All previous posts of this article were full of typos and grammatical
howlers. I have reedited and redacted the original version largely because
of widespread interest it generated beyond Gambia-L. It is therefore perhaps
just as fitting that I post that final version here even if only for
archiving purposes. I hope it has duly become more presentable and readable.
A pdf version can be downloaded from here: 

 

http://www.gambia.dk/downloads/Why
<http://www.gambia.dk/downloads/Why%20NADD%20Broke%20Down.pdf>  NADD Broke
Down.pdf

 

All the same, my apologies for clogging your inboxes with old stuff. 

 

sidibeh

 

 

WHY NADD BROKE DOWN

 

Introduction

 

It all began with a euphoric bang. After a rickety start burdened with
doubts and hesitations, Gambia's political landscape was to be altered
forever. All the opposition parties had finally agreed to build a coalition
in order to combine their resources for contesting the 2006 and 2007
Presidential, National Assembly, and Local Government elections. After
fractured efforts to create a similar umbrella party to contest the
elections of 2001 and 2002, the efforts of a group of Diaspora Gambians
largely based in the United States finally succeeded this time, to bring the
rival parties together and broker an agreement to create such an umbrella
party. These compatriots succeeded in convincing the opposition parties that
their combined strengths, properly organised, funded, and equipped with a
common political platform, offered our suffering population the best chance
of defeating the APRC at the polls. After a period of consultations and
dialogue, all five opposition parties accepted the idea and so the National
Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD) umbrella party was founded in
January 2005. This was an historic an epochal milestone in post-independence
Gambian politics.

 

But if NADD's founding was greeted with much goodwill and excitement, its
collapse was to produce an even greater measure of anguish and
disillusionment across the wide spectrum of opposition party members and
supporters throughout the country and within the Gambian Diaspora. Hopes to
vote the dictatorship from power were dashed and the divided opposition
returned to its old acrimonious, inter party rivalries in new realignments.
The incumbents not only consolidated their grip on power, but even
reinforced their presence in the legislative assembly, depriving the
Opposition from returning to the assembly a number of its most respected and
representative voices.

 

The Opposition lost heavily in both ballots. Its division into competing,
rival alliances produced in their previously unified supporter base general
confusion, anxiety in having to redefine, question, reassess loyalties, and
despondency with politics in general; all of these reasons eventually led to
widespread apathy. The divisions amongst the leadership having degenerated
into personal differences will be difficult to reconcile. But the prospects
for another coalition are even more remote than formerly, largely because
ordinary opposition supporters, having lost faith after repeated trials, and
facing another term of economic and social sanctions under Jammeh, will
prove immensely difficult to mobilise for yet another season of a weary
process of coalition building.

Well, what forces lay behind the collapse of the original NADD? Who should
we hold responsible? Can we learn anything from the mistakes made in order
to move towards reconciliation within the Opposition, and eventually even
towards brokering a rapprochement before 2011? Can we in the Diaspora, still
take the lead in shaking hands, objectively debating what mistakes were
made, and resolve to apply corrective measures in our respective parties,
and initiate the process of reconciliation?

It is in that spirit of reconciliation through introspection and
self-criticism that this contribution is made.

 

The Background

 

Shortly after the founding of NADD in January 2005, Dr. Ebrima Ceesay posted
an inspiring article initiating a discussion on the collective search for a
NADD flag bearer, among other things.  While Ebrima Ceesay thought that an
ideal choice would be anyone from amongst the oppositional leaders
themselves, he cautioned that should such a choice result to disharmony,
"then an Independent candidate living in The Gambia could well be the best
choice". He recommended Dr. Isatou Touray whom he argued was not only
qualified to lead a five-year interim NADD government, but also possessed
the added merit of being a well educated social activist. Nonetheless, other
readers on Gambia-L contributed with names of intellectually merited
Gambians such as Dr. Ebrima Samba, Dr. Lenrie Peters, and elder statesman
Alhaji Assan Musa Camara.

 

The common qualification of these able Gambians was that none of them was
openly affiliated with any of NADD's five constituent parties, and that all
of them were believed to have broad national appeal, and able to put up a
formidable challenge to the APRC presidential candidate, Dr Yahya Jammeh.
Perhaps like many other compatriots, the current author assumed that the
reason most people suggested flag bearers for NADD to be "outsiders" was
because of impressions conveyed from an article in the NADD Memorandum of
Understanding, Article 9, paragraph A, which reads:

"The interim president of the republic under the Alliance shall serve for
one five year term of office only. He/She shall vacate his or her seat at
the end of his or her term and shall neither seek nor support the
candidature of any other person for the ensuing presidential election".

 

Because of this clause, the author suspects, many readers assumed that it
seemed more practical for all stakeholders in NADD to select an acceptably
qualified person from the "outside"; a person who is not affiliated to any
political party, someone of impeccable character and integrity. It was
further assumed that if the flag bearer were to be chosen from any
constituent party of the Alliance, the spirit of the above clause from the
MoU could risk being compromised. So it was taken for granted that even the
members of the NADD Executive were favourably inclined to search for a flag
bearer from outside NADD. Furthermore, the selection of Alhaji Assan Musa
Camara, former vice president of the republic, as NADD chairman, seemed to
have impressed on many that he was interim president in-waiting, in the
event of a NADD victory at the 2006 polls. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, a
highly respected elder politician, for whom the position of interim
president would grant the opportunity to preside over the implementation of
NADD strategic objectives while steering the nation during a period of
national reconciliation after a decade of brutality, would be a fitting and
graceful exit into retirement.

But soon all these speculations were laid to rest when it became apparent
that the flag bearer was to be selected from the opposition leaders in the
NADD Executive.

 

 

The Split

 

On January 20, 2006, The Independent reported that information reaching it
suggested that NADD was to announce its choice of flag bearer at a major
rally to be held in Brikama within a matter of days. But this was never to
occur. A few days later Pa Nderry Mbai of the Freedom newspaper reported on
what were rumoured to be divisions in the NADD Executive. Following on the
heels of that report, the resignation of Mr.Ousainou Darboe from the NADD
proved to be a veritable bombshell. From that point onwards, the coalition
effort began to unravel with gathering speed. Alhaji Assan Musa Camara, NADD
Chairman, some members of the PPP executive, and Hamat Bah all followed
Darboe's footsteps and left the Alliance. Official reasons given by Ousianou
Darboe for his withdrawal hinged on allegations of "hatred", "mistrust", and
"insincerity".

However, there were reports that Darboe's withdrawal had to do with his
refusal to support an Omar Jallow (a.k.a O.J) nomination for flag bearer.
Impressions were that Pa Nderry Mbai obtained first hand information from
NADD EC meetings. Details about differences in the NADD executive emerged
especially in the electronic media indicative of attempts by some "lobby"
group supporting the candidature of one Executive Committee member as
opposed to the others.

 

After the departure of these gentlemen from NADD, the remaining EC members
selected Mr. Halifa Sallah to the position of the NADD flag bearer. Those
who left NADD formed a separate alliance between the United Democratic Party
(UDP) and the National Reconciliation Party (NRP) and officially labelled it
the Alliance for Regime Change, (ARC). Two separate opposition alliances
emerged for the run up to the elections. Even though both groups immediately
began campaigning for their different platforms to their supporters
particularly, and to the voters in general, salvos of accusations and
counter-accusations of disloyalty to the agreed upon protocols of the
original NADD were also fired at rallies. It was not long before similar
differences emerged on Gambia-L and other discussion fora between supporters
of one alliance against those of the other. The blame game sometimes
degenerated into accusations of tribalism and dishonesty, and some
commentators on one side seemingly expressed total incomprehension for the
refusal of the others to acknowledge what to them were obvious travesties
committed by leaders of the opposite side. These differences are still there
and simmering.

Despite the war of words, the leaders of the two alliances continued with
consultations to find a possible rapprochement on the divisive issues. The
dialogue was encouraged and supported by many Gambians, some publicly and
others privately. Notable amongst them were the efforts of Dr. Abdoulaye
Saine and Mr. Lamin J Darboe, both of whom offered compromise proposals to
the two camps. Other Gambians, believing that a compromise solution was
impossible before the elections, perhaps because the contentious positions
were aggravated by personality conflicts, felt intervening in the process
was hopeless though the efforts of others in that regard needed to be
respected.

 

ANALYSES

 

The above was a chronological synopsis of the process that led to the
unravelling of the NADD into two separate coalitions that contested the
elections on two different tickets. I presented these events as objectively
as I could in relation to those factors which I believe to be important and
at once reflective of my own interpretations. Obviously others must have
perceived and interpreted the process differently.

 

Excoriating one party or its leader for the collapse of a project as grand
and historic as NADD set out to implement, must itself qualify as a dubious
venture. While the load of opprobrium might be unevenly distributed, the
responsibility for general failure must be placed on the shoulders of all
involved, without exception.

 

NADD committed its first mistake from the very beginning. Within weeks of
its formation, the NADD flag bearer, and his/her running mate ought to have
been quickly selected and presented to the general public. The coalition
could then settle into the administrative calm required for creating and
building organisational structures, planning its campaign strategy, and
above all, allowing the executive committee members, time to gradually
cultivate mutual trust and a cordial and professional working relationship
amongst themselves; elements which are necessary if former rivals and
adversaries are to convince voters that they not only are part of a strong
team, but also that they would succeed in government. Because this most
important administrative question remained unresolved, mutual suspicion was
allowed to grow unchecked, fomenting unnecessary tension at meetings, and
enhancing the growth of a consultation syndrome.

 

Everyone knew that President Jammeh would not face the NADD coalition lying
down. It was only a matter of time before his hatchet men shifted their work
into search and destroy missions. Instigated by the clerk of the National
Assembly, the APRC challenged the legal bases upon which NADD was founded.
That the Supreme Court ruled in its favour produced the first glimpses of
fissures inside NADD. Apparently, Ousainou Darboe's caution not to register
NADD as a constituted umbrella party was not listened to, a fact the trained
lawyer made use of publicly. The ensuing electioneering, depriving NADD of
valuable time to concentrate on important organisational work and Hamat
Bah's loss of his seat meant not only added tension in the NADD EC but also
poor use of meagre resources.

 

President Jammeh became even more hysterical after the APRC suffered defeat
at the by-elections. So he ceased at every straw to discredit NADD:
threatening that NADD will never rule and calling the alliance names. His
unilateral increase of tariffs for trucks at ferry crossings sparked a
dispute with Senegal which responded by closing its borders. Opposition
leaders accused him of incompetence and corruption. So NADD suffered another
disruption of its work as a result of the arrest and subsequent detention of
Halifa Sallah, O.J and Hamat Bah. This was in November 2005. The absence of
the three from the scene for some six weeks exposed NADD's administrative
difficulties, further delaying the selection of a flag bearer.

 

By January 2006, NADD could no longer postpone the naming of its
presidential candidate. During the last week of January, Ousainou Darboe
left the Alliance. This was a major blow to NADD. Newspaper reports and a
write-up by Dr. Abdoulaye Saine indicated that Mr. Darboe's withdrawal had
to do with his refusal to support an O.J candidature. At this point NADD
began to unravel. Ousainou Darboe's action, more than anything else, seemed
to have triggered that collapse. Here a number of questions need to be
asked: was his action the spontaneous response to an unacceptable
candidature, or was it the final effect of a process that he could no longer
be party to? This process, even if flawed, was transparent throughout as
Halifa Sallah showed all along. Why then did the good lawyer Darboe choose
to withdraw at this point? Why could he not as a respectable man of the law
stand on his two feet and argue his case? Should we accept his explanations
of mistrust, hatred, and insincerity as solid justifications for his exit?
The questions are many and I have no answers. But in a short while I will
offer an explanation of Ousainou Darboe's behaviour.

 

There was general belief that NADD could still be reconfigured if
compromises could be found. NADD mandated Halifa Sallah to represent it on
all negotiations with the ARC leadership. As mentioned earlier, notable
proposals from learned Gambians were those submitted by Lamin J Darboe,
barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court, and Dr. Abdoulaye Saine,
professor of political science.

 

In April 2006, Dr.Saine writing on behalf of a Committee of Concerned
Gambians, suggested that the two alliances unite and present a single ticket
with Darboe/Sallah or Sallah/Darboe as presidential and vice-presidential
candidates respectively.

 

In June 2006, L J Darboe wrote a memo in which he presented a number of
proposals including the suggestion that Darboe be chosen as presidential
candidate and Sallah as his running mate.

The constant in all these proposals was the recurrence of Darboe as flag
bearer or running mate. There seemed to be a realisation that a unified
coalition was hardly possible without Darboe chosen as leader, a position I
also maintained even before the former's withdrawal from NADD.

Furthermore, I cannot think of any other reason behind the proposals of Dr.
Saine and L J Darboe (a professed Halifa Sallah supporter) other than their
tacit recognition that Ousainou Darboe, for all intents and purposes, leads
the largest opposition party in the Gambia.

In May 2006, Mr. Ebraima Manneh, senior administrative secretary of the
UDP/NRP alliance replied to Dr. Saine's e-mail. He indicated in that reply
that the UDP/NRP alliance had already chosen Mr.Darobe as presidential
candidate and Hamat Bah as his running mate. Among other things he wrote
"...We have studied carefully your ideas and it is apparent that you have
not exhausted all the possible options. You have for example, left out Hamat
Bah and the NRP which is the second largest opposition party and which came
out third in the last presidential elections. We cannot ignore this fact in
any arrangement that has to be worked out within the opposition ranks".

Mr. Hamat Bah himself, while in the United States in May, made remarks
admitting to the committing of mistakes during the inter-party deliberations
that culminated to the signing of the MoU establishing NADD. Mr. Bah said
that they - meaning the original five constituent parties of NADD - agreed
to and acted on principles of equality when they were not equal. Mr. Bah
even held that democracy was about numbers.

It must first be noted that the tone in Mr. Manneh's e-mail was laying down
conditions suggesting the ARC's inclination to conduct negotiations with
NADD from a position of strength. With such a tone deployed from the onset,
dialogue could hardly be conducted in good faith. The ARC's conditions for a
unified Opposition can be summarised thus: there must be recognition of the
proven electoral strength of the parties (from past elections) in selecting
the leader. We should recall as well that Ousainou Darboe left NADD for
reasons bordering on personality conflicts (mistrust, hatred, and
insincerity). It is therefore fair to conclude that as far as the UDP/NRP
alliance is concerned, a reunited coalition with NADD is possible if on the
one hand, due consideration is given to the size of the parties; and on the
other hand, matters relating to personal chemistries within the coalition
leadership are sufficiently addressed. We can also conclude, through
inductive reasoning, that since these are the conditions held up for a
unified coalition, they must in all likelihood, also be the major reasons
behind the split from NADD in the first place, whether or not these were
clearly stated! 
.

ANALYSES (continued)

 

In his reply to Dr. Abdoulaye Saine's e-mail of April 2006 posted on
Gambia-L on July 13th, Halifa Sallah presented what is perhaps the best
document exposing the ideas behind the MoU. There certainly are many other
materials one may need to peruse in other to broaden one's perspective on
issues such as sovereign equality, building an umbrella party, the five-year
interim term, selection process of flag-bearer, and so on. Mr. Sallah's own
writings, speeches, interviews - representing the NADD position - on these
matters are too numerous to name and quote, and certainly impossible at this
point in time for me to attempt to research. So I had to discriminate
intentionally between materials I will be quoting in reference to what NADD
stood for as presented by Halifa Sallah.

That discrimination also must reflect the contentious issues which led to
NADD's breakdown. Let me be clear about this: NADD's goal as spelled in
Article 2 of the MoU is ".to put an end to self-perpetuating rule, ensure
the empowerment of the people so that they can participate in sustainable
development". This goal, like most of NADD's Strategic Objectives, can only
be put in place through Constitutional amendments, such as the National
Assembly could legislate. [In principle President Jammeh (since he is now
considered mad, by most people) could introduce a bill to amend the
Constitution granting presidential term limits to two five-year terms only.
In which case NADD would have to rewrite its goal]. Only two of NADD's ten
Strategic Objectives could fall into what may be termed as tactical
objectives. These are in Article 3, paragraph B, which deals with pulling
NADD's resources for the elections, and Paragraph C, which reads ".launch a
five-year transitional programme in order to ensure an open democratic
society based on the promotion of national unity, freedom, peace, prosperity
and justice for all". This is the only matter (the five-year transition)
from NADD's objectives that, together with the obvious issue of leadership,
came into contention while attempts at reunion were pursued.

 

Getting to the bottom of NADD's breakdown, it will therefore be most
instructive if we study issues relating to these two questions, the struggle
for leadership and the interim transition.

 

From his reply to Dr. Saine (NADD'S POSITION ON THE CALL FOR UNITY AMONG THE
OPPOSITION), Halifa Sallah wrote:

 

".suffice it to say that if the task of the first  meeting of the leaders
was restricted to the selection of a presidential and  vice presidential
candidate from parties which had this or that percentage in  a previous
election, we would not have signed a memorandum of understanding in
unanimity despite the diversity of interests and idiosyncrasies of the
leaders. What the leaders sought to do was to enhance ownership of NADD by
all parties by advocating for the principle of sovereign equality of all
parties.  It gave equal opportunity to all members to seek the mandate of
the people on the basis of consensus or through the holding of primaries".

 

Halifa Sallah continues:

 

".It goes without saying that some of the critics have questioned why NADD
was 
created as an umbrella party. The answer is simple. Since no single party 
could remove the present regime the combined efforts of the parties were
deemed 
necessary to achieve that aim. Most members of NADD acknowledged that if the

combine efforts of all were to promote the candidature of one party, all the

other parties will be marginalized during the period of promoting his or her

candidature".

 

Sovereign equality is a principle of international relations that
establishes the equality of countries irrespective of their geographic size,
economic or military might, or their level of social development. But the
principle does not call for the surrender of individual sovereignty to a
higher organ. The UN is the best known organisation founded on sovereign
equality.

 

Well, NADD's effort here is first and foremost, to establish equality among
its constituent members. It follows logically that if it is required to
establish this kind of equality at the onset, then there must have been some
presumptive element of inequality in the first place? What else would that
element be if not the numerical strengths of the parties? So the question of
size had to be subdued from the onset so as to give "equal opportunity to
all members to seek the mandate of the people on the basis of consensus or
through the holding of primaries" and to eventually ensure that other
parties are not marginalised if one party sought to promote its own
candidature! Otherwise, there would have been no NADD! This must be true
even if it is counter argued that sovereign equality was principally
desirable in order to prevent posterior claims of organisational and
political credit by one party.

True, the combined efforts of the opposition parties were required if the
dictator should be gotten rid of through a transparent democratic process.
It was therefore inferred desirably that since no one party could dislodge
the dictatorship on its own, the credit for doing so must be shared equally
by the collective. But should that mean that the parties are equal in size,
influence, resources? Elsewhere this piece of fuzzy logic was extended to
put under contention even the numerical strengths of the parties in
question.

 

Since all member parties of NADD are registered political parties vying for
power through the mandate of the voters any arrangement they subsequently
enter into must serve the interest of some or all of them. Obviously the
only parties that risked marginalisation are the smaller ones, and so it is
no accident that NADD split along those lines: the smaller parties on one
side and the two larger ones on the other.

Ladies and gentlemen the first quote of Halifa Sallah above juxtaposed with
NADD's goal gives rise to a key question: If the overriding goal of NADD is
to put an end to self-perpetuating rule (a goal that can only be achieved by
a NADD government), why should the very EXISTENCE of the alliance be made
contingent on the leaders' compliance with the principle of sovereign
equality? Why? Before venturing answers to this question allow me first to
read more of Halifa Sallah:

 

".At no time did any member put the issue of the percentage earned in
previous elections as a bargaining chip to contest elections. At no time did
any member call for a primary to determine candidature".

 

".It was envisaged that if each party surrenders its sovereignty to the 
umbrella party for a transition period of five years all of them will retain
their 
original size and political weight and would be guaranteed a level ground
for 
contesting the next following elections. This is when the size of a 
political party would matter".

 

".in short, before we agreed on the content of the MOU we set up a technical
committee comprising the experts of all the political parties. Your party
was represented by people of high intellectual calibre. Within the technical
committee were former permanent secretaries and people with PhD".

 

The last quotation here is from an article (NADD and UDP/NRP view on Unity)
posted on Gambia-L on August 11 in a direct response to Ousainou Darboe.

 

One plausible and logical answer to the previous key question is that
everyone accepted tacitly that leadership of NADD (because sovereign
equality defined the process of leadership selection) was more important
than everything else. An answer none of the leaders will ever agree with!

Another plausible answer is the fear of marginalisation of smaller parties.
Yet still a third plausible answer, linked to the second, is the desire to
secure a guarantee that NADD's Goals and Strategic Objectives will be
pursued irrespective of whom is selected as flag-bearer.

 

Before going any further let me assert that there was indeed a fear of
marginalisation, as well as the suspicion that one party may assume a big
brother role for its own sake and finally, fear that the Strategic
Objectives could be derailed. I believe these were genuine concerns. This
was the reason, among others, why theoretical arguments were developed, put
in print in the MoU and sealed with the signatures of all the five party
leaders. So there must have been some degree of mistrust as Ousainou Darboe
claimed?

But let me quickly say that as a matter of principle it was right that these
fears were clearly spelled out, freely expressed, and consequently
recognised. So Mr. Darboe's claims of mistrust, unless referring to some
factors other than those I mentioned, and unless debate on these matters
were conducted surreptitiously, are without merit.

On the other hand, why must the interests of the smaller parties be pushed
so hard as to jeopardize the stability of the entire project? The larger
parties, surely, also have interests of their own!

 

So our respectable coterie of intellectuals reasoned this way: place all
political parties on an equal footing from the beginning; the parties remain
undissolved but they surrender sovereignty to the umbrella party; a leader
gets selected from one of them; NADD governs for five years; during that
period the individual parties (and their supporters) are all compelled to go
underground (!), only to emerge at the end of the five years with their
sizes and all, intact and constant like all the matter in the universe! I do
not know about you, but I find this quiet baffling, and I doubt if it can
indeed pass the laugh test anywhere. But this is serious business; and all
this line of reasoning repeatedly churned out, like the proverbial party
line, by none other than Halifa Sallah.

 

That our political leaders and well educated Gambians can sign a coalition
document based on these premises seems incredible to me. This is about huge
political power; not a UN kind of thing (where we had a fabulously correct
Kofi Annan but who was in the main, quiet powerless!). Everyone knows that
the majority of Gambians do not cast their votes on account of convictions
on concrete issues, and so everyone must know that such a formula will be
untenable as soon as a leader is selected from inside NADD. The outcome
should be quite predictable. This ladies and gentlemen, is where they all
failed us. Brothers Mo Baldeh, Buharry Gassama and others, all saw that
happening. Why could Halifa Sallah and others not see it? For those
interested, read my short piece from the archives:

 

http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?A2=ind0601
<http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?A2=ind0601&L=gambia-l&H=1&O=
D&F=P&X=712F7E5BF4ED613618&Y=sidibeh%40adamomail.se&P=29966>
&L=gambia-l&H=1&O=D&F=P&X=712F7E5BF4ED613618&Y=sidibeh%40adamomail.se&P=2996
6

 

They were all, without exception, beset with the idea of power. That a
seasoned lawyer and others broke agreements they signed previously, that
Hamat Bah disregarded basic principles of confidentiality in the midst of
negotiations, that there were instances of mandinka nationalism here and
there, are all largely effects of events; not their causes.

 

Finally, here is my explanation of Ousainou Darboe's behaviour:

 

I think he went into all of this hesitantly, suspicious of the intentions of
the others, and possibly even feeling intimidated by Halifa Sallah's
involvement. [BTW NADD members or supporters (like myself) need to recognise
that Halifa's mere presence is intellectually intimidating for political
adversaries. The sad and very unfortunate fact that some will campaign
against his very person and put up a candidate just to secure his defeat is
an instance of intense dislike.This must be gravely considered by those who
value him so much]. After all the initial hiccups, and also realizing that
the idea of a coalition is the best chance of ridding Gambia of the
dictator, he agreed to join the coalition. I think Mr. Darboe saw the
dangers inherent in the MoU and its articles on leadership selection and
especially the interim five-year term. But he dismissed these as theoretical
matters only, hoping to renegotiate the term limit eventually. He persuaded
himself confidently that, when the chips are down, everyone else would come
to their senses and recognise that he, and no one else, ought to be flag
bearer on account of the size of the UDP.

The nomination of O.J must have shocked him, realizing that going into
primaries would be a mere formality, since unless there was internal
rebellion within some parties, the village or ward representatives will
simply vote on instigation from their leaders. With equal representation, he
could not possibly win, with PDOIS, PPP, and NDAM votes stacked against his
chances. Also, it is possible that Waa Juwara was not particularly kind to
him during their numerous EC meetings, given their history of personal
discord. He felt badly hoodwinked by the whole process. So he withdrew as
gracefully (!) as he possibly could, and time stood still.

As a lawyer of vast experience, what could he say? Having signed the MoU
willingly, he could not possibly admit that he was tricked into doing it. It
would be exceedingly humiliating. A Mandinka proverb calls it "tying
someone's hands to a tree". So his followers, all over the place (including
Gambia-L) remained speechless despite Joe Sambou and others pummelling them
about their lawyer-leader breaking the rules of engagement! They will remain
defenceless on that score forever. Should we accept Mr. Darboe's behaviour
even if we understand it? Not at all.

All this has been a liberal interpretation of NADD's breakdown.

 

CONCLUSION

 

A progressive interpretation of what happened needs to be even more
rigorous. Reading through most of what Halifa Sallah, i.e NADD wrote on
different issues relating both to the founding of the coalition and
subsequent attempts at reunification, one cannot escape the impression that
there was a clear discrepancy between language and the existing political
reality. It is as if the nature of NADD was to be found not in its agenda
but in the language it deployed to define itself. Even though some of the
democratic questions it resolved to address were perhaps radical in content,
NADD itself is far from being a radical organisation. Its basic principles
were built on the premises to organise and agitate for reforms within the
existing political context. Progressives inside NADD (members of PDOIS and
NDAM, to be hopeful) needed to recognise the petit-bourgeois identity of the
UDP leadership and engage with them on that basis. Sprouting from the
vacuous remnants of the older PPP, GPP, and the NCP, it contained, not only
Gambia's largest waramba community of Friday muslims, but also the party
with the broadest mass base in the entire opposition. There was hardly any
reason to doubt that the UDP was and still is interested in democratic
reforms. The key question is whether it could mobilise at will the
organisational capacity to implement those reforms.

There were present in NADD all the ingredients for a democratic revolution
(a common minimum program, and an alliance of all forces bent on bringing to
an end the excesses of a truly oppressive state) with one exception: a
strong and well-structured mass organisation.

What then should progressives do in such a situation?

 

They needed first to establish a common trench with all democratic forces
and concretise the minimum programme. There should have been no issue
whatsoever about the UDP providing a flag bearer. On the other hand
negotiations needed to be centred on the composition of a NADD government.
With progressives in government, the possibilities of bringing about truly
democratic reforms would have been immeasurably enhanced. With a
theoretically equipped vanguard, student unions could be activated out of
social indifference, and the trade unions pulled out of their bureaucratic
slumber. Government could look into taking control of the peanut trade to
free our peasants from the caprices of unserious businessmen, and quickly
enforce mandatory testing of HIV/AIDS. (Recall what Thomas Sankara did in
Burkina Faso about polio during his very short time)! As we say, the
possibilities would have been almost endless.

 

Many, many thanks

 

C Momodou S Sidibeh

 

February 2007

 


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