Colley
Marvelous piece again.I can't wait to see your next article.
Once again,God saved you to tell the true colors of the "Alibaba and the six
thieves"
Peace!!!!
>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT
>Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 19:27:56 -0700
>
>COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT
>In my last piece I explained how after two days of
>confusion at the State House following the immediate
>takeover that the so-called coup organizers finally
>came together and formed a ruling military council
>with Yaya given the leadership role as the most senior
>officer among them. Still guided by their order of
>seniority Sabally, as I said, got the number two
>position, followed by Haidara, then Singhateh and
>Yankuba in that order.
>However, for those of us within, there was no question
>about who was really in charge. Singhateh was no doubt
>the man calling the shots with unprecedented
>arrogance. Of course there was crazy Sana battling for
>equal recognition or rights, acting on his erratic
>whims, though with a dangerous bond with the new
>defense minister. Most of the arrests and detentions
>of officers to Mile Two Central Prisons were
>orchestrated by Singhateh and Sabally, although the
>physical apprehension of those detainees was largely
>carried out by the "Mighty Sabally" aided by Haidara
>and their guards. Sabally in addition showed little
>respect for Yaya, just as Singhateh at that initial
>moment demonstrated none at all to their new chairman
>either. As for Sabally he had maintained his
>disrespect for Yaya for the entire six months he had
>served as vice-chairman of the AFPRC or up to the day
>he was arrested on the 27th January 1995.
>It did not however take Yaya too long to realize that
>potential enemies surrounded him. For a while it
>appeared as if he was lost in survival plans. But
>then, the US ambassador Mr. Andrew Winters came asking
>for the coup leader to speak to Sir Dawda by phone. It
>was the very day Yaya got elected as chairman of the
>AFPRC. Mr. Winters did not specifically ask for
>Singhateh, but the head of the military government.
>Yaya as a result was certain that he was the person
>the Ambassador wanted to talk to Sir Dawda until
>Singhateh told him to forget about going and left with
>Mr. Winters.
>This particular incident in the development of the
>whole coup episode told a lot about how the success of
>those clowns in seizing power was merely luck and
>nothing of the sort of great leadership they later
>tried to sell to the gullible Gambian masses. Nothing
>was properly planned or executed.
>Anyhow, it was after this embarrassing encounter with
>Singhateh that Yaya started to forge his personal
>defense scheme. Yaya was definitely not pleased with
>that treatment. So no sooner had Singhateh left with
>the ambassador to speak to Sir Dawda than Yaya began
>to surround himself with guards he trusted. And it was
>interesting to note that he got the bulk of these men
>from his former gendermarie colleagues. The men they
>were suppose to fight were suddenly turned into
>dependable allies within Yaya's inner security circle.
>Soon he put it to his new guards that soldiers
>carrying weapons were not to be allowed near him
>especially around his room upstairs. (After his
>appointment, he immediately moved upstairs and
>occupied Sir Dawda's main bedroom). His guards, now
>headed by Musa Jammeh strictly enforced the order from
>Yaya on every armed soldier except on Singhateh and
>Sabally.
>Anyway in their presence, Yaya was still very cautious
>in the manner he dealt with them. Perhaps he was aware
>of the intentions of these key players in the coup to
>have most of the officers executed later. I'll get to
>that later.
>Before forgetting this important point, I thought it
>historically necessary to mention the special role
>played by Major Malick Njie (Army Doctor) at those
>first critical days of the coup. Although he was just
>from course in Nigeria and was on his leave, he
>managed to respond to the invitation to the State
>House. For two days he also stayed around to see how
>he could help stabilize the situation. With his
>medical background therefore he was assigned with the
>special task of ensuring that the Royal Victoria
>Hospital was fully operational plus all the medical
>centers affected by the coup outside Banjul. For three
>days he tirelessly moved from one affected medical
>facility to the other until everyone of them was back
>to full operation. On the fifth day, when he came to
>give the council members a situation report on his
>achievements, Sabally and Haidara arrested him and
>took him straight to death row. It was a very cowardly
>and treacherous act.
>However by the 25th of July, things started to look
>hopefully stable. The soldiers' uncontrolled and
>dangerous driving in the city had considerably
>dwindled. There were negligible problems here and
>there which in the final analysis made the coup a
>relatively peaceful event. One sergeant was arrested
>for robbing a Mauritanian shopkeeper in Brikama at
>gunpoint. Another corporal was also arrested for
>trying to steal the engine of a Mercedes Benz parked
>at the former Secretary General's residence at Fajara.
>There was also a civilian arrested wearing military
>uniform pretending to be a soldier and extorting money
>from commercial drivers around Soma. He was a seasoned
>criminal who had traveled all over the world and could
>speak all kinds of languages, local and foreign. A
>weapon in his hands would have been too deadly. And
>finally there was one soldier who out of excitement or
>whatever, accidentally shot him self on the foot. It
>was not very serious anyway. Apart from those isolated
>incidents, the country quickly began to return to
>normalcy by the 25th of July.
>At that moment Captain Mamat Cham was so pleased with
>General Dada's assistance that he recommended for the
>Nigerian General to be invited to the State House for
>more help. The idea was communicated to the general,
>which he readily accepted but requested for a vehicle
>to be sent to get him. But at the last minute when
>Captain Cham was about to dispatch a vehicle to get
>him from Fajara, Singhateh vetoed the idea.
>Anyhow, later that day, Captain Cham had a bigger
>responsibility of helping the council members choose
>civilian ministers for the new cabinet. Apart from Mr.
>Bakary Darbo who was selected out of sincere respect
>and confidence most of the AFPRC members had for the
>former Finance Minister, I really didn't know the
>criteria used to select the others including my very
>self.
>All I knew was that a special meeting to select the
>ministers was again conducted upstairs by the room
>occupied by Yaya. Captain Cham was present. And I was
>made to understand that he, Captain Cham recommended
>the appointment of Fafa Mbye as minister of justice
>and also Mr. Mawdo Touray as chief protocol officer.
>Like previous missions outside, Captain Cham was the
>officer who went to meet most or all the prospective
>ministers at their home to seek their consent for
>their formal appointment. On his return he reported
>everyone's acceptance of the appointments except that
>of the candidate from the PDOIS party. They rejected
>the offer on the basis that the coup was undemocratic
>and was against the principles of their party
>doctrine.
>However, it was Singhateh who informed me of my
>appointment as minister for trade and industry. He
>told me that the decision to give me that position was
>derived from their strong confidence in my ability to
>offer a valuable contribution to the course.
>Up to that moment nothing of serious importance could
>be attributed to the reason why the PPP government was
>overthrown. And that was evident in the manner the
>former top executive members of that government were
>treated in comparison to how the GNA senior officers
>in particular suffered the misdirected stupidity and
>anger of the fools. There was nothing logical in
>arresting the officers who had nothing to do with
>their success or failure or their purpose of
>overthrowing the government. Speaking to Yaya about
>trying to stop Sana was useless. He would express his
>dissatisfaction with Sabally's actions in the absence
>of the vice-chairman, but as soon as Sana surfaced
>with more names of officers he just arrested, Yaya
>would commend him for a job well done. It was hard to
>understand when the whole madness would end. Some of
>us were however hoping that by the time the new
>government became fully operational; they would put
>Sana in his place and allow civility to prevail. We
>did not know that Sabally after all had gotten into
>something too much for his midget head and that only
>by applying his maddening rules of the game against
>him would he be finally tamed. It was done on the 27th
>of January 1995. That was the day Yaya and Singhateh
>came together at last and dragged Sabally and his
>friend Haidara by the tails straight to death row as
>well. We gave them a warm welcome that day.
>Anyway, as the general situation indicated in the
>beginning, there was nothing of significance that the
>AFPRC government could say were the serious crimes
>committed by the PPP government towards the Gambian
>people to warrant the coup. And until those kangaroo
>courts were created as commissions of enquiry boards
>to implicate the Gambians they simply hated, there was
>still little for them to say. In the process, the
>crude oil saga was dug out giving them their first
>anti-PPP ammunition that boosted their public image.
>With 420 million Dalasi said to have been involved in
>what the commission reported as "embezzlement of
>public funds", Yaya started calling Sir Dawda and his
>government "Dirmos…! Dirmos…! Dirmos…! (Well, time has
>proven to all of us that when looking for the biggest
>Dirmo of the century, missing Doctor Dirmo Yaya Jammeh
>leaves you with nobody better qualified for the
>crown). The fact that he was caught red handed on a
>crude oil corruption saga coupled with all kind of
>racketeering-blood diamond, arms trafficking
>etceteras- not in Dalasi but millions of dollars was
>enough to drag him out of State House straight to
>death row.
>Anyhow, the fact of the matter was that we were poorly
>armed with good reasons for the coup. Yet we were
>appointed ministers and expected by all means to
>justify our positions or actions to the Gambian
>public.
>The following day however, the other ministerial
>positions were formally announced over Radio Gambia.
>That evening, I did not stay too late at the state
>house. For the first time since the coup I decided to
>go home and spend the night with my family. Before
>leaving I spoke to Yaya at the balcony by his room. He
>even asked me to make sure that I reported for duty
>early the next morning since it was supposed to be the
>day for the swearing in of the newly appointed
>civilian ministers. We were very close indeed,
>providing us with the opportunity to talk about a lot
>of things. He treated me with respect and I thought he
>was a genuine good person. We even discussed the
>urgency for him to look into getting a wife since he
>was without one at the time. He agreed that it would
>be his top priority before long. And he definitely had
>someone in mind around Brikama.
>Oh, by the way, I think the 26th of July was the day
>IGP Pa Sallah Jagne returned from Dakar. He was among
>those who joined the America vessel with Sir Dawda and
>his family. Upon his arrival, Sabally and Haidara
>arrested and chained him to Mile Two Prisons.
>A week or two later Lamin Kaba Bajo also returned from
>Dakar. Within weeks he was appointed Commissioner
>Western Division. Too hard to reason out!
>I slept at home that night but Captain Cham spent the
>night at his usual room at the state house.
> The following morning I drove myself from my house to
>the State House. I did not have any driver or guards.
>Few soldiers had come to me asking for whether they
>could become my guards but I turned their offers down.
>I did not feel the need for guards anyway.
>It was about 8:00 a.m. when I drove into State House.
>There were a lot of soldiers standing around with a
>hand full of officers as well. The most senior officer
>was Lieutenant Ebrima Cambi.
>Interestingly, Lt. Cambi was one person Yaya wanted to
>see arrested They had had personal problems before
>regarding an army vehicle that Lt. Cambi forced Yaya
>to ground on the orders of Colonel Akogie. When I
>first heard him talking about arresting Lt. Cambi I
>was lucky to talk him out of it. After that I called
>Lt. Cambi and warned him to be careful of his
>activities before he was arrested. Anyhow by the
>morning of the 27th of July all arrests plans for the
>lieutenant seemed to have been forgotten. Weeks after
>he was nailed down. He was the last officer to be
>arrested around the middle of August.
>As expected when I alighted, Lt. Cambi called every
>person on the ground to attention before he saluted
>me. I saluted back and told him to stand everybody at
>ease and carry on. Typical military rituals!
>I walked into the building, took the stairs straight
>up to Yaya's room. The area was unusually quiet. There
>was only one guard around, Corporal Mballo Saidykhan.
>He was a former member of the presidential guard. I
>was really surprised to hear from the corporal that
>Yaya was still sleeping since he went to bed last
>night. After being so particular about timing that
>morning for the swearing in ceremony of the new
>cabinet ministers, it was surprising that he was still
>in bed. I later added one and one and figured the
>whole thing out. Yaya just did not want to meet me
>because of the conspiracy they had hatched against us
>the previous night.
>I walked across the corridor and ran into Singhateh.
>When I spoke to him, I noted some degree of arrogance
>and rudeness in his voice. He walked away from me.
> Down the hallway there was the room occupied by
>Sabally and Haidara. They were in a cheerful mood
>until they saw me walking in. I even tried to joke
>with them but by their reaction they showed me that I
>was not at all funny to them. I took a seat on one of
>the chairs in the room; they both got up and left the
>room. It was now clear to me that something had
>seriously gone wrong.
>Captain Mamat Cham was in the next room. I was
>slightly relieved when I saw him. He was nice and
>spoke to me just like before, although I found him
>talking to some civilians about the current situation.
>Among them was Mr. Bolong Sonko who was the chosen
>minister of external affairs.
>There were also officials from the Gambia Ports
>Authority with reports of emergency international
>monetary transactions that were to be attended to
>ASAP.
>Anyway I was able to get Captain Cham to talk to me
>one to one at the back of the room. I asked him what
>had happened the previous night after explaining to
>him my strange encounters in the last ten to fifteen
>minutes. At first he insisted that nothing unusual
>happened but when I pressed him further to think about
>everything that had happened last night, he talked
>about Singhateh's rude behavior.
>According to the Captain at around 3.00 a.m.,
>Singhateh woke him up from his sleep and told him to
>vacate the room and go to a smaller one because, by
>appointment he was his senior as the minister of
>defense. Asked what he did, Cham said that he accepted
>without argument and moved to the other room. After a
>short while, Singhateh came back to him and informed
>him to go back to the room he was asked to leave. He
>went back, and that was the last time he saw or spoke
>to him.
>"Do you know that Yaya is still in bed?" I asked cham.
>He did not know and was equally struck by the unusual
>lateness..
>It was barely five minutes later when a soldier walked
>in, saluted me and asked me to answer the
>Vice-Chairman downstairs. That was very unusual again.
>Whatever Sana had wanted to tell me out of the
>ordinary he could have said it when I met him with
>Haidara minutes ago.
>I left Captain Cham to attend to his civilian guests
>and went down the stairs to the lower floor. Sana was
>outside the building waiting for me. He asked for
>Captain Cham.
>"He is upstairs", I said.
>The same soldier was sent back up to get him.
>In the meantime I asked Sabally what was going on.
>"Nothing serious', he said. " I just want to show you
>and Captain Cham something".
>When the captain came down, Sana offered to ride with
>me in his vehicle while Cham joined Haidara.
>As the convoy was about to Leave State House, Dr.
>Malick Njie arrived to give his report about the job
>he had been doing in the hospitals and clinics. Anyway
>he was asked to join us in one of the vehicles behind'
>Driving through Independence Drive in a state of
>deafening silence in the vehicle I soon noticed
>something that further bothered me. Ahead of us I
>noticed an overloaded pickup vehicle with soldiers
>armed to the teeth. It was trouble staring at me
>directly in the face.
>For a moment I thought we were going to Yundum until
>the convoy branched off to Mile Two Prisons. The
>vehicles came to a screeching stop at the center of
>the yard, by the admin office. Within seconds we were
>surrounded by soldiers pointing their rifles at us as
>Sabally said the words: "SIR, YOU ARE UNDER ARREST".
>"For what?" I asked.
>"You are just under arrest sir"; he repeated the same
>words.
>I turned around and saw that we were four in number:
>Major Malick Njie, Captain Cham, ASP Aboubacarr Jeng
>(police officer who was helping in the documentation
>of our activities since day two of the coup) and
>myself.
>I told Sabally to inform my family about the arrest
>and detention. He would not even talk back. He simply
>waved at us with his weapon to move into the prison
>enclosure-death row to be more precise.
>It was unimaginable but more reasonable than trying
>anything foolish just be shot by that imbecile for
>nothing.
>As for the prison officers who received and searched
>us, they took everything they considered illegal to
>keep in the cells; they behaved as if we were serial
>killers already sentenced to die within few hours.
>They took everything from me from my wristwatch to my
>belt and even my shoelaces.
>Then they put us in cell rooms about nine feet long
>and five feet wide. It had one wooden bed placed on
>concrete slabs with one dirty blanket spread on it.
>There was a small window opening to the outside at the
>upper part of the wall. Call it the superhighway for
>the all the mosquitoes in that swampy area. Not a
>single documentation of our names, the time we came in
>or why we were there was done. There were no
>cautionary statements from anybody. We were just like
>bunch of animals herded into a slaughterhouse.
>Beside the extremely bad food served, we were for
>almost two weeks not allowed to leave the cells for
>anything, showering or even breathing fresh air
>outside. We were locked up 24/7.
>When some detainees later got sick, and Haidara whose
>ministry was in charge of the prisons, was asked about
>taking them to the RVH, he made this statement:
>"Anyone who is sick should never be taken to any
>hospital, and if he died he would happily take the
>responsibility of burying that person.".
>Well what goes around comes around. When he got sick
>after being tortured for two weeks, the doctors begged
>Singhateh to let him be evacuated to the RVH but the
>then Vice-Chairman vetoed it without sympathy or
>remorse. He died that same week.
>It was the darkest period in the political history of
>the Gambia and I hope and pray that the appearance of
>these monsters would be the last ever seen in the
>Gambia.
>You see, in the GNA, we were simply ordinary Gambians.
>We had had our differences, argued among ourselves and
>sometimes even threatened each other. But that was all
>about it. We did not for once imagine that smiling
>colleagues in our midst were capable of even
>considering hurting us let alone murdering us in cold
>blood. Some Gambians attribute great importance to
>peoples' names. So the name Haidara was after all very
>much respected and often honored as originating from
>good Muslims background ( the Sheriffs) who would
>rather save lives than waste them for no good reasons.
>Perhaps that was the reason why God did not wait for
>too long to stop this man whose actions were ungodly
>and too inhuman for the Gambia.
>As for Sana, his crazy life has though crumbled;
>nonetheless I still think we are yet to see this
>devil's last deplorable end.
>I still wonder what would have happened if I had spent
>the night of the 26th of July at State House and how I
>would have reacted to Singhateh if he had treated me
>in the manner he rudely treated Captain Cham. I was
>throughout with the impression that Edward was a nice
>simple gentleman, respectable and could never consider
>hurting any person much more his fellow officers in
>the GNA. He was so likable that I believe I was among
>those who gave him the name high speed.
>Anyway after our arrest and detention 2Lt Alagie
>Kanteh was briefly appointed spokesman of the council.
>Few weeks after his appointment, he was arrested. He
>was the first person who warned us in the jail about
>Singhateh's serious intention to have all detainees
>executed. According to Kanteh, since Singhateh visited
>Sierra Leone where he had a special meeting with
>Captain Valentine Strasser, he had been going around
>with the strong commitment that the best solution to
>our cases was to put us before a firing squad and kill
>us all.
>With all that, some of us were still doubtful about
>the ability of such a nice-looking person to even
>think of that evil thought.
>But on the 6th of September 1994 at about 2:00 a.m.
>the entire AFPRC members paid us a horrible visit at
>the prisons; it as the day we saw Singhateh's true
>colors.
>I will deal with that next time.
>However thank god that we all survived the evil
>intentions of those devils. After all if we were
>executed some Gambians may have pretty well tried to
>justify it in every way.
>
>
>Ebou Colly.
>
>
>
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