Halifa’s role to the NADD breakup:

Halifa Sallah – The NADD Coordinator:  For me to be able to demonstrate objectivity, I  have to keep reminding myself that there is a need to make a clear distinction between Halifa Sallah the Coordinator of NADD; from Halifa Sallah  the public servant advocate, politician and  civic leader, committed to defend and protect the rights of all Gambians. This write up is only looking at what he has done, or neglected to do as a Coordinator to make NADD a successful enterprise.  This is important for me to do because I am a PDOIS sympathizer, and have a tremendous admiration for Halifa the person, the advocate of public policies.

During the NADD journey I have gotten the opportunity to know Halifa better and continue to respect him immensely. He epitomizes the best in the Gambian character, and gives hope that maybe not all is lost; moreover, reinforces the fact that indeed there are good and decent Gambians, even among politicians. Like his counterparts in the opposition, he was invited to the “Meet the Diaspora Summit” in Atlanta, and it was at this summit that the NADD idea was tabled. Halifa was one of the individuals that did not embrace the idea right away, he raised the fundamental issue of why a coalition, and coalition for what. He argued whether this whole effort will not end just like other coalitions in the African continent, basically removing a dictator only to replace with another. He continued to talk about the importance of bringing relevant change to the lives of Gambians, and permanent change through enlightenment. It was very apparent that he was interested in system change. This was vin
tage Halifa – classic PDOIS. As usual, he came across very impressive, and for Gambians living in the Diaspora, we were very receptive to the OJ’s nomination of Halifa to become the Coordinator of NADD.

As the Coordinator, Halifa’s role was to bring these opposition parties together, irrespective of their party and personal differences, to help find a common ground that a coalition force can be built and would ultimately remove President Jammeh, replace him with a democratic system. He was given the responsibility because he was one person that the entire group can trust. And in all through the talks, he demonstrated fairness and guarded that trust. In fact, even after the MOU was signed and his responsibility as a Coordinator ended, his partners re-elected him to continue as the Coordinator, and Hassan Musa as the Chairman. Clearly, the trust factor was there.

 From my own experience and really looking back, NADD had three fundamental issues to tackle and these challenges could have made or broke the effort, and in the final analysis it was these same issues that ended the aspiration of an entire nation. The first fundamental challenge was putting together the constitution – the agreement that would help bring about the direction and plans for the coalition effort. That constitution/blue print came to be the MOU. The second potential land mine was to finally come up with a political entity, or to use one of the political parties to run against the APRC in the 2006 General elections. This was a huge issue because it addresses the very heart of the coalition itself. According to sources this particular issue was debated, and let out lots of emotions and tempers during the talks. The final one was who among these party leaders would lead the coalition against Jammeh, or to bring in an independent person to lead it.

As the Coordinator, Halifa was able to accomplish the first challenge, it was not easy and there were competing blue prints.  According to sources, and other official feedback we were getting from the inside, they have spent a lot of time debating this important issue. UDP insisted that the party led idea is the most realistic framework to do this, and together they will still be able to implement the necessary democratic changes. The MOU became the blue print that they all agreed to, but as one thumbs through the document it became obvious that Halifa got what he wanted. The document is a clear reflection of his core beliefs, and the nuances and aspirations of PDOIS the political party. Now, the truth is these were different political parties coming together to forge a new direction, and Halifa got the best out of the deal, and politics of course is about interests.. Like his counterparts, he had his agenda and would have liked to see his agenda to be accommodated in the effort. H
is partners went along with him, even though they might not have like everything in it. Really, what PDOIS could not achieve in twenty years – in terms of political program ideas, now the entire opposition was willing to support as the new way forward. Truthfully, it was apparent that the entire opposition endorsed what is invariable the PDOIS concept. But, at the end he failed to demonstrate and capitalize in this new opportunity and refused to be a practical politician and would have to pushed the envelope. He wanted safeguards and guarantees, and cleverly had to minimize the political risk. In the MOU, the second potential land mine – under what entity would this effort operates was also addressed – it indicated that the new entity is NADD, and will become the home of the coalition effort. But, the entire problem was not going to go away because technically NADD was not a political entity that can contest elections. What we all witnessed during the by-elections, candidates were 
still running under their individual parties – UDP, NRP and PDOIS, but were still seen as NADD candidates.  This part got murky because the initial intent was to have a coalition of party called NADD, all the parties came together to form an umbrella party, but this entity cannot legally contest elections. Halifa, the constitutional scholar must have known that in the final analysis, NADD would have to be registered as a political party, and that will be the only way to deny the individual parties to run away with the effort. If you end up selecting any one of the party leaders as flag bearer, they would have to legally run under their party banner, even though they will be regarded as the NADD presidential candidate. Halifa was not going to take this political risk. NADD had to be registered as a political entity to eliminate the possibilities of given any advantage to any of the parties, and with  that move, it led to the supreme court ruling that hampered NADD financially and en
able the APRC to got lots of political mileage from it. For STGDP, this was a disappointment, and we could not understand how the savvy politicians could have overlooked, and the Coordinator should be held responsible. Remember, we had by-elections before the registration of NADD and these elections led to victories. Different candidates from UDP, NRP and even PDOIS run under the NADD banner before the registration, and people walked into these pools and voted for NADD. Why the registration? Was this also one of the safeguards that Halifa thought was needed because he just cannot leave it in the hands of his partners? The Coordinator was unwilling to take a political risk with his partners, and had to build safeguards. At least, they have gone with an MOU that Halifa was comfortable with, a true reflection of his core beliefs, but he still wanted to make sure that the whole process is wrapped with safeguards.  Halifa should have champion the effort by accommodating the wishes of so
me of the major players, especially the UDP. They were an important party to the coalition, and it was not completely unrealistic to give them a political reason to stay in the fold. He failed to understand the politics of the moments, and had focus too much on safeguards.

Another issue that contributed to the breakup from Halifa’s end was when they were all arrested by Jammeh and taken to Mile 2. The whole country was outrage, and I could still remember that night we had a telephone conference, there were over sixty Gambians trying to call into the conference. Their arrest basically brought all of us together; I can still remember that night – UDP, NRP, PDOIS, NDAM, and PPP supporters were all angry and were speaking the same language. At the end of the conference, we were able to raise close to three thousand dollars. As the Coordinator, Halifa was arrested and taken to jail, and when Mr. Darboe, really the legal expert in the group offered to represent him, he declined and claimed to represent himself. Here, he demonstrated poor judgement, and without a doubt affected whatever trust Ousainou had for him. I still remember receiving a call from Karamba, and UDP folks were outrage and angry. He was a coordinator of a complex entity, and maintaining t
rust is a required element if you are going to maintain the group. When he failed to allow one of his partners to represent him, to what was considered a political case that goes right through the heart of their coming together. This was a major faux par, and might have contributed in a major way to the break up

For STGDP, dealing with NADD was not always very easy, and the relationship was very interesting. When I read from Haruna’s piece saying that STGDP should have only remained as facilitators, I could not help but just shake my head. That is exactly what we were, a political interest group trying to influence decisions. During these times, Halifa was the hardest to communicate with, and as the coordinator there were always members in our group insisting that we should only act or react to issues that we only got from the Coordinator. This was not easy because Halifa was always reluctant to share lots of information. We have had several instances that the effort was confronted with problems leading to a break up, and when we finally talk to Halifa, he was always very careful, optimistic and would end up spinning the whole issue. I understood that there was the confidentiality element, but when a house is on fire it is important to call it exactly what it is. I could only say his failu
re to play politics, and wanted to keep the whole effort on a certain plain did no really help at the end

STGDP was always very concern that the leadership issue, if not address quickly this whole enterprise would failed. During this time STGDP had a political liaison officer who would constantly call Halifa to get information, and continued to relate to him what our concerns were. The leadership issue was always one of the issues we kept hammering away, always trying to influence them to tackle it and bring closure to it. Halifa had always downplayed its importance, and would tell us that we are indeed the ones obsessed with the leadership, the same kind of similar characterization from Waa. As the Coordinator, he must have known that this is indeed the most important aspect of the whole effort in terms of keeping all the parties in the effort. This was one big land mine, the big elephant in room that he failed to address, and by postponing the inevitable. Was this also one of the safeguards? I do not believe in a million years that he had an agenda to fight for the leadership, and he
 had never given us any indication that this was in the cards. The language in the MOU as it pertains to the selection process was murky at best, and only added complications to a potential land mine. I have gone and looked at the word CONSENSUS, this was one of the most important words in the MOU, and there is a real reason it was in there... I first smelled the problem with this clause in Atlanta at a meeting with two of the leaders – OJ and Waa, and their interpretation of what consensus meant was quite interesting. They both had a different interpretation on what it meant, and this was after lots of debates and signing of the document. Finally, when we posed the question to Halifa, he told us that no single person can be elected without everyone supporting the person’s candidacy. In other words, any of the leaders can veto the decision. I understand the fairness in the spirit of the intent, but it is unrealistic. .

In the end, the well trusted Coordinator could not deliver our dream of a coalition of all political parties to run against Jammeh. Instead, we ended up with a NADD coalition that was not practically different from PDOIS, and of course the election results reflected that. People who went to the pools and voted for NADD, actually voted for PDOIS, and the ones that stayed home had to because the NADD party did not exist. Politics is indeed a complex phenomenon. Personally, I believe that Halifa’s core beliefs which are reflected in that document called the MOU is what is good for the future of our country. But his emphasis on safeguards and his failure to focus on the politics of the moments and take a risk with the most realistic plan that would still leave us intact; instead he wanted to do the right thing and was willing to pay a price of losing the election than cutting a deal when we needed it.

Musa Jeng

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