On Mon, 8 May 2000 14:18:38 -0400, Todd Moody <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

>On Mon, 8 May 2000, Ken Stuart wrote:
>
>> >Do bugs have enough of a nervous system to be capable of
>> >suffering?  A case can be made that the systems responsible for
>> >pain reside mainly in the limbic system, which bugs lack
>> >altogether.  So what reason is there to believe in the suffering
>> >of bugs?
>>
>> Pain and suffering are experiences of the mind, not the body.
>
>Agreed, but there is a body of evidence that these mental states
>are *correlated* with states of the body in many cases.  We're
>not aiming for proof here; just warrant for reasonable belief.

Certainly there is a connection between mind and body.  However, we know that,
for example, mental stress affects the body.   And...

>> When you are dreaming, and a large rock smashes your hand, what physiological
>> processes caused that pain and suffering?
>
>This shows that pain is possible without its usual causes, but
>doesn't begin to count as a reason to deny animal pain.

But this is not a point about "animal pain", it is about mind-body causality.
In the dream, we have mental pain and suffering without any bodily causes.

>> Suffering is simply the experience of something happening that is not desired
>> (which, by the way, is more easily dealt with by eliminating the desire than by
>> eliminating the circumstances).
>
>I think this is a gross oversimplification.  The frustration of
>some desires is too trivial to be called suffering, as for
>example when a shoelace breaks.  But if you insist on calling
>this suffering, then it would be odd to say that it is easier to
>deal with it by ceasing to desire tied shoes.

"Desire" may be too strong a word in that situation, perhaps "attachment" is
more accurate.   It doesn't mean that you blissfully walk around with your shoes
untied, it just means that your mental outlook is such that it doesn't cause you
suffering.

Here is a more concrete example of these concepts... A man saves his money for
many years to buy a red 1966 Mustang, which he finally succeeds in purchasing.
A few days later, he goes to the mall to buy something, carefully parking in an
empty part of the parking lot.   Ten minutes later, he hears "Will the owner of
a red Mustang please come to the parking lot, your car has been involved in an
accident." on the PA system.   In considerable anguish, the man runs out to the
parking lot, only to find that his car is fine, and the accident involved
someone else's 1979 Mustang.   This makes the man quite happy - more so than
even before hearing the PA system.   All these states of anguish and happiness
were caused not by actual events, but by his mental outlook and attachments.

>> So, to posit that other species suffer, we also have to ascertain that they
>> have:
>>
>> - Minds
>> - Self-consciousness
>> - Personal experiences
>> - Desires
>>
>> To my knowledge, the only way to ascertain that would be by cross-species mind
>> reading...
>
>I agree that we should not talk about the suffering of species
>that lack these capacities.  That's precisely the point.  But I
>reject the claim that the only way to ascertain it would be by
>cross-species mind reading.
>
>If I apply a glowing coal to my skin, I will reliably feel pain.

Not a good example!  You have never heard of fire walkers?

>That pain will likely be correlated with certain behaviors on my
>part, as well as with certain neural processes.  The same
>stimulus will produce similar responses in other humans, who
>report that they also feel pain.  If I do the same thing to a
>dog, the dog will engage in similar behaviors and these will be
>correlated with similar neural processes.  What reason do I have
>to doubt that the dog feels pain under this circumstance?  I
>can't think of any.

We can consider it likely that the dog's nervous system has a similar pain
response to injury.

Again, what we don't know is whether a dog has a mind and/or self-consciousness
and/or personal experiences and/or desires.

>Ethical vegetarians may wish to dispute
>whether morality requires us to err on the side of caution here
>or not, but that doesn't show that the whole notion of moral
>concern over animal suffering is arbitrary or illusory.

[ We're talking about "ethical" concern - morals are simply defined as what is
customary in society... ]


--
Cheers,

Ken
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