On 4 Jul 2003, Fye Samateh wrote:
> Mr Camara.
>
> Please subscribe Zakaria Saho on the list at this adress.
> [log in to unmask]   thanks.
>
> Fye.
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Momodou Camara" <[log in to unmask]>
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Friday, July 04, 2003 9:10 AM
> Subject: (Fwd) Liberia: Waiting for Washington
>
>
> > ------- Forwarded message follows -------
> > From:                   "Africa Action" <[log in to unmask]>
> > Date sent:              Thu, 3 Jul 2003 15:51:02 -0500
> > Subject:                Liberia: Waiting for Washington
> > Send reply to:          [log in to unmask]
> > Priority:               normal
> > To:                     [log in to unmask]
> >
> > AFRICA ACTION
> > Africa Policy E-Journal
> > July 3, 2003 (030703)
> >
> > Liberia: Waiting for Washington
> > (Reposted from sources cited below)
> >
> > With President Bush's trip to Africa only days away, the Pentagon
> > has been asked to prepare contingency plans for participation of
> > U.S. troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations in Liberia, as
> > demanded by Liberians, West African countries, and the United
> > Nations. But the president has apparently not yet made his
> > decision. Even if some troops are sent, serious questions remain on
> > the details of participation, and particularly on the terms of U.S.
> > engagement, given the Pentagon's preference for non-engagement or
> > for total unilateral control. The longer the decision is delayed,
> > the more prominence it will have as President Bush visits five
> > African countries next week, two of them in West Africa.
> >
> > This posting contains excerpts from two recent news stories from
> > allafrica.com on the debate, and from an extensive 1995 report by
> > allafrica.com's Reed Kramer detailing previous failures of U.S.
> > Liberia policy, including when the President's father was faced
> > with crisis in Liberia in 1990. The full paper, too long to include
> > here, is available on the allafrica.com site at the link indicated
> > below.
> >
> > Meanwhile news reports indicate that the U.S. has suspended
> > military aid to about 35 countries, including, in Africa, Benin,
> > Central African Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger,
> > South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. The countries are signatories
> > to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC),
> > and failed to satisfy U.S. demands to sign "bilateral immunity
> > agreements" confirming that U.S. nationals can commit war crimes or
> > other serious human rights offenses without fear of accountability
> > to that international body. For a commentary on the ICC and Africa,
> > see the issue of Pambazuka News for July 3, 2003 at:
> > http://lists.kabissa.org/lists/archives/public/pambazuka-news
> >
> > +++++++++++++++++end summary/introduction+++++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> > Bush 'Still Deciding' on Whether to Send Troops to Liberia
> >
> > http://allafrica.com
> >
> > July 3, 2003
> >
> > By Charles Cobb Jr.
> > Washington, DC
> >
> > U.S. President George W. Bush says he wants to get enough
> > information before he makes a decision on whether to send troops
> > to Liberia: "I'm in the process of gathering the information
> > necessary to make a rational decision as to how to enforce the
> > ceasefire -- keep the ceasefire in place," he told allAfrica.com
> > Thursday morning.
> >
> > The administration has been pressed by regional African leaders
> > and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to send up to 2,000 troops to
> > Liberia. Representatives of the West African regional
> > organization, Ecowas, met with "our military thinkers Wednesday
> > to discuss military options," said Bush, but a report of that
> > meeting has not yet reached the White House. "Once the strategy
> > is in place I will let people know," Bush promised.
> >
> > No details on the number or type of troops that could be deployed
> > as part of an intervention force have been released but the
> > Associated Press Thursday quoted defence officials as saying that
> > U.S. military command in Europe has been ordered to begin
> > planning for possible American intervention in Liberia. A
> > 'Warning Order' was sent Wednesday night to Europe Commander Gen.
> > James Jones asking him to give the Pentagon his estimate of how
> > the situation in Liberia might be handled. ...
> >
> > ********************************************************
> >
> > Bush Pressed To Commit 'Boots On The Ground' in Liberia
> >
> > July 1, 2003
> >
> > By Reed Kramer and Charles Cobb Jr.
> >
> > Washington, DC
> >
> > A decade after 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed by an angry mob
> > in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, the Bush administration is
> > facing mounting pressure to put American 'boots on the ground' in
> > Africa once again. Calls for an active U.S. intervention in
> > Liberia are coming from the United Nations and various member
> > governments, including Britain and France and leading African
> > officials.
> >
> > Senior administration officials met at the White House Saturday
> > to discuss Liberia during a Cabinet-level 'principals' meeting of
> > the National Security Council. Another session is scheduled for
> > Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said during a television
> > appearance Monday. "There's a sense of urgency with respect to
> > the situation, and I don't want to pre-judge when the president
> > might decide or what he might decide, but we are seized with the
> > matter," Powell told interviewer Jim Lehrer on public
> > television's NewsHour program. "We understand that this is a
> > problem that has to be dealt with in the very near future."
> >
> > Last week, President George W. Bush called on the Liberian
> > leader, Charles Taylor, to leave office "so that his country can
> > be spared further bloodshed." Addressing a U.S.-Africa Business
> > Summit sponsored by the Corporate Council on Africa, Bush said:
> > "We are determined to help the people of Liberia find peace."
> >
> > Because Liberia was founded by freed American slaves in 1847 and
> > was a staunch U.S. ally during the Cold War, particularly in the
> > 1980s, many people in Africa and other parts of the globe see the
> > country as an American responsibility. However, administration
> > policy to date has sent mixed signals to the parties involved in
> > the conflict. In mid-June, with fighting in Monrovia escalating,
> > the Bush administration positioned a U.S. Navy amphibious assault
> > ship, the USS Kearsarge, off the western shore of Africa to aid
> > in the potential evacuation of American citizens. The ship,
> > equipped with helicopters and a sizeable medical team, arrived
> > just as negotiations over Liberia's future reached a critical
> > point.
> >
> > According to mediators taking part in the talks in Ghana, the
> > presence of the American ship was a critical factor in persuading
> > the warring parties, particularly Taylor's beleaguered
> > government, to agree to end the fighting. But after only three
> > days - before the ink on the accord was dry, the ship was ordered
> > back to its homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, where it arrived
> > Monday following six weeks involvement in the war on Iraq and a
> > short stint providing security for President Bush's visits to
> > Egypt and Jordan last month.
> >
> > "Once Taylor saw that ship steam away, he reverted to his old
> > ways - shifting and delaying and refusing to accept what he has
> > already agreed to do," said one senior U.S. official involved in
> > the issue. Instead of stepping aside for an interim
> > administration, as the agreement envisioned, Taylor insisted he
> > would serve out his term, which ends in January.
> >
> > Despite this setback, the mediators last week managed to get a
> > ceasefire in place, after first pressuring the rebels to end
> > their assault on Monrovia and then arm-twisting Taylor to join in
> > the truce. The accord was the work of Ghana's President John
> > Kufuor, current chair of the Economic Community of West African
> > States (Ecowas), and General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former
> > Nigerian head-of-state, who is the chief Ecowas negotiator.
> >
> > On Saturday, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called
> > on the Security Council to augment the Ecowas effort with
> > significant support. "International action is urgently needed to
> > reverse Liberia's drift towards total disintegration," he said.
> > ...
> >
> > During a previous war-enduced crisis in 1990, when the current
> > U.S. president's father was in office, Assistant Secretary of
> > State Herman Cohen toured West Africa to meet with key actors in
> > the unfolding crisis, only to be recalled to Washington where the
> > focus was on preparation for war with Iraq. "You can only
> > concentrate on so many things at once," Brent Scowcroft, the
> > national security adviser to President Bush said in a 1993
> > interview. The decision proved costly in both human lives and
> > humanitarian assistance, Cohen said in an interview last week.
> > The instability spread through the region, engulfing Sierra Leone
> > and Cote d'Ivoire, and impacting the regional giant Nigeria.
> >
> > The first Bush administration "looked the other way" while
> > Liberia descended into chaos, Crocker said. This time around,
> > Crocker said "it wouldn't surprise me" if President Bush
> > "confronts the skeptics in the Pentagon -- and we all know that
> > is where they are -- and says this is the time to act." ,,,
> >
> > Asked about Liberia on Monday at the Pentagon, Secretary of
> > Defense Donald Rumsfeld said: "We've spent time over the weekend
> > -- a good deal of time over the weekend -- visiting among
> > ourselves about that and thinking through different aspects of
> > it," he said. The president has not yet "made a call," he said,
> > "nor has the State Department requested an evacuation out of
> > Monrovia." "We ought to be engaged," said Susan E. Rice, who was
> > assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1997 until
> > 2001. "Ecowas is saying they will send 3,000 troops as part of a
> > multinational force if the United States will send 2,000 troops
> > and takes the lead. I think that is a bargain we ought to
> > accept," she told the Brookings forum. "For Liberia, the United
> > States is the international 911. There is no other." ...
> >
> > ***********************************************************
> >
> > Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End
> >
> > Africa News Service (Durham)
> >
> > Excerpts only: see full text at:
> > http://allafrica.com/stories/200101090216.html
> >
> > July 1, 1995
> >
> > By Reed Kramer
> >
> > Half a decade ago, with the Berlin Wall coming down and the
> > Soviet Union entering its final days, a small-scale conflict in
> > West Africa quietly put post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy to an
> > early test.
> >
> > Liberia's civil war, which began with a cross-border raid by a
> > tiny rebel band in late 1989, has claimed the lives of one out of
> > every 17 people in the country, uprooted most of the rest, and
> > destroyed a once-viable economic infrastructure.
> >
> > The strife also has spread to Liberia's neighbors, contributing
> > to a slowing of the democratization that was progressing steadily
> > through West Africa at the beginning of the decade and
> > destabilizing a region that already was one of the world's most
> > marginal. U.S. taxpayers have footed a sizable bill -- over $400
> > million to date -- for emergency aid that arguably never would
> > have been needed had their government used its considerable clout
> > to help end the killing.
> >
> > As fighting escalated in early 1990, the Bush administration
> > faced a serious conundrum. Western European and most of Africa
> > looked to the United States to take the lead in seeking a
> > peaceful resolution of the Liberian crisis, since the country's
> > history bears an unmistakable "made in America" stamp. But senior
> > administration officials, determined to limit U.S. involvement in
> > what was viewed as a "brush fire," rejected the notion of
> > inherent American interest or responsibility.
> >
> > "It was difficult to see how we could intervene without taking
> > over and pacifying the country with a more-or-less-permanent
> > involvement of U.S. forces," Brent Scowcroft, President George
> > Bush's national security advisor, said in a 1993 interview with
> > the author after leaving office. In addition, Scowcroft
> > continued, U.S. attention was "dedicated towards other areas most
> > involved in ending the Cold War." There was the fall of communism
> > in Eastern Europe and, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August
> > of 1990, the build up the war in the Gulf. "You can only
> > concentrate on so many things at once," Scowcroft said.
> >
> > But a range of senior U.S. officials did focus considerable
> > attention on Africa's oldest republic. During a crucial period of
> > increasing carnage in mid-1990, Liberia was a regular item on the
> > agenda of the Deputies Committee of the National Security
> > Council, where most major foreign policy problems were handled.
> > Later in the year as the crisis deepened, the Deputies dealt
> > daily with both Liberia and Kuwait, according to participants in
> > the sessions.
> >
> > "We missed an opportunity in Liberia," Herman J. Cohen, assistant
> > secretary of state for African affairs in the Bush
> > administration, said in an 'exit interview' (CSIS Africa Notes,
> > Number 147, April 1993). "We did not intervene either militarily
> > or diplomatically."
> > ...
> >
> > The following account of the U.S. decision-making process during
> > Liberia's disintegration is drawn from some 30 interviews with
> > policymakers at all levels in Washington and abroad, and from a
> > review of historical materials and public records, Some of the
> > interviews were on the record, but most were with officials who
> > agreed to talk only if their names and positions were not cited.
> > ...
> >
> > Ready-Made Cold Warrior
> >
> > It became the job of William Tubman, a reform-minded career
> > politician who was electe4d president in 1943 and inaugurated the
> > following year, to lead the country into an era when the global
> > spotlight turned towards Africa. ...
> >
> > The core of his platform was the "Open Door" policy, designed to
> > promote the development of the country's largely undeveloped
> > interior based on joint ventures between the government and
> > foreign investors. ...
> >
> > As it had done in the two World Wars, Liberia steered a decidedly
> > pro-American course as the Cold War engulfed the globe. The
> > United States set up a permanent mission to train the Liberian
> > military and began bringing Liberian officers to American
> > institutions for further training. In 1959, Liberia concluded a
> > mutual defense pact with the United States. ...
> >
> > Although Liberia was no longer the focus of U.S. interest in
> > Africa -- new nations like Ghana and Nigeria and the
> > anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa claimed the bulk of
> > official and media attention -- U.S. aid grew steadily. From 1946
> > to 1961, Liberia received $41 million in assistance, the fourth
> > largest amount in sub-Saharan Africa (after Ethiopia, Zaire, and
> > Sudan). Between 1962 and 1980, economic and military aid totaled
> > $278 million. In per capita terms, Liberia hosted the largest
> > Peace Corps contingent and received the greatest level of aid of
> > any country on the entire African country. ...
> >
> > The Soldiers Take Control
> >
> > Americo-Liberian political hegemony ended abruptly on April 12,
> > 1980 when 17 young army officers of indigenous descent staged a
> > bloody coup. Tolbert was slain in the Executive Mansion, along
> > with more than a score of others, mostly security personnel.
> > Another 13 officials died in a nationally televised execution 10
> > days later on a Monrovia beach. Coming amid rising public
> > pressure for political and economic reform and a crackdown on
> > dissent by the Tolbert regime, the takeover was welcomed by many
> > inside and outside Liberia as a significant shift favoring the 95
> > percent of the population excluded from power by
> > Americo-Liberians. ,,,
> >
> > Caught off guard by the turn of events, the Carter administration
> > reacted cautiously. But after a policy review, an aid package was
> > approved "to exercise influence on the course of events," ...
> >
> > After Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, support for Liberia was
> > increased. Aid levels rose from about $20 million in 1979 to $75
> > million and then $95 million, for a total of $402 million between
> > 1981 and 1985, more than the country received during the entire
> > previous century. Ties with the Liberian army were strengthened;
> > the military component of the aid package for this period was
> > about $15 million, which was used for a greatly enlarged training
> > program, barracks construction and equipment.
> >
> > In 1982, Doe was invited to Washington for an Oval Office meeting
> > with President Reagan. Although the session began on a miscue,
> > with Reagan introducing his visitor as "Chairman Moe" during a
> > photo taking in the Rose Garden, Doe received what he wanted -- a
> > promise of continued American backing.
> >
> > ... As part of the expanding relationship, Doe agreed to a
> > modification of the mutual defense pact granting staging rights
> > on 24-hour notice at Liberia's sea and airports for the U.S.
> > Rapid Deployment Force, which was trained to respond to security
> > threats around the world. A year after the meeting with Reagan,
> > Doe followed the precedent set by Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko in
> > establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, thus breaking away
> > from the isolationist stand adopted by most African countries in
> > the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
> >
> > A Cog in the Anti-Qaddafi Machine
> >
> > Exerting a pivotal impact on Liberia policy was the closely held
> > fact that Doe and his small country had been drawn into an effort
> > to oust Libya's Muammar Qaddafi from power. Within weeks after
> > Reagan's inauguration, the CIA, under the direction of Reagan's
> > trusted adviser William J. Casey, began encouraging and
> > supporting anti-Qaddafi activity by Libyan opposition groups and
> > friendly foreign governments. ...
> >
> > By the time Doe arrived at the White House in August of 1982, the
> > CIA task force had pinpointed Liberia as a key operational area
> > -- an easily accessible base for the CIA's heightened clandestine
> > campaign against Libya throughout the area. According to
> > government officials involved in Liberia at the time, one of the
> > first steps taken was to make high-tech improvements in at least
> > one of the communication facilities in Monrovia
> >
> > Liberia's usefulness as a regional linchpin already had been
> > tested during a covert operation in support of Chadian leader
> > Hissene Habre, who had successfully ousted his Libyan-backed
> > rival, Goukouni Oueddei in June. ...
> >
> > According to Woodward, Casey selected Doe as one of 12 heads of
> > state from around the world to receive support from a special
> > security assistance program. The operations were designed to
> > provide both extraordinary protection for the leaders and
> > otherwise unobtainable information and access for the CIA.
> > Unknown to almost everyone else involved in making decisions
> > about Liberia for the administration, this gave the CIA and the
> > White House a huge stake in keeping the Liberian regime in place.
> >
> > That objective proved increasingly challenging. Although a
> > 25-person constitutional commission headed by Amos Sawyer, then
> > dean of the University of Liberia, presented its report in early
> > 1983, the ruling PRC delayed the holding of a promised
> > referendum, creating growing unease in the country. ...
> >
> > In early 1984, the government shut down the leading daily, The
> > Observer, edited by Kenneth Best, one of Africa's best known
> > journalists. The PRC also used a ban on political activity,
> > enacted in the aftermath of the coup, to crackdown on critics.
> > ...
> >
> > When [election] balloting took place, Doe declared himself the
> > winner by 50.9 percent of the vote, despite ample evidence that
> > he had been defeated. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration
> > accepted the results. ...
> >
> > Liberians were "baffled" by Washington's reaction and the
> > "reluctance to concede the grimness of Doe's human rights
> > record," Enoanyi says. The situation grew increasingly bad,
> > particularly after a failed coup attempt by Doe's exiled former
> > second-in-command Thomas Quiwonkpa, which was followed by
> > stepped-up attacks on the opposition.
> >
> > After the election results were announced, the [U.S.] House and
> > Senate each passed nonbinding resolutions calling for an end to
> > U.S. assistance, but the administration announced aid would
> > continue. ...
> >
> > Meanwhile, the CIA activity in Liberia increased markedly. ...
> > The country proved important for another covert action that year
> > -- the airlift to Unita mounted after the 1985 repeal of the
> > Clark Amendment, which had barred covert U.S. security assistance
> > to any of the factions in Angola. Almost as soon as the votes
> > were counted, the Agency began shipping materiel, with Roberts
> > Field again playing a key support role as a transit point.
> >
> > In early 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz landed at Roberts
> > Field at the end of a six-nation African tour and, to the
> > consternation of many, applauded "continued efforts towards
> > political reconciliation" during a luncheon with Doe. ,,, On
> > December 24, 1989 two dozen armed insurgents quietly crossed into
> > Liberia from the Ivory Coast, ushering in a new and tragic phase
> > of the Liberian saga.
> >
> > U.S. Policy in the 1990s
> >
> > The connections spanning two centuries and the particularly close
> > ties of the 1980s led Liberians and others to expect that the
> > United States would help when trouble came.
> >
> > The 1989 insurgents were led by Charles Taylor, 40, a former
> > procurement clerk in Doe's government who fled to the United
> > States after being charged with embezzling a million dollars, was
> > detained in Massachusetts for extradition and escaped from jail
> > while awaiting a hearing. The rebels expected to quickly garner
> > support and cover the 200 miles to Monrovia in a matter of weeks.
> > ...
> >
> > The unrest caused mild alarm In Washington. An interagency
> > working group , chaired by Assistant Secretary Cohen, was
> > convened to review the situation and reexamine options. This was
> > followed by extensive discussions in the Deputies Committee.
> > "There were different views on how active we should be," said one
> > participant, "but ultimately, the prevailing view was that this
> > was something for the Liberians to work out themselves."
> >
> > The policy that evolved throughout 1990 can be viewed through the
> > prism of three guiding principles.
> >
> > 1. Reluctance to Break with Liberia's Rulers.
> >
> > As soon as the first reports arrived from Nimba, there were a few
> > calls within the administration for a course correction that
> > would distance the United States from Doe's unpopular rule. ...
> >
> > As the deliberations moved up the policy chain, new global
> > considerations took precedence. Liberia's proven utility as a
> > military staging base and intelligence monitoring site weighed in
> > Doe's favor. Moreover, policymakers were instinctually leery of
> > Taylor, since they had intelligence indicating he had received
> > modest backing from Libya, including training for some of his
> > men.
> >
> > 2. Disregard for the Potential Impact of Low-Level Engagement.
> >
> > U.S. prestige carried more sway in Liberia than most senior
> > policymakers realized in their 1990 evaluations. The inclination
> > was to downplay the significance of historical ties rather than
> > employing them as tools for successful diplomacy. ...
> >
> > 3. Preference for Arms-Length Diplomacy.
> >
> > Forceful diplomatic engagement of the kind that has long been
> > routinely employed by superpowers was never attempted in Liberia.
> > Instead, U.S. involvement was limited largely to the protection
> > of American lives and the provision of emergency aid. And there
> > was not much public pressure to do anything more. ,,,
> >
> > West African governments, however, expected and wanted a more
> > active American role. "We could not understand how the U.S.
> > government with its long-standing relationship with Liberia could
> > remain so aloof," said Ambassador Joseph Iroha, a career Nigerian
> > diplomat who represented Ecowas in Monrovia for several years
> > during the war. West African states sent in troops to stop the
> > fratricidal killing," he said, because "we couldn't allow this
> > sort of thing to continue."
> >
> > What Have We Learned from Liberia?
> >
> > Unfortunately, by the time Ecowas was able to organize an
> > intervention force in late 1990, the country's dismemberment was
> > far advanced and domestic division had been cemented with
> > widespread bloody conflict. In addition, the peace force brought
> > problems of its own. ...
> >
> > Critics of U.S. policy argue that even after the administration
> > decision to limit direct American involvement, Washington could
> > have done much more, both materially and diplomatically, to
> > bolster the West African effort and make it more successful.
> >
> > No one can judge with hindsight whether the loss of an estimated
> > 150,000 lives and the regional devastation spawned by the
> > Liberian crisis could have been prevented without extended U.S.
> > military engagement ...
> >
> > What is certain is that failure to stop the fighting during 1990,
> > before the entire country was demolished, erected barriers to a
> > solution that still have not been overcome. The result was to
> > condemn Liberia and much of the region to continuing suffering
> > and to divert scarce international assistance from economic
> > development to sustaining refugees. ...
> >
> > +++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> > Date distributed (ymd): 030703
> > Region: West Africa
> > Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+ +US policy focus+
> >
> > ************************************************************
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> > ------- End of forwarded message -------
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