The Chinese Century
Time  Magazine
Thursday, Jan. 11, 2007 By MICHAEL ELLIOTT 

WHOSE  CENTURY?

So, a China whose influence is growing but that is trying to  ease old 
antagonisms--what's not to like?
In one view, nothing at all, as  long as China's rise remains peaceful, with 
China neither provoking others to  rein in its power nor slipping into outward 
aggression. And yet as remote as a  confrontation seems today, there are some 
China watchers who fear a conflict  with the West could still materialize in 
coming years. They point to two  factors: the modernization of China's defense 
forces and the risk of war over  Taiwan. The authoritative Military Balance, 
published annually by the  International Institute for Strategic Studies in 
London, estimates that China's  military spending has increased nearly 300% in 
the past decade and from 1.08% of  its GDP in 1995 to 1.55% in 2005. (By 
contrast, the U.S. spends 3.9% of its GDP  on defense, and the U.S. economy is more 
than five times as big as China's.)  China's most recent defense white paper, 
published last month, showed a 15% rise  in military spending in the past 
year. Place such an increase in the context of  Taiwan policy and you can start to 
feel queasy. The island has been governed  independently since the defeated 
forces of Chiang Kai-shek retreated there in  1949. Beijing wants to see the 
island reunited with the mainland one day. The  U.S., although it has a 
one-China policy and has no formal diplomatic mission in  Taiwan, is committed to 
defend Taiwan from an unprovoked attack by  China.

In all likelihood, war over Taiwan is unlikely. After a miserable  200 years, 
China's prospects now are as bright as ever, the opportunities of its  people 
improving each year. It would take a particularly stupid or evil group of  
leaders to put that glittering prize at risk in a war. Those in Taiwan who favor 
 independence--including its President Chen Shui-bian--have singularly failed 
to  win the support of the Bush Administration. "China," says Huang Jing of 
the  Brookings Institution in Washington, "is now basically on the same page as 
the  U.S. when it comes to Taiwan. Neither wants independence for Taiwan. 
Both want  peace and stability." China's military buildup is best seen as a 
corollary of  changes in Chinese society. Where Chinese military doctrine was once 
based on  human-wave attacks, it now stresses the killing power of technology. 
There's  nothing new, or particularly frightening, about such a 
transformation; it's what  nations do all the time. If the Sioux hadn't learned how to 
handle horses and  shoot Winchesters, they wouldn't have wiped out Custer's forces 
at the Little  Bighorn.

But other aspects of China's rise are real and troubling. China  is a 
one-party state, not a democracy. Some U.S. policymakers and business  leaders like 
to say there is something inevitable about political change in  China--that as 
China gets richer, its population will press for more democratic  freedoms and 
its ruling élite, mindful of the need for change, will grant them.  Could 
be. But China is becoming richer now, and if there is any sign of  substantial 
political reform--or any sign that the absence of such reform is  hurting 
China's economic growth--it is, to put it mildly, hard to  find.

Does China's lack of democracy necessarily threaten U.S. interests?  One 
answer to that question involves looking back to the cold war. The Soviet  Union 
was not a democracy, and although the U.S. contested its power in all  sorts of 
ways, American policymakers were content to live with the reality of  Soviet 
strength in the hope (correct, as it turned out) that communism's appeal  
outside its borders would wither and Russia's political system would become more  
open. Is that how the U.S. should treat a nondemocratic China? In the  
forthcoming book The China Fantasy, James Mann, an experienced China watcher now  at 
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, warns that living  
with a more powerful, nondemocratic Beijing would not be easy for the U.S. In 
 crucial ways, the U.S. has less leverage over China than it ever had over 
the  Soviet Union. China holds billions of dollars of U.S. government assets.  
American consumers have come to rely on cheap labor in China to provide goods 
at  Wal-Mart's everyday low prices. The Soviet Union, by contrast, was an 
economic  basket case: it had minimal foreign-exchange reserves and was desperate 
for U.S.  and European high technology.

This lack of leverage over Chinese behavior  may make for an uncomfortable 
future. Mann sees a time when a powerful China not  only remains undemocratic 
but also sustains unpleasant regimes in power, as it  does today in such nations 
as Zimbabwe and Burma. Such behavior could make the  world a colder place for 
freedom. Green, the former National Security Council  staff member, agrees 
that China "wants to build speed bumps on the road to  political globalization 
and liberalization" and is "particularly against any  attempt to spread 
democracy." Sandschneider, the German China expert, says the  Chinese "talk about 
peace and cooperation and development, which sounds great to  European ears--but 
underneath is a question of brutal competition for energy,  for resources and 
for markets."

How can that competition be managed? And  how can the U.S. and its allies 
convince the Chinese not to support rogue  regimes? The key may be to identify 
more areas in which China's national  interests align with the West's and where 
cooperation brings mutual benefits.  China competes aggressively for natural 
resources. But as David Zweig and Bi  Jianhai of the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology argued in Foreign  Affairs in 2005, it would make just as 
much sense for the U.S. and China--both  gas guzzlers--to pool forces and 
figure out how to tap renewable sources of  energy and conserve existing 
supplies. For a start, the U.S. could work to get  China admitted into the 
International Energy Agency and the G-8, where such  topics are debated.

The U.S. can also encourage China's leaders to  recognize that irresponsible 
policies will diminish China's long-term influence.  As China expands its 
global reach, it will find itself exposed to all sorts of  pressures--of the sort 
it has never had to face before--to behave itself.  Already, there are voices 
in Africa warning China that it is acting just like  the white imperialists of 
old. In the Zambian city of Kabwe, where the Chinese  own a manganese 
smelter, the local shops are stocked with Chinese-made clothes  rather than local 
ones. In the oil-rich delta region of Nigeria, where Chinese  rigs have a 
reputation for poor safety and employment practices, a militia group  recently warned 
the Chinese they would be targeted for attack unless they  changed their ways.

There are some glimmers that such criticism is having  an impact in Beijing. 
The Chinese, says Joshua Kurlantzick of the China Program  at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, "are beginning to understand  that some of 
their policies in Africa are turning people off" and have quietly  turned to the 
U.S. and Britain for help in devising foreign-aid policies. A  former senior 
U.S. official says Chinese officials have been closely monitoring  the growing 
international distaste over its support for the Sudanese government.  
Congressman Lantos says younger Chinese diplomats "are embarrassed that the  Chinese 
government is prepared to do any business with Sudan for oil despite  what is 
happening in Darfur." Slowly, slowly, engagement with China, debate with  its 
leaders--and the hope that as they see more of the world, they will  understand 
why so many want to shun dictatorships--may all act to shade Chinese  
behavior.

Such engagement will always be controversial. Like it or not,  it involves 
cozying up to a nation that is not a democracy--and does not look as  if it will 
become one soon. But China is now so significant a player in the  global 
economy that the alternative--waiting until China changes its ways--won't  fly. 
There is still time to hope that China's way into the world will be a  smooth 
one. Perhaps above anything else, the sheer scale of China's domestic  agenda is 
likely to act as a brake on its doing anything dramatically  destabilizing 
abroad.
On the optimistic view, then, China's rise to global  prominence can be 
managed. It doesn't have to lead to the sort of horror that  accompanied the 
emerging power of Germany or Japan. Raise a glass to that, but  don't get too 
comfortable. There need be no wars between China and the U.S., no  catastrophes, no 
economic competition that gets out of hand. But in this century  the relative 
power of the U.S. is going to decline, and that of China is going  to rise. 
That cake was baked long ago. 

With reporting by Hannah Beech /  Bangkok, Simon Elegant, Susan Jakes / 
Beijing, James Graff / Paris, Megan Lindow  / Dondo, Alex Perry / Johannesburg, 
Bill Powell / Shanghai, Andrew Purvis /  Berlin, Simon Robinson / Kabwe, Elaine 
Shannon, Mark Thompson /  Washington

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