Joe,
I have not been closely following this thread of discussion so please
help me here. Is there any "Road map" and/or timeline to a coalition?
Also what would happen to the money being collected if some reason the
parties failed to form a coalition in 2006?

Malanding

Joe Sambou wrote:

> Mo, thanks for your analyses of political meandering in The Gambia for
> the
> past 20 years.  I agree with much of that analysis.
>
> "On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for
> themselves
> no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from funding
> one
> emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
> accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on
> the move
> again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed, is also a
> role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in giant
> doses
> up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one year to
> the
> next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of non-committal
> illusionary project and put something more concrete in its place."
>
> Mo, yes, call us illusionary and other such descriptions and reject
> what we
> are doing outright, but anyone with a sense of what it takes to win an
> election knows that rhetoric alone takes you no where.  I wish you and
> those
> that wish to join you in this outright rejection of what we are trying to
> accomplish here, success.  For your success is for all Gambians.  Mo,
> I can
> easily do the same thing you are doing, write volumes and reject this and
> that effort, but I have better ways of wasting my time.  I believe in the
> market place of ideas and thus, will leave it to the stakeholders to
> decide
> what they want to do.  Please do not attempt to distort what we are
> calling
> for.  If you want to convince yourself that we view our role as
> "excitable
> financiers, jumping from funding one emergency to the next", then by all
> means be my guest and I am not going to say what we are trying to
> accomplish
> the 1000th time, for folks on this and other lists know exactly what
> we are
> calling for.  If you must, continue your campaign to discredit what
> some of
> us are doing, but I think you should spend more time convincing the
> stakeholders to join your outlook and not discredit us.
>
> Mo, the reason the "limited coalition" failed in the last elections
> was not
> more so, because of Sheriff Dibba's boycott, but because of the
> exclusion of
> PDOIS and NRP.  As you pointed out, PPP and UDP wrongly believed that
> they
> were going to defeat the APRC and can do that with or without PDOIS
> and NRP.
>  NCP was invited because UDP and NCP had the same following, but UDP
> especially, believed that they just needed the other parties for
> cosmetics
> reasons.  The PPP was in it because they knew they do not have a support
> base, for almost all their support went to UDP or APRC while they were
> silenced. UDP did not want PDOIS and the NRP to be included in the
> coalition
> talks because they knew that they would not be able to put the fix they
> intended for the NCP.  If the two exclusions were in, the NCP would
> not have
> boycotted because the nomination would have followed due process and
> not be
> an announcement hatched by Darbo, OJ, and Assan Musa.
>
> On the other hand, PDOIS also miscalculated the need for a coalition to
> defeat Jammeh as they sincerely believed that with their message and
> ideas,
> Gambians would finally see where their interest rest.  They were
> convinced
> that it was important to go the first round solo and then contemplate a
> coalition in the second round, and they cited the situation in Senegal
> with
> Wade's victory.  Those of us calling for a four party coalition saw
> the flaw
> in that optimism and tried to convince all of them to come together up
> until
> the elections.  We all know what happened.
>
> Transitioning to the campaign  period (village to village, division to
> division canvassing), the opposition was not visible because they were
> all
> cash strapped and could only make appearances in few select places, while
> Yaya crissed crossed every real estate of our landscape, especially up
> country.  Our vision for the opposition was to come together, all
> four, and
> use Darbo, Sidia, and Hamat, all three with no baggage from the first
> republic to convince Gambians about the bad news that was the APRC.  That
> was a winning formula and any novice of politics knew that.  However, the
> moment the APRC saw OJ and Assan Musa next to Darbo, they forgot about
> Darbo
> and used the PPP card.  Thus, Gambians were falsely convinced that
> Darbo was
> a front for the PPP and Jawara was a shadow that lurked in their
> minds, and
> Jawara was indeed lurking in the shadows.  So, there are many minor
> reasons
> why Jammeh stayed on, in addition to voter registration rigging.  Thus,
> history tells us that we need to work with the opposition to bring
> about a
> genuine coalition and craft a winning formula that is well financed.
> This
> is what we are trying to do and not the baseless and outright
> falsehood you
> try to paint.  That says more about you than about what we are about.  I
> wish you success in your efforts to discredit our efforts, but I am
> confident that the stakeholders will decide what is best for them.  Your
> opinion of what we are about is one in a million.
>
> Chi Jaama
>
> Joe Sambou
>
>
>> From: Momodou S Sidibeh <[log in to unmask]>
>> Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
>> <[log in to unmask]>
>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> Subject: Coalition - Make or Break!
>> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2003 14:53:26 +0100
>>
>> Hi Everyone,
>>
>> I need to apologise for the delay in posting this opinion piece. Not
>> just
>> because I had intended to post it much earlier than now but also
>> because,
>> all other things being equal, drawing attention and interest to such
>> mundane matters when many of us have our spiritual energies reserved for
>> the requirements of Ramadan might be an added burden. Happily,
>> Ramadan is
>> also a period for deep reflection and self criticism, a way to
>> cleanse our
>> minds by auditing our circumstances and to, as a consequence, improve
>> upon
>> where we are weak.
>>
>> While I have been hard pressed to allocate time to contribute to the
>> debate
>> when it raged sweetest, there has been a beautiful and informative
>> flurry
>> of  opinion expressed in view of the current dearth of strategy towards
>> removing Jammeh from power. Many, many thanks to brothers Omar Joof,
>> Sanusi
>> Owens, and sister Jabou Joh. But even if we accept Mr. Omar Joof's
>> view on
>> the intentions of Mr. Waa Juwara as regards his opinions about the
>> coalition published in the Independent, designing a strategy for
>> coalition
>> building demands a return to the immediate past in order to attempt
>> determining the probable structural defects that may plague such a huge
>> project. The resolution of some of these problems, I think, are in fact
>> fundamental to the success or failure of the collective attempt to
>> unseat
>> the APRC regime. As I shall argue here, much of it has to do with the
>> constellation of opposition parties since the usurpation of power by the
>> AFPRC in 1994.
>>
>> President Jawara, during one of his most memorable speeches, derided the
>> opposition for its inherent frailties, and ineffectual propaganda. In
>> Georgetown in 1990 (?), when he dropped a bombshell saying he was
>> going to
>> resign as party chairman and therefore head of state, he threw his
>> audience
>> into laughter by saying that the GPP is splintered from the NCP which
>> itself splintered off the PPP. He went on to say that "as for PDOIS,
>> they
>> are a party of malcontents"!
>> [The mandinka word that approximates to splinter as a verb, "ka farasi",
>> when used in a particular context conveys its meaning  with tons of
>> humour].
>> The president's assertion, insofar as it related to the GPP and the
>> NCP was
>> absolutely accurate. But it is not in fact the accuracy of the assertion
>> that per se, is important in describing the identities of the parties.
>> Since the APRC banned the PPP and the NCP prior to the 1996
>> elections, it
>> inadvertently created a political void  that the UDP and the NRP
>> emerged to
>> fill. The UDP grew on the wreckage of the two former older parties.
>> There
>> leaderships notwithstanding, the mass base of the UDP and the APRC were
>> mostly made up of former supporters of the two parties, with the APRC
>> drawing its constituency largely from the anti-PPP opposition that swept
>> across the country drawing immediate converts into the dizzying
>> whirlwind
>> of revolutionary vengeance and humiliation meted to former PPP
>> royalty by
>> instances such as the Algali commission. It was payback time for
>> many, but
>> only briefly.
>>
>> Once the 1996 elections were over and the former soldiers consolidated
>> their positions of power and mastered the art of accumulating immense
>> wealth while still holding onto political office, they began to
>> disband the
>> very structures that would have evolved into organs of popular power if
>> their programmes were infused with sincere democratic content. This
>> process
>> is eerily analogous to Jerry Rawlings disarming of the PDCs and WDCs
>> (People's/Workers  Defense Committees) in Ghana barely fourteen months
>> after his second seizure of power, December 1981. These were the local
>> village committees or wards for the defense of the revolution;
>> structures
>> designed by the party but under the control of the July 22 movement,
>> active
>> in the rice distribution scheme and operated as portals into the
>> party. The
>> APRC deliberately trimmed the winds in the sails of the July 22 movement
>> while it opened up itself to an influx of new blood. Very quickly, known
>> and unknown PPP "yai kompins" and former NCP foot soldiers rushed
>> onto the
>> APRC gravy train. Yaa Fatou Badjan, a former backbone supporter and
>> mobilizer for Jibou Jagne simply told Uncle Jibou that it was time
>> that she
>> and her followers  jumped ship. She quickly became the APRC's campaign
>> chairwoman in Serre-Kunda East, responsible for distributing Ramadan
>> sugar
>> - annually supplied by the President - and campaign t-shirts to
>> supporters
>> and members of the party. Another high profile defection was that of
>> Mrs.
>> Nyimasata Sanneh Bojang, this time from the PPP. There are many similar
>> comical instances in Gambian politics where people who were ardent
>> rivals
>> for years, suddenly find common cause under the patronising wings of
>> vitriolic dictator.
>> Without the charismatic nature and consistent work of O.J, the PPP,
>> in most
>> likelihood would have fizzled away, not unlike the NCP, from the
>> constellation. As for the NCP, its leadership seems to have sold itself,
>> body and soul, to the APRC. It is unclear to me where its support base
>> migrated if at all it has not dissolved unnoticed into that vast
>> emptiness
>> of personal allegiances.
>>
>> So here we are, with the UDP, NRP, NDAM, PPP and PDOIS with the
>> potential
>> of forming a coalition. The only party, that we can claim with
>> certainty,
>> stands ideologically apart from the rest is PDOIS. In spite of its
>> pan-Africanist outlook, and militant inclinations, NDAM's political
>> profile
>> remains unclear to me. Counting PDOIS out, where concretely lie the
>> differences between the other four? Are there ideological differences or
>> considerations of political economy so prominent that one should vote
>> PPP
>> rather than UDP? Not just that they share a common anti-corruption
>> position, vow to establish the rule of law, strengthen democratic
>> institutions, and prioritise agriculture, these parties hardly evince
>> opposing position on significant policy questions. I remain convinced
>> that
>> the major differences between them have little to do with politcal,
>> economic, or cultural ideas. Herein lies the major difficulty of the
>> proposed coalition. Given that the differences had to do with economic
>> polices or principles of democracy for instance, the parties can
>> appreciate
>> each other's standpoints and negotiate with some flexibility on the
>> bases
>> of those differences in the interest of the common good even in the
>> short
>> term. But the differences between the parties seem to be based on
>> fractured
>> histories, personalised rivalries, and perhaps both ethnic and
>> provincial
>> considerations. Provided that the parties have active democratic
>> structures, it is conceivable that backward leadership traits such as
>> personal rivalries, could be eventually swept away. But these structures
>> are either non-existent or hopelessly dormant. UDP vividly exposed this
>> weakness when it failed to internally and democratically address the
>> financial irregularities which led to Mr. Waa Juwara's resignation as
>> propaganda secretary.
>>
>> It is at this point important to recall the most recent attempt at
>> coalition building during the campaign towards the last elections.
>> The APRC
>> regime deliberately delayed repealing decree 89, that effectively banned
>> politicians of the first republic and their parties from activity
>> till July
>> 22, 2001. But even before that date PDOIS had, as a result of a party
>> congress held in Wuli, declared its readiness to join a tactical
>> alliance
>> in preparation for the elections. The other parties joined the
>> chorus, but
>> despite calls for the newly franchised decree 89 parties to join forces
>> with what was tactically labelled the Opposition, a broad-based
>> coalition
>> that was to field a single presidential candidate never materialised. A
>> reasonably vocal group from Gambia-L campaigned all it could muster and
>> called for the unity of the opposition and appealed to decree 89
>> politicians to join the Opposition. An obviously notable difficulty
>> in that
>> process was Mr. Sheriff Dibba's claim that he was apparently
>> sidelined in
>> one of the more important deliberations, an incident that eventually
>> supplied a convenient exegesis for his subsequent defection to the APRC.
>>
>> Immediately after the elections, Mr. Ousainou Darboe conceded defeat by
>> congratulating the incumbent even before proper consultations with
>> others
>> in the UDP leadership on the party's official position regarding the
>> elections.  Mr. Juwara's departure from UDP was anything but smooth. His
>> fervid allegations against  Mr. Ousainou Darboe is a strong enough
>> reason
>> to suspect that problems of personal chemistries may severely affect
>> efforts to build a coalition.
>>
>> Beside the problem of personalities, a coalition must agree on a common
>> political platform that must at once espouse the profiles of all parties
>> and yet appeal to the opposition as a whole. The constituent programmes
>> within such a platform are what must give credibility to the idea of a
>> coalition in the first place. Its mandate cannot solely extend to the
>> question of peacefully defeating the incumbency. The question of what to
>> replace the APRC regime with is at least as equally important. The
>> entire
>> opposition needs to be mobilised on and persuaded for the relevance of
>> these programmes if a political vacuum is to be avoided; the sort of
>> vacuum
>> that a military coup purports to occupy, or because of which Senegal
>> might
>> intervene for reasons of its security. Needless to say, it is
>> precisely in
>> the debate about programmes for the coalition that citizens,
>> card-carrying
>> members, supporters and sympathisers of the different political parties
>> should make their voices heard: how should the coalition take issue with
>> the IEC, the registration of voters, the whole electoral process, the
>> regime's desperate attempts to incinerate the critical press out of
>> existence, reactionary amendments aimed at promulgating indemnity,
>> issues
>> of local democracy, and so on and so forth. These and many other
>> issues are
>> what even Diasporans like ourselves need to engage with, contribute
>> to, and
>> thereby exercise our right to participate in the democratic process.
>> Equally, these and questions of the economic collapse are best dealt
>> with
>> on a national basis. Not that Mr. Juwara of NDAM has no right to take
>> initiatives on issues of national political relevance; but to insist
>> that
>> such issues are best dealt with in consultation with other members of
>> the
>> opposition, collectively combining their propaganda efforts and exerting
>> combined strength to demand for peaceful protests against APRC's
>> disastrous
>> economics. In times as hard and tough as these in Gambia,
>> coordination of
>> the activities of, and consultation amongst the opposition parties
>> provide
>> the ready psychological and concrete bases for a coherent and strong
>> coalition. Consultations will not just help do away with much of the
>> personal tensions that accumulated over the years, it also provides
>> strong
>> signals to the grassroots that we are all in the same damn, sinking,
>> boat.
>>
>> Two years ago debate about the problems within the coalition were
>> felt to
>> be an exercise in destructive forensics. Prissy abstractions could
>> not be
>> allowed to derail the all too important rush towards unseating Jammeh;
>> political expediency was felt to be best served by overlooking the
>> enormous
>> problems a coalition could be subdued by. All this inspite of misgivings
>> and warnings by, especially,  sister Jabou Joh. The elections were so
>> close
>> that clamouring for an unprincipled unity seemed to override all
>> considerations of what that unity should rest upon. The concentrated
>> focus
>> on wresting power from the hands of the APRC induced neglect of critical
>> issues that needed to be put under scrutiny. While the APRC was
>> celebrating
>> numerous cases of high profile defections to its ranks, many of us
>> dismissed GRTS broadcast of these river-crossings as misinformation
>> ploys.
>> So when rumours of secret meetings between Mr. Dibba and Mr. Jammeh were
>> circulating, it was still derided by many on Gambia-L as yet another
>> furtive sting to divide the Opposition. The leaders on the ground,
>> i.e some
>> of them at any rate, sensed what was going on. Perhaps they
>> mistrusted Mr.
>> Dibba's secret consultations with president Jammeh so greatly that they
>> deliberately left him out from a meeting. So the coalition broke
>> down. The
>> rest is history.
>>
>> Current actualities in Gambia demand interventions of many forms.
>> While a
>> diasporan like me should never encourage people to take to the
>> streets for
>> anything, I should in all humility, ask Mr.Waa Juwara, in his
>> capacity as a
>> leader seeking political office, to mobilise his unique experience and
>> organisational skills to take the lead in initiating consultations
>> with ALL
>> the opposition parties (if that indeed was not done prior to Waa's
>> call for
>> a peaceful demonstration), so that they may collectively draw out a
>> strategy to deal with the disastrous consequence of the current economic
>> and social malaise. It will hardly help if one leader or party
>> attempts to
>> take on the regime individually in a physically risky show of defiance.
>> True, one can make powerful statements as a leader, but unless those
>> statements are backed-up with the continuity of a committed, disciplined
>> and strong organisation, they will eventually fail in their declared
>> intentions; and that failure makes future efforts at reorganising
>> that much
>> more difficult. Furthermore the failure to consult with others may
>> reinforce mutual suspicions that have their roots in the past.
>> We Diasporans, in our capacity as Gambian citizens(!) and concerned
>> individuals must demand of our leaders that they must get ahead and work
>> out their differences, concretely start negotiating on a coalition
>> programme that will be acceptable to their constituencies.
>> On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for
>> themselves
>> no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from
>> funding one
>> emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
>> accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on the
>> move again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed,
>> is also
>> a role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in giant
>> doses up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one
>> year
>> to the next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of
>> non-committal illusionary project and put something more concrete in its
>> place.
>>
>> Ramadan Mubarak to you all,
>>
>> Momodou S Sidibeh
>>
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