This is good. Well thought out.
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From: Kathy Salkin [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 4:05 PM
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Subject: A Good Article for Attacking Iraq by an Ethnicist (Long!)
From the 6-Oct 2002 issue of the Boston Globe:
A just war?
Many of the country's leading ethicists oppose a strike on Iraq. But a look
at
the centuries-old theory of just war suggests that military action may be in
fact be morally necessary.
By Jean Bethke Elshtain, 10/6/2002
EVERAL WEEKS AGO, 100 teachers of Christian ethics, both pacifists and those
working within the just war tradition, signed a petition declaring, in its
entirety: ''As Christian ethicists, we share a common moral presumption
against a pre-emptive war on Iraq by the United States.'' Although I am an
ethicist and a Christian, I was not among the signatories, for two reasons.
First, the statement is vague and, therefore, evasive. Within the just war
tradition, there is a common moral presumption for justice as well as a
recognition that all war is terrible. But there are times when justice
demands
the use of force as a response to violence, hatred, and injustice.
This leads to my second reason for declining to join my colleagues. I
believe
it is possible within the tradition of just war thinking to make a case for
preemptive or preventive use of force. Has that case been made where a war
against Iraq is concerned? The answer is ''yes,'' but a complex ''yes'' that
includes caveats and warnings. An all-important concern is the kind of war -
or use of force - that follows.
The principles of just war, which date back to the writings of Saint
Augustine
in the fourth century, insist that wars of aggression and aggrandizement are
never acceptable. Wars may not legitimately be fought for purposes of
vengeance, glory, or territorial gain. Nor should they be fought to avert
dangers that are remote or that may be avoided in alternative ways. One must
also consider the likelihood of success. Don't barge in and do more harm
than
good. Before we commit ourselves to force, we must weigh carefully whether
more harm will come from acting or from not acting.
In his speech to the United Nations, President George W. Bush insisted that
the world currently faces an erratic and brutal foe who will not hesitate to
use weapons of mass destruction against those who cannot defend themselves,
whether his own people or the civilians of other countries. The theory of
just
war sets a high threshold for choosing military action. Does the Iraqi
threat
constitute a legitimate ''casus belli,'' or reason for war? Herein lies the
rub, and on this just war thinkers differ.
RELATED LINKS
Just War: a guide
The just war tradition requires that the philosopher, the politician, and
the
ordinary citizen consider a number of complex criteria when thinking about
war. These criteria are grouped into two central categories: the
justification
for the use of force (the so-called ''jus ad bellum'') and the establishment
of limits on the force that is used (the ''jus in bello'').
What are the occasions when war becomes necessary? For St. Augustine, the
most
potent justification is the protection of innocents from certain harm. If
one
has compelling evidence that harm will come to noncombatants, and that this
harm is grave and substantial, neighbor love may require a resort to arms.
The
potential harm might be directed at one's own civilians, or it might involve
the noncombatants of another country. It is better to put one's own
combatants
in danger than to stand by as the innocent are slaughtered.
All the people killed on Sept. 11, 2001, were innocents in the just war
sense
- noncombatants whose only crime was going to work or boarding an airplane
on
that horrible day. There is certainly no barrier within the just war
tradition
against trying to prevent future harm of that sort, for it is clear and it
is
imminent.
The horror of what was visited on us last Sept. 11 and the recognition that
terrorists would not hesitate to strike again prompted me to play a central
role in drafting a statement, ''What We're Fighting For.'' The statement was
signed by more than 70 distinguished scholars from across the political
spectrum who were united in their belief that a military response to the
attack was a matter of justice, not revenge; that Sept. 11 constituted an
act
of war; and that the United States had to respond to the attacks and should
respond in a manner consistent with just war teaching. That meant not
intentionally targeting civilians and using a level of force proportional to
the threat.
Nearly everyone, with the exception of absolute pacifists and those who seem
to think we should let ourselves be slaughtered with impunity because so
many
people out there ''hate'' us, agrees. Agreement stops on Iraq, however. Iraq
has not attacked us directly, and it may never do so. The threat it poses
may
not be the ''real and certain'' danger that just war theory requires. It is
a
sovereign state and just war doctrine has, since the emergence of the modern
state system in the 17th century, included a strong presumption in favor of
a
state's right to determine its own affairs. Indeed, whether you think war
against Iraq conforms to just war doctrine will turn in large part on how
you
think of states and their prerogatives.
If, as some argue, the state is the sole arbiter of its own affairs, your
stance is likely to be one of extreme caution when it comes to a preemptive
strike. In my view, however, just war demands that we see a sovereign state
as
an actor that either does what states are supposed to do - provide basic
civic
peace, rule of law, and security for citizens - or does not. When a state
destroys or is prepared to destroy its own citizens and to propel its
violence
outside its own borders, it becomes a criminal entity. Under just war
theory,
states themselves must often come under severe moral scrutiny.
In other words, a state's right to direct its own affairs is not, and has
never been, absolute. It may forfeit that right if it commits aggression
against another state (as Saddam did against Kuwait), or if it harms in
substantial and grave ways its own people or a group of its own people (as
Saddam did when he used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds), or if it
provides substantial and essential material support to others who wish to
inflict such harms (as Saddam allegedly did by supporting Osama bin Laden,
whose ''fatwas'' call for the murder of all Americans, wherever they are
found).
As for the question of whether Iraq poses a ''real and certain danger,'' it
bears notice that an imminent threat does not necessarily mean one that is
just around the corner. It may refer, instead, to murderous capabilities an
outlaw regime is in the process of developing. If one can make a strong case
that the use of such capabilities is highly likely, then the just war
caution
against ''intervening'' may be overridden.
Of course, deterrence of Iraq would be preferable. Under the terms of just
war, force should only be used after other options have been explored. But
can
deterrence work against Iraq? Clearly, Saddam Hussein has used the period
since inspections ceased in 1998 to build up weapons of mass destruction.
His
previous use of those weapons and his ongoing efforts to violate UN
agreements
give little reason to have faith in deterrence. To be sure, it might be
possible to keep Iraq contained within its borders. Saddam's army may not be
sent anywhere at all. But even so, his weapons of mass destruction may well
do
a lot of traveling, whether through overt or covert use, whether at the
hands
of the Iraqis or of international terrorists. Therefore, deterrence must
involve - as the UN itself has repeatedly agreed - keeping Saddam from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Once the case for preventive force has been made, the question then becomes
one of jus in bello - what sort of force and against whom? The single most
important factor here is the principle known as discrimination. This means
that noncombatants cannot be the intended targets of harm, as were the
victims
of Sept. 11 and the Iraqi Kurds. In any conflict civilians will fall in
harm's
way. But it is forbidden to knowingly and maliciously target them. Of
course,
if the United States goes to war, it must not target civilians. As for
Saddam,
we know he has no compunctions in this regard, and that fact, too, weighs
heavily in evaluating the threat he poses and our own actions.
In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, one of Hussein's strategies was to locate
noncombatants in or near legitimate military targets precisely in order that
they might be harmed. He could then point an accusing finger and say, ''Look
what the Americans and the United Nations coalition are doing,'' when, in
fact, it was his own actions that had brought them to grief. Saddam's record
is clear. He will not hesitate to target civilians intentionally. The only
questions are when and where.
There are many puzzling features to the current debate. We hear a lot, and
rightly, about not going it alone. But in fact we are not. The Bush
administration is seeking congressional authorization (''legitimate
authority,'' as the just war tradition calls it) to use US military might.
It
is urging the Security Council to adopt a strong resolution that basically
calls upon the Iraqi regime to abide by all the other resolutions the UN has
passed and Iraq has ignored.
When critics bemoan the current administration's alleged unilateralism, they
seem to be operating under a peculiar double standard. The United States,
working around the clock to secure support for the preventive use of force
to
disarm the Iraqi regime, is accused of egregious unilateralism. But a state
-Iraq - that has behaved and continues to behave unilaterally in defiance of
the international community's various and repeated resolutions is let off
the
hook. Why?
Here America's responsibility as the world's great superpower comes in to
play. We look back, as we should, with shame at our inaction (and that of
the
international community) while Bosnian Muslims and Rwandan Tutsis were being
slaughtered. In violation of the just war framework, the cries of the
innocent
went unheard or unheeded. Of course, no administration can protect all
Americans everywhere at every point in time. No country or international
body
can protect all civilians everywhere at every point in time from being
preyed
upon by the ruthless. That is utopian, and the just war tradition cautions
against such utopianism and overreach. But it also insists that those who
have
the power to stop the mass killing of innocents may well be obliged to do
so.
In the days and weeks ahead these are the considerations I will weigh as I
reflect on the use of force against Iraq - should Iraq defy the UN, and
history suggests it will. Our great power brings with it a solemn
responsibility. That responsibility isn't limited to protecting the citizens
of the United States alone. There is an underlying strain of isolationism in
much of the current debate. Again and again an image of ''Fortress America''
emerges as we are enjoined not to meddle abroad. Much of this discussion is
partisan, of course, as the argument turns on which administration is doing
the alleged meddling. But much of it implies a retreat within our borders.
Sovereignty trumps other concerns for those who espouse a kind of
quasi-isolationism.
Justice falls by the wayside in such preachments. The Iraqi victims of
Saddam
Hussein are not considered worthy of serious consideration. But just war
theory demands that we consider them, as well as Saddam's potential victims
outside Iraq. That is why we must put relentless pressure on him to conform
to
UN resolutions, and, if he fails to do so, insist that he pay the
consequences
- not because we want a war but because force can sometimes be put at the
behest of a more just international order.
Jean Bethke Eshtain is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and
Political Ethics at the University of Chicago. Her forthcoming book, "Just
War
and American Power in a Violent World," will be published in February by
Basic
Books
|
