Mori
----- Original Message -----
From: Mori Kebba Jammeh <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 7:15 PM
Subject: Re: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE


> Ebou,
> Thank you very much for your excellent narration. It was very
disheartening
> that people who can call themselves Muslims could have done such a
gruesome
> act in the Gambia in 1994. Thanks to God there are people alive who can
> narrate the series of events that happened in the coup.
>
> Reading through this peace, I felt so much emotional and I can't imagine
how
> they could have done what they did. That was why butchering school
children last
> year was not hard for them either, but whoever participated in those
> atrocities must realize one thing and that is NO CONDITION IS PERMANENT.
>
>
> Mori
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Sunday, May 06, 2001 9:05 PM
> Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE
>
>
> >                                          COUP IN
> > GAMBIA THREE
> > KB Dampha, I am pleased but equally saddened that you
> > asked about Gibril Saye or Lieutenant Saye. Pleased in
> > the sense that his case needs to be told which I shall
> > attempt to do the way I understand it. But am also
> > quite sad to remember every thing about this fine
> > soldier who was too good to die the way he did.
> > Everything you mentioned about this soldier,
> > especially his devotion and love to promote sports in
> > the GNA-had a keen hand in football, basketball,
> > volleyball and everything-made him more so a victim to
> > be mourned and wept for until that day when his body
> > is exhumed from that toilet pit and given a decent
> > burial. We can classify Saye as the real soldier with
> > difference. He was nice, respectable and highly
> > competent. But above everything, the young man was
> > soft hearted, couldn't hurt a fly when it comes to
> > killer instincts that we saw among the ranks of the
> > army since 1994. The guy had conscience and would
> > rather die than see the truth twisted and remain
> > indifferent to it like so many APRC lackeys we see
> > today. One of the reasons I later learnt for the
> > AFPRC's decision to eliminate him was among other
> > things his constant challenge to all of them over our
> > detention at the central prisons without any credible
> > reason or explanation for it. I understand he had
> > openly and constantly protested to the council members
> > to try us if they had anything against us or set us
> > free. But death row at Mile Two prisons was not, as
> > far as he was concerned, a place for good officers
> > like us. He had even gone against all odds one day by
> > coming to the prisons to see us with encouraging words
> > to the effect that they were working hard for our
> > freedom. He had brought us provisions and toilet
> > articles as well. It was shocking to learn few days
> > later that Saye was dead.
> > So you were right Dampha in stating that the 11th
> > November event found me in jail. About thirty-five of
> > us were detained for nothing we did.  But I can still
> > remember how devastated Saye's family was over the
> > death of the man who solely provided for them. They
> > even had to send a secret inquirer at Mile-Two prison
> > to find out whether Saye was detained with us. His
> > father cannot still get over what he new was a murder
> > of his son, because he saw his son when he was leaving
> > for work the morning after the so-called abortive
> > counter coup. Soldiers who were present at the camp
> > that day also took the trouble to go to the family
> > house and explained to them what happened at Yundum
> > that weekend afternoon.
> > I personally conducted my private investigation over
> > the case and came out with the concrete evidence that
> > these men were murdered when they least expected it
> > from these cowards. A man like Saye would have never
> > dreamt about Sana Sabally taking a direct role in his
> > slaughtering. They were very close job associates,
> > sharing the same office where Saye was his deputy in
> > the heavy-weapons platoon. They were always together
> > in their small office by the fuel storeroom. Before
> > the coup one would easily mistaken them for brothers
> > given the way they used to hang closely together.
> > On the flip side however I think that was the reason
> > why Sabally freaked out after the 11th November
> > massacre. Killing a human being out of no justifiable
> > reason could be psychologically very traumatic to the
> > mind of the killer but when the relationship between
> > the killer and the victim was bonded by that human
> > factor bordering on friendship and love, the tragedy
> > turns into a clinical nightmare.
> > Anyway, that's another trivial story that I may come
> > back to in later discussions.
> > But as I said I started my investigation about 11th
> > November in the jail with special interest in Saye's
> > case. The first opportunity I had to know what exactly
> > happened was when in February surviving soldiers
> > arrested and accused of complicity in the counter coup
> > were brought to Mile-Two prisons under heavy armed
> > guard. The notorious Staff Sergeant Kanyi was part of
> > the guards. They had to be transferred from the Yundum
> > cells to death row at Mile Two. They were WO-2 A
> > Trawelleh, Sgt. N kabareh, Sgt. S. Manjang Cpl.
> > A.Jallow, Cpl. M. Saidykhan, L/CPL M.O. Njie, L/CPL K.
> > Kamara and PTE. B. Manneh.
> > When they were first brought in, they were so much
> > convinced of being lesser criminals than we were that
> > for a while they refused to say anything pertaining to
> > what bought them there. Every one of them thought his
> > arrest or detention was a mistake because, as far as
> > they were concerned, they did not have a clue about
> > any organized counter coup as such. As a result they
> > all thought sooner rather than later they were going
> > to go home.
> > Then on the22nd February, 1995, each of them received
> > a letter from Baboucarr Jatta's office (then army
> > commander) warning them to brace up for a general
> > court martial scheduled to start on 25th February
> > 1995. That was to say that they had barely thirty
> > hours to face a court martial on charges of treason.
> > For their defense, they were not allowed to have any
> > representation from professional legal officers or
> > practitioners. The following officers' names were
> > forwarded to them as the only available persons they
> > could choose their legal representatives from: Captain
> > M.B. Sarr, Captain S. Fofana, Captain JP Jasseh and
> > Lt. Seckan. These were men who were big time legal
> > illiterates. For the prosecution however, Justice B.
> > Akamba a Ghanaian solicitor was the head of the team.
> > It was clear to all the accused that it was after all
> > a kangaroo court martial that awaited them and they
> > also knew that Baboucarr Jatta was a genius at it. It
> > was a lost course to all of them.
> > That was the time they really started talking. By the
> > time they were hastily tried, found guilty and all
> > sentenced to nine years imprisonment with hard labor,
> > they had told us everything they witnessed and knew
> > about the murder of their colleagues.
> > Most of them were arrested after Barrow, Faal and
> > Nyang were killed but well before Saye was arrested.
> > They were in the Yundum cells when Saye reported for
> > work the following morning and was placed under arrest
> > by the military police. Every clothes he was wearing
> > (he was in working uniform) was taken off him and was
> > left with only his underwear before the military
> > police forced him to join them in the cells. He was
> > stunned and tried to ask for explanation but was
> > simply told that the orders came from the council
> > members of the government. Who were they? Of course
> > the cowards: Yaya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Edward
> > Singhateh, Sadibou Haidara and Yankuba Touray.
> > Anyway like all of them who were detained Saye had
> > felt that the error would be corrected and that he
> > would soon be set free.
> > Then the next day while Major Frazer Joof, commander
> > of the military police unit was taking their
> > statements at the military police office, they
> > received orders to stop the investigation and send
> > them back to the cells. They were informed that the
> > council members were at the officer's mess discussing
> > their fate. It was lunchtime, so they decided to have
> > their meals. Half way in their eating they heard some
> > strange movements out side. Then a voice they could
> > not recognized started calling for all those officers
> > arrested to come out now. Sorting out the officers
> > from the other ranks was, according to them, very
> > scary.
> > All the officers were handcuffed the moment they
> > stepped outside. Then they loaded them like sheep in
> > the back of an army Land Rover and covered them with
> > tarpaulin.
> > The windows of the cells at Yundum were not quite
> > high, so those in the cells could clearly view the
> > activities going on outside. It was from there that
> > they saw the convoy of council members departing with
> > the officers including Saye. Baboucarr Jatta was with
> > them too.
> > For two to three hours they sat in silence praying and
> > hoping that things were not really what they thought
> > they were, until they heard the convoy roaring back
> > into the camp with the green tarpaulins all soaked in
> > blood. They drove them back to the toilet area where
> > they stayed for another twenty to thirty minutes. Then
> > they came back and called for Sgt. E.M. Ceesay and
> > Sgt. Basiru Camara to follow them to the back. Few
> > minutes later they heard burst of automatic gunfire
> > twice. They were the last two to be murdered. It was a
> > nightmare of unprecedented proportion that shocked
> > every person with human emotion that evening.
> > The second part of my investigation, which filled in
> > the blank spaces left by the accused men, was
> > completed when I was freed from detention after ten
> > months. After being released and reinstated back to
> > the army, I eventually became very close to Baboucarr
> > Jatta who in his non-stop effort to clear himself of
> > any wrong doing that day told me the missing details.
> > Anyhow taking stock of what Jatta had in mind could be
> > extremely elusive. Sometimes he would echo as if Lt.
> > Barrow had really planned a coup; but at other time it
> > is as if, the AFPRC government, in order to eliminate
> > the officers and soldiers who felt they betrayed the
> > nation and the army, framed everybody. For example
> > when Lt. Barrow was arrested that night, Jatta's
> > explanation was that he had found him surrounded by
> > Sabally and his guards after he was severely beaten
> > up. He said that Sabally showed him a list of names of
> > government officials Barrow and his partners had
> > planned to execute if they had succeeded. His name
> > Jatta was on top of the list.
> > But he said upon scrutinizing the paper he had
> > discovered that the list was forged to justify their
> > desire to execute them. As a matter of fact, he
> > confirmed the forgery in the paper when he noticed
> > that his own name on top was quickly scribbled in
> > pencil while the whole list was in ink. He said he
> > took the list from Sabally and walked up to Barrow and
> > asked him why he wanted to kill him. But as soon as
> > Barrow started swearing that he did not mean to kill
> > anybody, Sabally turned around and hit him on the
> > mouth with the wooden butt of his AK47 rifle, breaking
> > all his front teeth.
> > "The torture they subjected Barrow and Faal to", Jatta
> > had said, "even if they were not shot and killed
> > finally, they would have most likely died from their
> > injuries".
> > Jatta also explained how all those arrested were later
> > taken to Mile-Two prisons first and then to Fajara
> > Barracks that night for execution during which a good
> > number of them took the risk and ran away into the
> > dark. Almost all of them escaped to Cassamance
> > including Lt. Minteh, Lt. Jarju Lt. Bah Lt. L.F.
> > Jammeh, Sgt Jadama, Sgt. Joof and others. The dash for
> > freedom happened when the captives were forced in line
> > at the middle of the field and then ordering some
> > selected soldiers to open fire on them in a typical
> > military execution style. Three times the order was
> > given, and three time the soldiers aimed and fired
> > above the heads of the victims. Then Edward Singhateh
> > soon got frustrated with the firing team, walked up to
> > where Barrow was standing, held him by the wrist,
> > pulled him away from everyone and then fired two shots
> > at him. One bullet hit Barrow on the leg and the fatal
> > one went through his ribs. He fell down on the ground
> > kicking and moaning until his whole body was reduced
> > to weak involuntary twitching of his muscles here and
> > there.
> > "It was then that everybody woke up to the reality
> > that they were dealing with real killers", said Jatta.
> >
> > There was total chaos. Some running for their lives
> > others dumb founded by Singhateh's action while most
> > of the soldiers suffered total shock. However, Faal
> > was unable to move because of the injuries he had
> > sustained that crippled him altogether. The bullet
> > that finished him was fired from the late Sadibou
> > Haidara's handgun. After that Staff Sergeant Kanyi was
> > left with his sadistic pleasure of pumping more brass
> > into poor Faal's body.
> > However let us not forget that in the heat of all this
> > commotion, Lt. Gibril Saye was at home perhaps helping
> > his wife nurse the three-week old son they just had.
> > So to even say that he was seen that night around
> > anywhere the coup was staged was ridiculous much more
> > being killed in a firefight that night as the cowards
> > tried to sell to the world. With the number of
> > soldiers supposedly killed in that single incident
> > that night, it is practically impossible or mind
> > boggling to imagine that it was a fire fight where all
> > the enemies were shot and killed while no one in the
> > friendly forces got a scratch on him. That must have
> > been the cause of the bitterness from Saye's family
> > members especially from his dad.
> > It should have also been a wake up call to the entire
> > Gambian population that the so-called soldiers of
> > difference were nothing but sadists with death. But as
> > Dampha rightly put it the civilian population in most
> > cases hardly show any interest in what happens in the
> > army or have little sympathy to the soldiers in active
> > service. The general concept is that they are all the
> > same, so whatever may happen among them good or bad is
> > their own business. On the contrary, most soldiers are
> > ordinary people, the typical Gambian type who sees his
> > work as a source of earning income. Although the
> > salary is very limited, the majority work hard to
> > manage their lives with it, get married, raise and
> > support good families hoping to survive the danger of
> > being killed in the job or avoid the evil of killing
> > unnecessarily until such time when they finish their
> > signed contracts and leave for something better.
> > However, talking about the summarily execution at
> > Yundum in which Saye was murdered Jatta had explained
> > it all in the way he experienced it. As it was
> > weekend, he said he was at home when he received a
> > call from an officer at Yundum Barracks reporting the
> > presence of the council members at the officers' mess.
> > And the way things appeared they did not seem to mean
> > any good towards the arrested officers and soldiers in
> > the cells. He immediately drove to the camp and found
> > them in the mess as reported. When he entered, they
> > instantly stopped talking. But after a short while
> > they informed him of their decision to execute
> > everybody in the cells for their role in trying to
> > overthrow their government.
> > According to Jatta, he tried to talk them against the
> > idea in every way to no avail. At one time he said he
> > almost got Sabally, the vice-chairman then, to
> > understand, but Singhateh called Yaya at the state
> > house to inform him about the situation. When
> > Singhateh returned from making the call at an office
> > close to the mess, he said that Yaya's decision was
> > final-death for all the officers.
> > That was when everybody moved out to get the officers
> > from the cells. It was lunchtime just like the
> > survivors inside the cells explained it later at Mile
> > Two.
> > Anyway everything was the same except that those in
> > the cells missed what happened in the killing process.
> > When the officers were handcuffed and covered with
> > tarpaulin in the back of the Land Rover, Staff
> > Sergeant Kanyi was ordered to ride with them at the
> > back.
> > By the time they arrived at the execution ground
> > behind Njamby Forest, Kanyi had severely hurt most of
> > them with bayonet stabs all over their bodies. He was
> > that instruction to Kanyi originated from Singhateh.
> > Jatta had claimed to have followed them all the way to
> > the killing field to put more pressure on them and to
> > still try to talk them out of it.  Well, he must have
> > done a perfectly disgusting job in convincing them not
> > to kill, anyway.
> > The officers were as soon as they arrived at the
> > ground lined up in a firing-squad formation to be
> > shot. It was another tense moment where it appeared as
> > if everyone was waiting for the other person to
> > commence the shooting. Then as if it was an accidental
> > discharge from Kanyi's weapon who was standing very
> > close to Singhateh, he fired straight at the officers
> > hitting Saye and killing him instantly. After that, it
> > was a matter of finishing the rest since one had
> > already died. It was the final green light for the
> > butchering orgy to start.
> > Jatta went on to explain how confused the council
> > members felt when the killing was all over. They were
> > altogether confused with what to do with the bodies.
> > They finally arrived at the stupid decision to have
> > their guards bury the corpse in the bushes somewhere.
> > Jatta said he talked them against that for fear that
> > people will soon find the bodies. That was how they
> > were eventually taken to Yundum Barracks, to the
> > toilets.
> > He talked about how Sgt. E.M.Ceesay and Sgt. Basirou
> > Camara were also killed that day. He could
> > particularly remember Lance Corporal Batch Jallow,
> > Singhateh's driver at the time pulling the trigger on
> > those two.
> > He further gave the gruesome details of how Saye's
> > long legs (he was about 6ft. 8ins. tall) could not fit
> > in the ditch together with the others and how Kanyi
> > and co used a machete to cut off his legs before
> > force-fitting the body in the mass grave. It was the
> > mother of all evil that I know the culprits will
> > account for someday. It is hard to comprehend how
> > brutal these demons were on people who did not hurt
> > anyone in their existence. Why was it impossible for
> > anyone among them to stand up and say that this must
> > stop, for it is all-wrong? Where was god in the hearts
> > of these GAMBIANS?
> > Jatta said Saye's father made a final attempt to know
> > about the fate of his son after Sana Sabally and
> > Sadibou Haidara fell victims of their own creation on
> > the 27th of January 1995. He had gone to the ministry
> > of defense to ask Singhateh but the old man was
> > referred to his office at the army headquarters. All
> > that the father wanted to know was whether his son was
> > dead or alive. He said he frankly told him to give it
> > up in ever seeing his son alive again because he was
> > really dead.
> > The old man, he said, thanked him for the information
> > and left with high emotions.
> > Now back to where I stopped in my last piece COUP IN
> > GAMBIA.
> > For a brief flashback, I was part of the team of the
> > American guests visiting the vice president's office
> > when a GNA officer at the state house told me about
> > the soldiers at Yundum Barracks on their way to Banjul
> > to overthrow the PPP government. However, because of
> > my duty that day to escort the guests upstairs to Mr.
> > Sahou Sabally's office, I tried to calmly perform it
> > without raising any alarms. Yet I was very worried.
> > The whole thing was really scary.
> > Upstairs, Mr. Sabally welcomed the team in few nice
> > words and then said. "Gentlemen, I am afraid to inform
> > you that we just received a report that the soldiers
> > at Yundum Barracks were on a rampage again".
> > He had sounded as if the matter was a familiar thing
> > that may die out soon. It was pretty much possible
> > that Mr. Sabally had thought that it was one of those
> > demonstrations from Yundum again which the TSG could
> > stop like they did before. Whether Mr. Sabally
> > understood the imbalance of power between the two
> > forces caused by the Nigerians lately could be
> > anyone's guess. Whatever he was thinking at that
> > moment, he appeared very calm about the matter.
> > Anyway Mr. Winters the ambassador before stepping into
> > the office immediately asked whether it was not better
> > for them to go back to the ship until the situation
> > was under control then they come back. The vice
> > president insisted that there was no need for that. He
> > told them to stay indicating that it was possible that
> > their help may be needed. While they stepped into the
> > office, I took permission to go and find out what was
> > going on. It was granted.
> > Downstairs, the same officer who first announced the
> > trouble at Yundum was still at the spot I left him. I
> > wanted him to tell me more about what he had heard and
> > whether it was not mistaken for the exercise rehearsal
> > the GNA was supposed to hold with the American marines
> > that morning.
> > It was not a rehearsal or anything like that. The way
> > they got the report, the soldiers had broken into the
> > armory sharing all the weapons among them and were
> > coming down to Banjul. Asked whether names of any
> > leaders were mention in the report, he said no. I did
> > not know whether it was only the other ranks again
> > like the past two demonstrations before or whether the
> > officers were part it this time.
> > I looked at the state house environment again
> > especially the security situation and felt very
> > insecure there. I had my office there and had been
> > working there for almost two years but the officers
> > and other ranks of the presidential guards were like
> > clowns. These people never trained, did not understand
> > section, company or battalion battle drills. They did
> > not know the difference between camouflage and
> > concealment in the language of battlefield tactic.
> > Combat fitness did not exist in their vocabulary. They
> > were overfed, better paid than all the security forces
> > in the country, spoiled and generally very rude
> > towards GNA officers. Their only reserved powers were
> > linked to the crazy "jujus" they carried in abundance
> > making think that they were bulletproof charms. The
> > charms were only for bluffing, because if they had
> > strongly believed in those powers the majority would
> > not have thrown their weapons at the last minute and
> > jumped over the tall state house fence and disappeared
> > into Banjul. Those who remained, Musa Jammeh and
> > others, simply opened the gates and surrendered. But
> > how could we blame them if their main commander who
> > should have taken charge of the critical situation
> > Captain Lamin Kaba Bajo chose to abandon the camp and
> > joined former president Jawara on board the USS Lamour
> > County? What was there to protect in a president who
> > had lost his nation? Perhaps if he had stayed the
> > majority of his men would not have had the nerve to
> > run away with their tails between their legs. What
> > else would you expect from such men, anyway? I knew
> > that staying with the state guard was unwise or even
> > suicidal. Beside, they only had AK47 rifles and most
> > of them hardly used their weapons for training or
> > anything.
> > If it was true that the soldiers had actually broken
> > into the armory, I thought, and were bent on taking
> > the country by force, there was no force that could
> > challenge them in the country. The GNA armory was jam
> > packed with super deadly weapons such as the RPG-7s,
> > AAMGs, 81MM and 60MM mortars that excluded the medium
> > range machine guns and the Chinese-type LMGs.
> > Truthfully the GNA was not quite trained on how to
> > employ these weapons in combat, but I know by merely
> > firing them at the direction of any enemy force not
> > exposed to even the sound that comes out of their
> > barrels was enough to chase them away or make them
> > surrender.
> > I therefore told the officer what I believed could
> > have been a possible way of pulling something. The
> > Gambia Marine, commanded by Major Antouman Saho had
> > new 50 Caliber machine guns delivered by the Americans
> > that very morning for the patrol boat. The firepower
> > of those weapons were enough to make the soldiers from
> > Yundum to listen if fired back to them out of
> > necessity. The ballistics of their projectiles has the
> > capability of piercing six inches of homogeneous steel
> > and was meant to kill armor in battlefields. They are
> > so deadly that there in an international law
> > forbidding anyone from shooting it directly at humans.
> > With the men at the Gambia Marine who had some pretty
> > good experience with similar weapons of the Chinese
> > type mounted on some of their other patrol boats, it
> > was possible to assemble a counter force that could
> > challenge the soldiers from Yundum.
> > The gentleman agreed with my analogy; hence I took off
> > to the Marine Unit base.
> > Major Saho was there, but he would not buy my idea. He
> > was in his office and was fully aware of what was
> > going on but had put it to me that he did not even
> > want his men to know about the coup situation because
> > he did not trust them.  " I don't want to have
> > anything to do with this trouble", he had continued.
> > "Was it not the Nigerians who were being paid fat
> > salaries to defend the country? Let's leave things
> > with them to solve."
> > Nothing was going to make him involve himself in the
> > problem or his men or weapons for that matter.
> > Anyway when I heard him talking to the concerned
> > citizens calling him from various offices in the
> > country asking to know what was going on, and he kept
> > on assuring them that special plans were underway to
> > arrest the situation, then I realized that I was at
> > the wrong place. Banjul was an island and the last
> > thing I wanted was to be cornered in the city in an
> > armed conflict. After all most of our family members
> > were at the other side of the bridge. I decided to
> > drive alone via Bond Road towards Yundum. I had had no
> > reason to fear any soldier from there. As for the
> > officers, leaving the Nigerians out, there were Major
> > Davis, second in command of the battalion, Captain
> > Badjie (now colonel) commanding "C" company, Captain
> > Sonko Commanding "B" company, Captain Johnson, AHQ
> > Camp, Captain Dibba Band, the late Captain Baldeh
> > Band, Lt. Ndure Cham (now major) engineering section,
> > late Lt. Barrow MT section, Lt. Sheriff Gomez,
> > battalion adjutant, Lt. Yaya Jammeh MP commander, Lt.
> > Mbye platoon commander, 2LT Haidara platoon commander
> > and 2lt Singhateh, platoon commander. 2Lt Sabally was
> > supposed to be at Farafenni at his new parent unit.
> > Going by anything in the past present or even future,
> > I could not see what I could have done wrong to any
> > soldiers or officers for me to be treated otherwise
> > than with respect and understanding. Terrible thinking
> > in a coup situation, as I learnt later.
> > In the first place, I was later made to understand
> > that Major Antouman Saho had reported me to all the
> > council members that I went to the marine unit to get
> > his weapons to counter the coup but that he drove me
> > away because the coup was an absolute necessity. That,
> > I suspect, contributed to my arrest and detention four
> > days later. Betrayal by people you trust is another
> > coup malady. So in trying to draw some basic
> > principles for any soldier caught in a coup situation,
> > my first ones will include this one: NEVER TRUST ANY
> > PERSON IN UNIFORM AROUND YOU.
> > However, my trip to Yundum stopped at Denton Bridge,
> > where the TSG commanded on the ground by Majors
> > Chongan and Swareh were making frantic efforts to
> > prevent the soldiers from crossing over.
> > I will deal with that crucial encounter next week.
> > In the mean time I want to commend all of you in the
> > struggle for your tireless efforts to liberate the
> > Gambia. This is a fight for freedom, and I know that
> > we are winning one battle after another but the war is
> > yet to be finished. Dampha, Saul, Kujabi, Hamjatta,
> > Jabou, Conteh, Joe, Ebrima, edrissa, Jobe, the
> > Movements in NY and Uk and all those combatants in the
> > front line, I salute you for your diligence and
> > endurance to sustain the struggle. I also want to take
> > a special moment to welcome an impressive new member,
> > abdou touray, whose contribution is so far fantastic.
> > Keep up the great work. We shall win.
> >
> > Ebou Colly
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > __________________________________________________
> > Do You Yahoo!?
> > Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices
> > http://auctions.yahoo.com/
> >
>
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>
> To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
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