MEDITATION I.MEDITATION I.


OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY DOUBT.

1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had
accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that
consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful;
and
from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my
life
to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the
work
of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and
abiding
superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be
one
of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to
leave
me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able
to
execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should
henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in
deliberation
any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have
opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no
passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable
retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the
general
overthrow of all my former opinions.[ L][ F]
2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole
of
these are false--a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach; but as even
now my
reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief
from
what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly
false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I
shall
find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be
necessary
even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless
labor; but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves
the
downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the
principles on which all my former beliefs rested.[ L][ F]
3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest
truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I
observed,
however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not
to
place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been
deceived.[ L][
F]
4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally
mislead
us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to
be
beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their
informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly
impossible
to doubt; as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire,
clothed
in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in my hands this piece of paper, with
other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess
these
hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state
of
insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors
as
to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are
in
the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold] and purple when destitute of any
covering; or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that
they
are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to
regulate
my procedure according to examples so extravagant.[ L][ F]
5. Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man,
and
that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing to
myself in
dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the
insane think are presented to them in their waking moments. How often have I
dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and
occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the
present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide
awake;
the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and
with
express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so
distinct
as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived
in
sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I
perceive
so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking
can
ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in
amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming.[ L][ F]
6. Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these
particulars--namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the
forth-
putting of the hands--are merely illusions; and even that we really possess
neither an entire body nor hands such as we see. Nevertheless it must be
admitted at least that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it
were,
painted representations which could not have been formed unless in the
likeness
of realities; and, therefore, that those general objects, at all events,
namely,
eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but
really
existent. For, in truth, painters themselves, even when they study to
represent
sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and extraordinary, cannot
bestow
upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of the
members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine something so
novel
that nothing at all similar has ever been seen before, and such as is,
therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is at least certain
that
the colors of which this is composed are real. And on the same principle,
although these general objects, viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the
like, be imaginary, we are nevertheless absolutely necessitated to admit the
reality at least of some other objects still more simple and universal than
these, of which, just as of certain real colors, all those images of things,
whether true and real, or false and fantastic, that are found in our
consciousness (cogitatio),are formed.[ L][ F]
7. To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and
its
extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude, and
their
number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and
other
things of the same sort.[ L][ F]
8. We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude from
this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences that have
for
their end the consideration of composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful
character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same
class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and
scarcely
inquire whether or not these are really existent, contain somewhat that is
certain and indubitable: for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true
that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does
it
seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of
falsity
[or incertitude].[ L][ F]
9. Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is all powerful, and who
created me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained steady possession
of my
mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged that there should be
neither
earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing, nor figure, nor magnitude, nor
place,
providing at the same time, however, for [the rise in me of the perceptions
of
all these objects, and] the persuasion that these do not exist otherwise
than as
I perceive them ? And further, as I sometimes think that others are in error
respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect
knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time I add
together
two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgment still
more
simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined? But perhaps Deity has not
been
willing that I should be thus deceived, for he is said to be supremely good.
If,
however, it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me
subject
to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness
to
allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is
permitted.[ L][ F]
10. Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to
deny
the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing
certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and
grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in
whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether
by
fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or
by
any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain
defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant
victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power
possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To
these
reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to
avow
that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it
is
impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or levity, but
from
cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforward, if I desire to
discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from
assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be
manifestly
false.[ L][ F]
11. But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be
taken
likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions
perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of
occupying
my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I
lose
the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall
consider
them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as
I
have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more
reasonable to believe than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded that I
shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate
design,
I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions
are
entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old
by my
new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted
usage
from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured
that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course,
and
that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I
now
seek is not action but knowledge.[ L][ F]
12. I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the
fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly
potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will
suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all
external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means
of
which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as
without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely
believing that I am possessed of these; I will continue resolutely fixed in
this
belief, and if indeed by this means it be not in my power to arrive at the
knowledge of truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, viz, [ suspend
my
judgment ], and guard with settled purpose against giving my assent to what
is
false, and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever be his power and
artifice. But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence
insensibly
leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who,
perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins
to
suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the
agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own
accord,
fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself
from my
slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this
quiet
rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to
dispel
the darkness that


will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised.[
L][ F]
[LoD] [S] [P] [M 2] [M 3] [M 4] [M 5] [M 6]
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