elder statesman
> Alhaji Assan Musa Camara. 
> 
> The common qualification of these able Gambians was that none of them was
> openly affiliated with any of NADD's five constituent parties, and that all
> of them were believed to have broad national appeal, able to put up a
> formidable challenge to the APRC presidential candidate, Dr Yahya Jammeh.
> Perhaps like many other compatriots, the current author assumed that the
> reason most people suggested flag bearers for NADD were "outsiders" was
> because of impressions conveyed from an article in the NADD Memorandum of
> Understanding, Part III, Section 9, Paragraph A, which reads:
> "The interim president of the republic under the Alliance shall serve for
> one five year term of office only. He/She shall vacate his or her seat at
> the end of his or her term and shall neither seek nor support the
> candidature of any other person for the ensuing presidential election". 
> 
> Because of this clause, the author suspects, many readers assumed that it
> seemed more practical for all stakeholders in NADD to select an acceptably
> qualified person from the "outside"; a person who is not affiliated to any
> political party, someone of impeccable character and integrity. It was
> further assumed that if the flag bearer were to be chosen from any
> constituent party of the Alliance, the spirit of the above clause from the
> MoU could be compromised. So it was taken for granted that even the members
> of the NADD executive were favourably inclined to search for a flag bearer
> from outside NADD. Furthermore, the selection of Alhaji Assan Musa Camara,
> former vice president of the republic, as NADD chairman, seemed to have
> impressed on many that he was interim president in-waiting, in the event of
> a NADD victory at the 2006 polls. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, a highly
> respected elder politician, for whom the position of interim president would
> grant the opportunity to preside over the implementation of NADD strategic
> objectives, while steering the nation during a period of national
> reconciliation after a decade of brutality, would be a fitting and graceful
> exit into retirement.
> But soon these speculations were laid to rest when it became apparent that
> the flag bearer was to be selected from the opposition leaders in the NADD
> executive. 
> 
> 
> The Split
> 
> On January 20, 2006, The Independent reported that information reaching it
> suggested that NADD was to announce its choice of flag bearer at a major
> rally to be held in Brikama within a matter of days. But this was never to
> occur. A few days later Pa Nderry Mbai of the Freedom newspaper reported on
> what were rumoured to be divisions in the NADD executive. Following on the
> heels of that report, the resignation of Mr.Ousainou Darboe from the NADD
> proved to be a veritable bombshell. From that point onwards, the coalition
> effort began to unravel with gathering speed. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, NADD
> Chairman, some members of the PPP executive, and Hamat Bah all followed
> Darboe's footsteps and left the Alliance. Official reasons given by Ousianou
> Darboe for his withdrawal hinged on allegations of "hatred", "mistrust", and
> "insincerity".
> However, there were reports that Darboe's withdrawal had to do with his
> refusing to support an O.J nomination for flag bearer. Impressions were that
> Pa Nderry Mbai obtained first hand information from NADD EC meetings.
> Details about differences in the NADD executive emerged especially in the
> electronic media indicative of attempts by some "lobby" group supporting the
> candidature of one Executive Committee member as opposed to the others.  
> 
> After the departure of these gentlemen from NADD, the remaining EC members
> selected Mr. Halifa Sallah to the position of the NADD flag bearer. Those
> who left NADD formed a separate alliance between the UDP and NRP and
> officially labelled it the Alliance for Regime Change, (ARC). Two separate
> opposition alliances emerged for the run up to the elections. Even though
> both groups immediately began campaigning for their different platforms to
> their supporters generally, and the voters in general, salvos of accusations
> and counter-accusations of disloyalty to the agreed upon protocols of the
> original NADD were also fired at rallies. It was not long before similar
> differences emerged on Gambia-L and other discussion fora between supporters
> of one alliance against those of the other. The blame game sometimes
> degenerated into accusations of tribalism and dishonesty, and some
> commentators on one side seemingly expressing total incomprehension for the
> refusal of the others to acknowledge what to them were obvious travesties
> committed by leaders of the opposite side. These differences are still there
> and simmering. 
> Despite the war of words, the leaders of the two alliances continued with
> consultations to find a possible rapprochement on the divisive issues. The
> dialogue was encouraged and supported by many Gambians, some publicly and
> others privately. Notable amongst them were the efforts of Dr. Abdoulaye
> Saine and Mr. Lamin J Darboe, both of whom offered compromise proposals to
> the two camps. Other Gambians, believing that a compromise solution was
> impossible, perhaps because the contentious positions were aggravated by
> personality conflicts, felt it was impossible to find a solution before the
> September 22 elections. 
> 
> ANALYSES
> 
> The above was a chronological synopsis of the process that led to the
> unravelling of the NADD into two separate coalitions that contested the
> elections on two different tickets. I presented these events as objectively
> as I could in relation to what I believe to be important and at once
> reflective of my own interpretations. Obviously others must have perceived
> and interpreted the process differently.
> 
> Excoriating the collapse of a project as grand and historic as NADD set out
> to implement on one party or its leaders, must itself qualify as a dubious
> venture. While the load of opprobrium might be unevenly distributed, the
> responsibility for general failure must be placed on the shoulders of all
> involved, without exception. 
> NADD committed its first mistake from the very beginning. Within weeks of
> its formation, the NADD flag bearer, and his/her running mate ought to have
> been quickly selected and presented to the general public. The coalition
> would then settle into the administrative serenity required for creating and
> building organisational structures, planning its campaign strategy, and
> above all, allowing the executive committee members, time to gradually
> cultivate mutual trust and a cordial and professional working relationship
> amongst themselves; elements which are necessary if former rivals and
> adversaries are to convince voters that they not only are part of a strong
> team, but also that they would succeed in government. Because this most
> important administrative question remained unresolved, mutual suspicion was
> allowed to grow unchecked, fomenting unnecessary tension at meetings, and
> enhancing the growth of a consultation syndrome.
> 
> Everyone knew that President Jammeh would not face the NADD coalition lying
> down. It was only a matter of time before his hatchet men shifted their work
> into search and destroy missions. Instigated by the clerk of the National
> Assembly, the APRC challenged the legal bases upon which NADD was founded.
> That the Supreme Court ruled in its favour produced the first glimpses of
> fissures inside NADD. Apparently, Ousainou Darboe's caution not to register
> NADD as a constituted umbrella party was not listened to, a fact the trained
> lawyer made use of publicly. The ensuing electioneering, depriving NADD of
> valuable time to concentrate on important organisational work and Hamat
> Bah's loss of his seat meant not only added tension in the NADD EC but also
> poor use of meagre resources.
> 
> President Jammeh became even more hysterical after the APRC suffered defeat
> at the by-elections. So he ceased at every straw to discredit NADD:
> threatening that NADD will never rule and calling the alliance names. His
> unilateral increase of tariffs for trucks at ferry crossings sparked a
> dispute with Senegal which responded by closing its borders. Opposition
> leaders accused him of incompetence and corruption. So NADD suffered another
> disruption in its work as a result of the arrest and subsequent detention of
> Halifa Sallah, O.J and Hamat Bah. The absence of the three from the scene
> for some six weeks exposed NADD's administrative difficulties, further
> delaying the selection of a flag bearer.
> 
> In January, NADD could no longer postpone the naming of its presidential
> candidate. Instead we all learnt, as if through dropping a bombshell, that
> Ousainou Darboe left the Alliance. This was a major blow to NADD. Newspaper
> reports and a write-up by Dr. Abdoulaye Saine indicated that Mr. Darboe's
> withdrawal had to with his refusal to support an O.J candidature. At this
> point NADD began to unravel. Ousainou Darboe's action, more than anything,
> else seemed to have triggered that collapse. Here a number of questioned
> need to be asked: what his action the spontaneous response to an
> unacceptable candidature, or was it the final effect of a process that he
> could no longer be party to? This process, even if flawed, was transparent
> throughout as Halifa Sallah showed all along. Why then did the good lawyer
> Darboe choose to withdraw at this point? Why could he not as a respectable
> man of the law stand on his two feet and argue his case? Should we accept
> his explanations of mistrust, hatred, and insincerity as solid
> justifications for his exit? The questions are many and I have no answers.
> But in a short while I will offer an explanation of Ousainou Darboe's
> behaviour.
> 
> There was general belief that NADD could still be reconfigured if
> compromises could be found. NADD mandated Halifa Sallah to represent it on
> all negotiations with the ARC leadership. As mentioned earlier, notable
> proposals from learned Gambians were those submitted by Lamin J Darboe,
> barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court, and Dr. Abdoulaye Saine,
> professor of political science.
> 
> In April 2006, Dr.Saine writing on behalf of a Committee of Concerned
> Gambians, suggested that the opposition unites and present a single ticket
> with Darboe/Sallah or Sallah/Darboe as presidential and vice-presidential
> candidates respectively. 
> 
> In June 2006, L J Darboe wrote a memo in which he presented a number of
> proposals including the suggestion that Darboe be chosen as presidential
> candidate and Sallah as his running mate.
> The constant in all these proposals was the recurrence of Darboe as flag
> bearer or running mate. There seemed to be a realisation that a unified
> coalition was hardly possible without Darboe chosen as leader, a position I
> also maintained even before Darboe's withdrawal from NADD.
> Furthermore, I cannot think of any other reason behind the proposals of Dr.
> Saine and L J Darboe (a professed Halifa Sallah supporter) other than their
> tacit recognition that Ousainou Darboe, for all intents and purposes, leads
> the largest opposition party in the Gambia.
> In May 2006, Mr. Ebraima Manneh, senior administrative secretary of the
> UDP/NRP alliance replied to Dr. Saine's e-mail. He indicated in that reply
> that the UDP/NRP alliance had already chosen Mr.Darobe as presidential
> candidate and Hamat Bah as his running mate. Among other things he wrote
> "...We have studied carefully your ideas and it is apparent that you have
> not exhausted all the possible options. You have for example, left out Hamat
> Bah and the NRP which is the second largest opposition party and which came
> out third in the last presidential elections. We cannot ignore this fact in
> any arrangement that has to be worked out within the opposition ranks".
> Mr. Hamat Bah himself, while in the United States in May, made remarks
> admitting to the committing of mistakes during the inter-party deliberations
> that culminated to the signing of the MoU establishing NADD. Mr. Bah said
> that they - meaning the original five constituent parties of NADD - agreed
> to and acted on principles of equality when they were not equal. Mr. Bah
> even held that democracy was about numbers.
> It must first be noted that the tone in Mr. Manneh's e-mail was laying down
> conditions suggesting the ARC's inclination to conduct negotiations with
> NADD from a position of power. With such a tone deployed from the onset,
> dialogue could hardly be conducted in good faith. The ARC's conditions for a
> unified Opposition can be summarised thus: there must be recognition of the
> proven electoral strength of the parties (from past elections) in selecting
> the leader. We should recall as well that Ousainou Darboe left NADD for
> reasons bordering on personality conflicts (mistrust, hatred, and
> insincerity). It is therefore fair to conclude that as far as the UDP/NRP
> alliance is concerned, a reunited coalition with NADD is possible if on the
> one hand, due consideration is given to the size of the parties; and on the
> other hand, matters relating to personal chemistries within the coalition
> leadership are sufficiently addressed. We can also conclude, through
> inductive reasoning, that since these are the conditions held up for a
> unified coalition, they must in all likelihood, also be the major reasons
> behind the split from NADD in the first place, whether or not these were
> clearly stated! 
> 
> To be continued.
> (While hoping to post the last and second part of this article in a couple
> of days, I am extending sincere apologies for the delay).
> Cheers,
> Momodou S Sidibeh.
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 
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