Buharry,
Thanks for a sharing this wonderful breakdown with us. I look forward to the next part.

Keep up the good work.

Momodou Camara



Momodou Buharry Gassama <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Hi!
>    The recent coalition victories in Jarra and Bakau,
> coupled with the
> recent announcements by Yaya Jammeh stating that no
> opposition will win
> against him and that developments slated for the next ten
> years will be
> greater than developments seen in the last, have made me
> think about the
> political situation in Gambia and the possibilities for the
> coalition in the
> 2006 elections. Whilst the momentum gathered by the
> coalition these past few
> months might give a feeling of invincibility, can one truly
> conclude that
> the few victories can be used to gauge their possibilities
> come 2006? Can
> the opposition win the 2006 elections? In order to answer
> this question, one
> needs to look at various factors.
> 
> The first set of factors will look at the APRC's
> possibilities and
> advantages that might hamper the coalition's efforts. It is
> important to
> look at the APRC as a viable force to be reckoned with and
> not just a party
> on its way to losing the 2006 elections. Many people have
> the tendency to
> conclude that just because Gambia is going through tough
> times, the days are
> numbered for the APRC. Whilst this might be a consoling
> sentiment, it is not
> rooted in reality. What is rooted in reality is that the
> APRC, despite all
> its failings is still a powerful force in Gambian politics
> privileged with
> many resources. In looking at the advantages of the APRC,
> one needs to first
> of all look at the party's position as a party in power and
> all the benefits
> incumbency entails especially in African politics. One of
> the most important
> benefits is control of the media. Even if the government
> does not
> deliberately try to manipulate or tilt television, radio and
> newspaper
> coverage in its favour, the mere fact that government
> ministers, officials
> or the president himself, carrying out their normal public
> functions, get
> more media coverage, disadvantages the coalition. This will
> give them the
> opportunity to sell their platform and achievements
> especially if there are
> projects that are launched or finished around election time.
> Things will get
> worse regarding the media if the government decides to
> manipulate the public
> media in its favour. This will give it the lion's share of
> television, radio
> and to a large extent print media. The coalition's ability
> to spread its
> programs will thus suffer.
> 
> Another important advantage the APRC has as a party in power
> is the vast
> resources of the state at its disposal. This includes both
> financial and
> material resources. Whilst it is in the letter of the law
> not allowed to
> take money from national coffers to finance the election
> campaign of any
> individual party, the APRC included, what is to stop the
> inclusion of such
> financing being entered as miscellaneous expenditure in some
> ministry or
> parastatal somewhere? What is to stop heads of parastatals
> from making
> "donations" as was done for the tenth anniversary of the
> A(F)PRC ? Money
> aside, the other resources of the state such as
> transportation, fuel etc.
> can be used to a great advantage. Whilst the coalition will
> need to hire
> transport and stand for the cost unless supporters provide
> such, the APRC
> has the advantage of using public transportation to
> transport its supporters
> around the country to attend rallies and beef up support.
> Private
> individuals and corporations that have a vested interest in
> seeing the
> continued control of the APRC are also a source of revenue
> and resources for
> the ruling party. These individuals or corporations might in
> some way want
> to preserve the status quo to protect their investments or
> might want to get
> contracts and other opportunities. They might then reason
> that being seen to
> be supporters and contributors will increase their chances
> or protect their
> investments.
> 
> The APRC can also engage in less subtle activities to
> increase its chances.
> It can use the law and security services to hamper the
> coalition's efforts.
> One of the most devastating of such tactics would be to
> stage a security
> scare such as a coup attempt, declare a state of emergency
> and postpone the
> elections. This has been done several times in other African
> countries.
> Another tactic would be use the law to disqualify certain
> individual
> politicians. Yet another tactic would be gerrymandering
> where constituency
> boundaries would be redrawn to suit the APRC and increase
> its chances of
> getting more favourable results. Raw harassment of and
> brutality against
> candidates and supporters and the rejection of permits for
> rallies by the
> coalition can also be used with devastating consequences for
> the coalition.
> 
> Given the homogeneous nature of the Senegambia people and
> the porous border,
> unqualified voters from Senegal (especially Casamance) can
> be furnished with
> Gambian papers and used as a tipping block wherever the APRC
> feels
> threatened. This was lamented over during the previous
> elections when the
> opposition charged that residents of Casamance were smuggled
> into the
> country to vote despite the fact that they were not
> citizens.
> 
> Yet another tactic would be to annul the election results if
> the opposition
> is seen to have won on election day or just afterwards. This
> has happened in
> such places as Algeria where the military stepped in to
> cancel the results
> when it became obvious that Islamic candidates were on the
> verge of winning
> the elections. This has however tragically led to a civil
> war with
> devastating consequences.
> 
> All these methods and many more, at the hands of the APRC
> prove that it will
> be foolhardy to think that the APRC can be easily defeated.
> With so much to
> lose, the party will predictably fight tooth and nail to
> stay in power.
> 
> Having looked at the factors surrounding the APRC as a
> viable player in the
> 2006 elections, let us now look at the coalition. Despite
> the fact that the
> coalition is the underdog in terms of resources and finance,
> many realities
> on the ground favour it. The deteriorating economic
> situation, the level of
> insecurity and the general sense of apathy can, if properly
> harnessed, bring
> about positive results. It is worth pointing out however
> that just taking
> these things for granted can result in a terrible shock for
> the coalition.
> This is because the same situation was prevalent in the
> previous elections
> but due to among other things, the opposition's failure to
> make practical
> use of it, the result was disappointment for them.
> 
> ***********************************TO BE
> CONTINUED**********************
> 
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