This looks to be an extremely good article, for which l have long waited for.
We read earlier before from the last MERIA Journal issue about how the Blair
Govt had used one of Meria's writers article to compile an Intelligence report
which was plagerised which later caused the Blair Govt a HUGE amount of
embarresment. Enough said.
Jeremy Compton
Article 4 of 8, Robert G. Rabil, "THE MAKING OF SADDAM'S EXECUTIONERS:
A MANUAL OF OPPRESSION BY PROCEDURES," 12 pages.
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MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (MERIA) JOURNAL
MERIA JOURNAL Volume 7, Number 1, (March 2003)
Direct Circulation 11,241, Total Circulation 17,175
*Serving Readers Throughout the Middle East and in 100 Countries*
Editor, Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors, Cameron Brown, Elisheva Rosman-Stollman,
Joy Pincus, Ehud Waldoks
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MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University. Site:
<http://meria.idc.ac.il>. Email: <[log in to unmask]> . All material
copyright MERIA. Credit if quoting; ask permission to reprint.
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Abstract: This article, based on official Iraqi documents,(1) examines the
numerous procedures of oppression used by the Ba'thi regime of Saddam
Hussein to rule Iraq. Planned by the regime's higher echelons and
coordinated among state and party institutions, these procedures reveal how
the regime sought to intimidate some citizens while turning others into
accomplices.
THE MAKING OF SADDAM'S EXECUTIONERS:
A MANUAL OF OPPRESSION BY PROCEDURES
By Robert G. Rabil*
Since its inception as a modern state, Iraq has been riven by ethnic,
religious, tribal, social, and political problems, arising in no small part
from the country's deficient sense of national legitimacy and integration.
The minority Sunni rulers of Baghdad sought to handle this problem by
asserting a strong central government authority throughout the state. The
military emerged as a crucial instrument in the wielding of power in the
1930s. Imbued by deep nationalist feelings and aspirations for pan-Arab
unity, Iraqi officers were behind the coups and counter-coups of
1936-1941.(2)
But at the same time, the clashes of rival parties and factions
constantly disrupted Iraqi stability. Even after the monarchy's overthrow in
1958, there followed a decade of ideological clashes and conspiracies to
seize power.
When the Ba'th took control in 1968, it was determined to end this era
and to sustain its own rule forever. The new regime thus created parallel
state structures to ensure its control. But the party itself came under the
grip of the same security men it catapulted to prominence. By controlling
Iraq's security apparatus, Saddam emerged as the lord of Iraq in the
mid-1970s.
Building on past experience, Saddam asserted his rule by combining a
system of generous rewards and harsh punishments with a relentless drive to
exploit Iraq's divisions and forging a symbiosis of tribal traditions, Ba'th
doctrine and his personality cult. Saddam was not unique as a person but his
comprehensive and methodical procedures of oppression were unique. He based
his survival on the regime's ability to atomize Iraq's civil society,
including the family unit, and in turning many Iraqis into accomplices and
oppressors. These formed a class of their own irrespective of ethnic and
religious affiliation and included Saddam's willing and unwilling
executioners. While the latter participated in Saddam's misdeeds under
pressure and distress, the former, represented mainly by the security
forces, were ready and bold participants.
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE PATH TO POWER
Saddam Hussein hails from an area rigorously governed by tribal
traditions and customs, enforcing a spirit of courage and intrepidity in the
face of adversity and harsh conditions. Survival and revenge are the twin
pillars of this tribal edifice. Situated on the banks of the Tigris river,
Tikrit is the home of the three tribes: al-Nasir, Sultan and 'Ajil, from
which Hussein descends, with al-Nasir being his direct pedigree.
At the center of tribal traditions are the rituals every member of
these tribes goes through to encourage a courageous and remorseless
character. Special emphasis is placed on upbringing. Children are raised by
their aunts or uncles so as to be free from motherly influence and tender
feelings. At a certain age, the youth are forced to slit the throats of
chicken to get accustomed to scenes of blood, ride horses and fire from a
special rifle, which recoils sharply, to show their manliness. Peace is
maintained among the tribes according to a delicate balance of power.
Intra-tribal murders are not condoned and every murder case is settled by
paying a specified ransom to the family of the deceased. Yet murders outside
the tribes do not entail special arrangement. For example, settling a murder
case involving a Kurd requires no ransom fee. Saddam's upbringing, like
other Tikritis, was based on these traditions and values.(3)
Saddam was born into a country glued together by the British in the
1920s to serve their interests. Arising from the ashes of the Ottoman
empire, Iraq comprised the three former Ottoman provinces of Mosul with its
Kurdish Sunni majority, Baghdad with its Arab Sunni majority, and Basra with
its Arab Sh'ia majority. The British favored Arab Sunnis and entrusted the
Hashemite family (allies of Britain and descendents of the Prophet) to rule
Iraq. From the beginning, the Hashemite monarchy lacked legitimacy because
of its close ties with colonial Britain and its narrow social base of
support.
Leading a coalition of Free Officers, modeled on Egypt's Free Officers'
movement, General Abd al-Karim Qasim staged a coup ending the Hashemite
monarchy in July 1958. Qasim attempted to impress on Iraq an identity based
on strident Arab nationalism and domestic social reform. Sustaining his rule
and implementing his plan required a reorganization of the army as well as
the state. He based himself at the Ministry of Defense instead of the prime
minister's office and selected trustworthy military cadres and demoted or
retired senior officers whose loyalty and ideology he distrusted. He and
other army officers occupied the main posts in the new government and the
army moved to the center of Iraqi politics.
Saddam's initial rise to prominence came after his participation in a
failed Ba'th Party attempt to assassinate Qasim in October 1959. This era
played an important role in shaping Saddam's political outlook by showing
how a constant struggle among forces, influenced by external powers or
ideologies, shook the country and eventually subverted Qasim's rule. Indeed,
Qasim's own coalition quickly broke into competing factions along political,
ethnic, social and religious lines. This polarization also affected the
army.
Movements clamoring for Arab nationalism and unity--represented mainly
by Nasserists and the Ba'th party--and movements for social
change--represented by the Iraqi Communist party--took center stage. Qasim
used the Communists to contain the Arab nationalists but kept them away from
sensitive power centers in the government or armed forces. Soon, due to his
wariness of the communists' influence within the armed forces, Qasim also
forced out Communist officers. Given his weakened support base and an
unpopular government campaign against the Kurds, Qasim was toppled by a
Nationalist/Ba'thist coalition, led by General Abd al-Salam 'Arif, in
February 1963.
One immediate consequence of the new coup was the rise of some Tikriti
Ba'thi senior figures to prominent positions.(4) This rise coincided with a
deadly purge of Communist soldiers initiated by the Ba'thists. However, the
Bathists' victory was short-lived. 'Arif outmaneuvered and prevented them
from consolidating power, then removed them in a counter-coup in November
1963. This episode in Ba'thi history destroyed any internal democracy. Nor
would it let the army be the arena for political conflict. Next time, the
Ba'th party was determined to destroy all rivals and monopolize all power so
as not to fall again. It was ready for a ruthless Ba'thization of Iraqi
society and the armed forces.
Ironically, the removal of the Ba'th from the 'Arif regime, coupled
with the assumption of the Ba'th Party to power in Syria, enhanced the
position within the party of some Tikritis including Saddam Hussein and
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. In early 1964, Michel Aflaq, a Syrian who was
co-founder and main ideologue of the Ba'th Party and secretary-general of
its National Command, made Saddam secretary of a newly constituted Iraqi
Regional Command. Bakr and Saddam participated in a major reorganization of
the party, while at the same time fighting the 'Arif regime.
In July 1965, divisions within the Iraqi government's ranks culminated
in the mass resignation of Nasserist ministers. Less than a year later,
'Arif died in obscure circumstances when his helicopter crashed on its way
to Basra in April 1966. A military-civilian confrontation ensued, and the
rival factions could not agree on a presidential candidate other than 'Abd
al-Rahman 'Arif, brother of the late president. The second 'Arif regime was
torn from its beginning by power struggles among the nationalists on one
side, and between the civilians and the military on the other. Weakened by
these struggles, the regime became increasingly isolated. At the same time,
it, like its predecessor, tried to strengthen the security apparatus and
subject Iraqis to widespread surveillance.
On July 17, 1968 dissident army officers with the help of the Ba'th
Party carried out a military coup. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was
established to assume authority and the new government drew its members from
the Ba'th Party and dissident officers.(5) Although Bakr took over the
presidency, the officers assumed many ministerial posts including the
premiership. This power sharing arrangement did not sit well with the Ba'th
Party's ambitions and before long, on July 30, it carried out a new coup
removing the officers from power.
Once it regained power, the Ba'th Party set about imposing its
ideological, political and administrative control over society and state,
particularly the army. One lesson the Ba'thists drew from the past decade
was that the army constituted a principal threat. This was compounded by the
lack of faith the party had in the existing security forces. Consequently,
the new rulers began a systematic campaign rooting out potential opposition
in the army and recruiting into its higher echelons loyal Ba'thist officers.
In addition, they gave Saddam the task of creating an independent
security apparatus whose task would be to eliminate dissidents and groups
that could form an opposition. Out of this attempt to penetrate and monitor
state and society, a deliberate plan to create parallel structures to
control the state and all other organs of civil society emerged. Central to
this plan was the attempt to imbue Iraq's society with Ba'thi pan-Arab
nationalist doctrine.(6) But contrary to its ideological commitments to
socialism and modernity, the new regime relied more on tribal solidarity
than party loyalty. In this respect, thanks to his tribal affiliation to
Bakr, Saddam was appointed, in November 1969, vice-president of the republic
and deputy chairman of the RCC.
The party was so confident in its drive to Ba'thize Iraq's society that
it publicly declared its aims to impose and maintain its total ideological
and political hegemony over state and society during its 1974 conference.(7)
This obsession was not limited to indoctrinating Iraqis and crushing
dissent. It was stridently chauvinistic as well. In 1970 the regime opened
the Ottoman archives, in which Iraqis were classified as either Ottoman or
Persian subjects, and launched a campaign of mass expulsion against all
Iraqis of Persian "origin." This campaign reached its apex in early 1980
when Saddam, within the context of subduing the Islamist opposition led by
the Da'wa party, issued several RCC decrees, including RCC decree 22/23/1807
of March 11, 1980 and RCC decree 666 of May 7, 1980, stipulating the
deportation and revocation of Iraqi citizenship from Iraqis of "Persian"
origin.(8) The magnitude of this campaign was so large that the regime
established detention centers for such Iraqis between the ages of 18 and
28.(9)
Saddam's role in implementing the party's program was critical. Thanks
to his control of the security apparatus, he was able to wield the real
power in the parallel organizations that lay behind the state's facade. In
addition, although his power base relied on his Tikriti connection, he did
not shy away from eliminating any claim to leadership within his extended
tribe, let alone within Ba'thi circles.(10) But Saddam's power was not
confined to the use of terror. He mastered the party's system of severe
punishments and generous financial rewards and promotions not only to ensure
loyalty but also to lure supporters. In this respect, the party's and, in
particular, Saddam's access to Iraq's riches following the rise in oil
prices after 1973 enabled him to allocate and distribute the dividends of
this wealth. Party control over the state was completed in 1977 when the
Ba'th Regional Command was merged with the RCC and all Regional Command
members became state ministers. At the same time, while Bakr was Iraq's
president, Saddam effectively controlled the state.
In April 1979, Saddam succeeded Bakr and masterminded the purge of the
Ba'th party and RCC from perceived disloyal and/or critical members. With
the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 Saddam launched a new era of rule in
Iraq best described by Kanan Makiya as the "republic of fear."
OPPRESSION BY PROCEDURES: TRANSFORMING IRAQI SOCIETY
The war with Iran marked a major change in the nature of the Iraqi
regime and how it ruled. During the first half of the 1980s, Saddam strove
to make Iraq a fiefdom for the Tikritis. Tikritis filled the most sensitive
posts in the state and especially in the security apparatus. Simultaneously,
Saddam began usurping the power of the Ba'th party and turning it into an
organization of mobilization, indoctrination and control, especially of
domestic threats.
They directed the party that supervised the creation of the parallel
structures of the regime and catapulted many Tikritis to high positions in
the security services. But the real change, the focus of this paper, came in
how Saddam managed to fragment and atomize Iraq's civil society by imposing
a comprehensive and methodical repressive system on Iraqis and by seeking to
turn them into accomplices of the regime and executioners of its policies.
This policy systematically targeted civil society in general and its
nucleus, the family, in particular. In other words, if you were not
affiliated with the regime, including the Ba'th, or an informer for it, you
would face physical and subsistence hardship.
Thanks to this policy there exists no civil or societal structure
outside those of the regime and the Ba'th party. In this way, the regime
makes sure, as expressed in Ba'th dogma, that the party remains the vanguard
and basis of society, making Saddam the lynchpin upon which Iraq's existence
hinges. Correspondingly, the Ba'th became a medium through which Saddam's
cult of personality was nurtured.
At this point, it is important to outline the procedures the regime
employed to achieve its goal. In order for any Iraqi to have a certain job,
become an agent of a company, acquire a sales license, or practice a
profession, his application cannot be processed before it is reviewed and
approved by the General Directorate of Security, known as Security or in
Iraqi parlance Amn.(11) Among the security apparatus, the General
Directorate of Security deals with domestic threats, including recruiting
Iraqis. Approval is solely based on the applicant's readiness to
"cooperate" with security and thus become an informer.
The minute an application is filled, a copy is sent to the provincial
Directorate of Security, which orders a comprehensive background check on
the applicant from both the Mukhtar (chief of village) and the directorate
of Security where he resides. As specified by Security, the Mukhtar has to
provide extensive information, including his "nationality" (Kurdish, Sunni,
or Shi'a), political orientation, the names of people with whom he usually
associates, his attitude and his family's attitude toward the regime, and
whether he or any relatives have in the past opposed the regime.
At the same time, the local Directorate of Security conducts its own
investigation of the applicant, based on specific questions from
headquarters. As shown for example, in the Sulaimaniya Directorate of
Security's letter number QSH/10971 of September 7, 1986, the questions are
almost identical to those provided to the mukhtar with the addition of
whether local security "has cooperated with the applicant in the interest of
security work."(12)
A personal data sheet is then created for him containing the
information provided both by the mukhtar and local security. Next, Security,
either at the provincial or district level, summons the applicant to its
headquarters and tries to recruit him. At the end of the interview, Security
demands from the applicant a written pledge indicating whether he will or
will not cooperate.(13) Security then creates a file on him and assigns it
to a security officer who will be his handler. It also requests that the
applicant write an initial report about any information he has on the
opposition, saboteurs (including any within his family) and deserters. After
vetting all the information, Security then judges whether he is qualified
for the job.
Applicants who decline to cooperate with Security will not be
considered for the job and become both suspects and targets of the regime's
reprisals. On the other hand, besides approving their applications, Security
rewards its new informers on the basis of the importance of the information
that they provide.(14) By this comprehensive system, the regime not only
deepened the fragmentation of society but also forced many Iraqis to become
informers and spies.
EDUCATION AS A SYSTEM FOR CONTROL AND RECRUITMENT
The Ba'th party places great emphasis on pedagogy. It is through
education that the Ba'th highlights and perpetuates its dogma. But in Iraq
under Saddam, the education system emerged not only as a means to
indoctrinate students with Ba'thi ideology but also as a way to monitor and
recruit both teachers and students. Saddam gradually eroded the power,
independence and purpose of the Ba'th party by turning it into an
organization whose main function was to monitor society and secure the
regime against domestic threats. The party became controlled by the same
security apparatus it created to control state organs. This is illustrated,
as we shall see, by the methodical and categorical rules the party imposed
at the behest of the security apparatus on Iraq's educational system.
These rules attempt to deny education and work to students and teachers
who do not embrace Ba'thi ideology with the cult of Saddam at its center,
decline Ba'th membership and cooperation with Security, and have relatives
associated with saboteurs. All this is foisted on a system already adopting
a discriminatory educational policy based on ethnic and religious
affiliation. In addition, in the General Directorate of Security's telegram
number 62439 of November 11, 1980, the Directorate established a branch,
codenamed M85, to monitor the activities of students throughout their
academic life including at universities.(15)
At this point it is important to note that the Ba'th party, besides its
central headquarters in the capital, has headquarters on the governate
(provincial) level (called Section), on the district level (called Branch),
and on the sub-district level (called Division). Within the party there are
several bureaus, including the Bureau of Youth and Students. Following
Security guidelines, this Bureau keeps registers on all schools and in which
politically related information on students and their families is regularly
recorded and updated.
A sample register, issued by the Ba'th party, Bureau of Youth and
Students of Sulaiminya Secondary School for Girls, contained the following
categories:
1. Name
2. Date and Place of Birth
3. Nationality
4. Religion
5. Current Residence
6. Political Orientation
6-1 Type
6-2 Party Rank
6-3 Division
6-4 Name of Person in Charge
7. Profession of the Father
8. Birth Place
9. Birth Place of Grandfather
10. Contribution to Qadisiyat Saddam [Iran-Iraq war]
11. Attitude toward Training
12. Number of Father's Citizenship Certificate
13. Name of Mukhtar [village chief]
14. Reputation [political attitudes] of Student and Family
15. Student's Grade Average for Last Year
16. Comments(16)
As illustrated by this register, the Ba'th keeps extensive records on
every student with the main objective of monitoring and recruiting them.
Once students are recruited, they become part of the whole surveillance
system. Students that engage in activities considered threatening to
national security (such as demonstrating) will have their records "marked"
and sent to the General Directorate of Security, which in turns orders that
their applications to higher learning institutions be rejected.(17) In
addition to that, the Ba'th regularly sends all registers to their
corresponding provincial Directorate of Security, which compiles them and
then sends lists comprising the names of secondary school graduates applying
for admission into Iraqi universities to all Security branches. Every branch
will receive the list of students residing in its sector. Along with the
lists, Security orders that every branch mark the nationality of every
student according to a color code: Red for Kurds, Yellow for Muslim Arabs,
Green for Christians, and the word Turkmen would be written next to the
names of members of that community.(18)
Another process to recruit teachers parallels the one to recruit
students. The Ba'th launches periodic campaigns to recruit "independent"
teachers, including recent politically independent graduates. Every teacher
is required to write a pledge indicating whether he will join the party.(19)
Subsequently, at the order of the Qutr's (in Ba'th lexicon Iraq as a region)
Secretary Bureau, in conjunction with Security, the Ba'th creates lists of
teachers who refused Ba'th membership and passes them on to Security.(20)
In addition, the party orders that a special form be created for every
teacher on the list, which includes information about the teacher such as:
political orientation; whether he has first or second degree relatives who
are either sentenced, executed, or with the opposition; name of the Ba'th
Party member who tried to recruit the teacher.(21)
Finally, the party orders that the teachers who refused Ba'th
membership be dismissed from the teaching profession.(22) Equally
significant, Security orders the dismissal of teachers who it designates as
"unqualified" to teach. This designation is tied to the regime's policy of
collective punishment whereby teachers who have family members overseas, who
are considered "escapees", are dismissed.(23) It goes without saying that
many teachers and students join the Ba'th Party and thus are compelled to
engage in activities-including spying on others--supporting the regime.
SADDAM AND SECURITY
Nowhere is the collusion of many Iraqis with the regime more pronounced
than in the relationship between Security and the regime in general, and
Saddam in particular. Following his assumption of the presidency, Saddam did
not relinquish his direct authority over the Security apparatus but remained
fully in charge as he expanded and diversified it.(24) In the early 1980s he
severed any connection between the Ministry of Interior and the Security
apparatus and brought them under the aegis of the Office of the
President.(25) Indeed, Saddam personally intervened in many cases involving
security officers and informers.(26) In addition to monitoring each other,
the apparatus's personnel serve as the ears and eyes of Saddam and, most
importantly, as implementers of his policies.
In addition, Saddam paid close attention to the process of recruiting
Security personnel. In addition to recruiting the top personnel mainly from
his tribe and affiliated ones within the Sunni triangle in the middle of the
country, he put all Security personnel through a careful review process
before finally hiring them. After their hire, Security personnel were given
strict guidelines. For example, no Security official could marry before
Security conducted a background check on the prospective bride and agreed to
the marriage.(27)
Equally significant, Saddam granted Security personnel more power than
any other state officials. Security officials throughout Iraq answered only
to their directors in the provinces, who in turn answered to the director of
the apparatus within the office of the president. In other words, governors
had no official power whatsoever over Security officials.(28) In practice, a
sergeant in Security had more clout than a governor. In return for their
total loyalty, Saddam heaped all kinds of rewards on them ranging from
specially tailored suits to cash bonuses to plots of land.(29)
Among the Security apparatus, the General Directorate of Security sat
on the top of the state hierarchy to monitor and recruit Iraqis as well as
suppress opposition. Besides maintaining records on Iraqis, it strove to
have the largest number of spies throughout Iraqi society. Not only did it
coordinate with the Ba'th or state organs to recruit spies but also
aggressively pursued enlisting ordinary as well as influential Iraqis of all
types, even within families.(30) Every provincial Directorate of Security
tried to establish a network of spies covering the whole province, from
village, to quarter, to sub-district, to district. According to official
Iraqi documents, including records of payments, many Iraqis collaborated
with Security, providing information in Ba'thi lexicon on "everything that
might negatively affect the public welfare," including delicate information
on their own families.(31)
Iraqis approached by Security could either cooperate and be generously
rewarded or face all kinds of pressure to do so. The method of
payment--tangible such as cash or indirect such as promotion--depended on
the quality of information. It is worth noting here that the Mukhtar
(village chief), though not a security official but an agent, played an
important role in providing Security with all kinds of information on his
community.(32) Building on information provided by the Ba'th and the
Mukhtars, Security even periodically recorded the new birth statistics
throughout every sector of every province, noting the political orientation
of the fathers of the newly born.(33)
Equally significant, the regime regularly launched campaigns to recruit
informers among the families of saboteurs, a designation that included all
those who actively or passively opposed the regime. In reality, these
campaigns were part of the psychological warfare that the regime employed on
the saboteurs and their families with the dual objectives of creating doubts
among them and recruiting some of them. An example of the official
instructions that became typical, especially during the 1980s, are included
in RCC letter/Northern Affairs Committee number 4/380 of December 12, 1981.
This RCC letter decreed that detained saboteurs' family members should be
prodded to become good citizens and that some be released so as to create
doubts whether they were informers and to encourage others to be
recruited.(34)
The security apparatus directed the most horrible actions and
atrocities committed by the regime. It was mainly Security that executed,
detained, tortured, deported, and displaced Iraqis collectively or
individually. It was also Security that supervised the wholesale elimination
of villages deemed "prohibited for security reasons."(35) Its association
with the regime was so deep that almost all Security personnel had "blood on
their hands." Security participated in grand plans such as operation
Termination of Traitors, which culminated in the Anfal campaign, and daily
operations running the gamut from executing to displacing Iraqis.(36)
Examples abound. At the order of Saddam, Security officials were at the
forefront in pursuing and executing Da'wa (Islamist Shi'a) party members as
instructed by RCC decree number 461 of March 31, 1980;(37) in the wholesale
deportation of Iraqis of "Iranian origin" as ordered by RCC decree
22/23/1807 of March 11, 1980;(38) in executing deserters and draft dodgers
as ordered by Saddam in his letter number 3/2/973/K of June 21, 1984;(39) in
liquidating saboteurs and their collaborators;(40) in detaining the families
of saboteurs;(41) in detaining the families of those who fled to Iran;(42)
and in countless other actions.
During times of national security crises, Saddam gave Security
officials and other state officials significant powers to do as they saw
fit. In this respect, during the regime's anti-Kurdish campaign of
1987-1988, Saddam not only mobilized a wide range of officials from the
lowest to highest ranking but also granted them great leeway to accomplish
the mission, that of killing and displacing a large number of Kurds.(43)
This, seemingly, was also part of the regime's strategy of spreading the
responsibility for actions taken. Indeed, pro-government Kurdish militia,
known as Jahsh (a pejorative name literally meaning mule) participated
actively in attacking their fellow Kurds and in the wholesale destruction of
many Kurdish villages during operation Termination of Traitors.(44)
Significantly, this circle of complicity was not confined to Security
and state officials, accomplices and spies. The regime did not shy away from
attempting to make the victims themselves complicit. According to Office of
the President's letter number MH1/2080 of October 14, 1984, Security
officials were instructed to commute the death sentences of all Da'wa party
members who executed their party colleagues, to life imprisonment.(45)
Needless to say, all state officials, including Ba'th party members, were
expected to carry out the regime's orders, which included divulging
information on one's own family.(46) Otherwise, they could face harsh
punishments including execution.(47)
SADDAM'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS?
As shown by official Iraqi documents, Security and a vast network of
spies undergirded the Iraqi regime and were not confined to a single
ethnicity or religious affiliation. As documents show, while many senior
figures of the apparatus were tribally affiliated with Saddam, a significant
number of lower ranking members and most informers were not Sunnis. In
addition, non-Sunnis, especially Shi'ites, are present at all levels of
government, including Saddam's inner circle.(48) Therefore, while it is true
that the regime is governed mainly by Tikriti Sunnis, still it is inadequate
to define its identity as exclusively or strictly Sunni. He may have thought
that the more he spread complicity, the stronger was the sector of Iraqis
who supported his rule.
It should be noted that many Iraqis refused to cooperate with the
regime, even in the face of threats to their physical or mental well-being.
On the same grounds, while it is difficult to estimate the large number of
Iraqis who cooperated with the regime, it is clear that this cooperation was
largely the result of the regime's policy of deepening the population's
dependence on it for basic services and employment. This alone, however,
cannot answer the difficult question as to why so many Iraqis cooperated
with the regime.
True, it is the harsh measures Saddam imposed on Iraqis that pressured
them into cooperating with the regime. Still, one cannot discount the
notion that many state officials, especially Security personnel, were
receptive to Saddam's orders in that they efficiently implemented them
without wrestling with any moral questions. Importantly, defection from or
insubordination in Security, unlike the army, was rare and most disciplinary
actions taken by the regime against Security personnel involved civil crimes
and infractions such as rape, taking bribes, or stealing.(49)
Thus one can safely argue that Security personnel, along with other
senior officials, were Saddam's willing executioners; while for the most
part the regime's informers were Saddam's unwilling executioners. Let us not
forget that Iraqis have been heavily indoctrinated and militarized under
Saddam, nor that Saddam himself is the product of the modern political
landscape of the region in general and Iraq in particular, especially since
1958.
It was the confluence of the distressing socio-political conditions of
the country with both the strident Ba'th doctrine and the conspiratorial
formative experience of the Ba'th Party that produced many Saddams. There
was never a shortage of people ready to pledge allegiance to him, creating a
class of oppressors and accomplices irrespective of ethnic and/or religious
affiliation.
Central to this, Saddam, more than any other Middle Eastern leader,
deepened the ethnic, religious, social, and political divides in the
country. On the one hand, he intensified the enmity among and between Iraq's
communities, thereby creating a common denominator of collective distrust.
This condition served to alleviate the burden of cooperating with the regime
in a way Iraqis could justify on the grounds that "if I did not cooperate
with the regime others would." And it served to fuel rivalry among Iraqis
with the result that they found it more convenient to cooperate with the
regime to preempt their competitors from doing so.
At the same time, Saddam brutally forged a symbiosis between tribal
traditions, Ba'th ideology, and his personality cult. In addition to
appointing a large number of officials on the basis of tribal affiliation
and enforcing a tribal code of rule, Saddam fused his personality cult with
the Ba'th doctrine so as to become not only the indispensable leader but
also the "messiah" leader who finally appeared to save Iraq and the Arab
nation. According to Ba'thi literature, "Saddam Hussein is not a traditional
leader, he is a defender (combatant), thinker, and a human being possessing
leadership qualities unavailable to others?He is unlike any other leader. He
fundamentally possesses the talent for leadership, hallowed by inspiration
and ingenuity."(50)
In another piece of literature, Saddam's birth is qualified as the
coincidence whereby life became transformed into political struggle.(51)
Given that the Ba'th original platform had been to assert its hegemony over
state and society, Saddam projected himself as a god-like figure to be not
only followed but also emulated. Iraqis who thought otherwise would be
guilty of both sedition and betraying the leader.
Yet this does not mean that the mass of Iraqis accepted this worldview
in their hearts. Where possible, the regime's officials and agents were
targeted for revenge. Informers, especially Mukhtars, were constant targets
for assassination, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan.(52) Iraqi officials,
especially security ones, were targets for both assassination and
kidnapping.(53)
But it was the March 1991 uprising that exposed in graphic detail the
real views of the people. Rebel Shi'as in the south of Iraq attacked
government buildings and facilities and killed many Iraqi and Ba'th
officials. Kurdish rebels stormed government headquarters, especially those
of security, and murdered Iraqi officials, some of whom were thrown from the
roofs of their headquarters before cheering crowds.(54) These actions
continued until the government suppressed the uprising with even higher
levels of violence.
CONCLUSION
For any post-Saddam regime, one of the most important issues will be
deciding where the guilt lies for the former government's violations of
human rights and international law. The capture of some of Iraq's archives
in 1991 has already shown many things about the regime's operations and
responsibilities for these actions. If the regime is overthrown, far more
detailed and extensive information on these things will come to light.
Two important principles should be maintained: a clear distinction
between the regime's willing and unwilling participants and the avoidance of
any bloodbath fueled by a general desire for revenge. Another point, of
course, would be that any future regime must be able to provide stability
without repeating the mistakes of the past.
*Dr. Rabil served with Red Cross in Lebanon, taught at Suffolk University
and currently is the project manager of Iraq Research and Documentation
Project at the Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC. He is the author of
Embattled Neighbors: Lebanon, Syria, Israel (Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2003). The author extends his thanks to IRDP research team.
NOTES
1. During the March 1991 uprising in Iraq, Kurdish opposition groups
captured huge quantities of Iraqi government documents primarily belonging
to Iraqi intelligence. Thanks to efforts by Kanan Makiya and Human Rights
Watch, these documents were transferred to the United States where the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee took charge of them. Along with
government officials, Human Rights Watch/Middle East first examined these
documents, which were subsequently given in digital format to the Iraq
Research and Documentation Project (IRDP). Supplementing documents possessed
by Makiya, this collection of documents numbering approximately 2.4 million
pages is available at URL: <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp>. The term
"oppression by procedures" was first suggested by Hasan Mneimneh.
2. Especially the four colonels Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Mahmud Salman,
Fahim Sa'id and Kamal Shabib. These officers were behind the Rashid Ali
al-Gailani's coup d'etat in 1941, which was subsequently quelled by British
military intervention. The British then restored the Hashemite monarchy.
3. See Hazim al-Amin, "Ala Hadhihi al-Taqalid Kabara al-Ra'is al-'Iraqi Fi
Baldatihi wa 'Ashiratihi" (On These Traditions the Iraqi President Grew in
His Hometown and Tribe), al-Hayat, May 12, 2002.
4. These included Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as Prime Minister, Tahir Yahya as
Chief of Staff, and Hardan al-Tikriti as Commander of the Air Force.
5. The non-Ba'thist dissident officers included Colonel 'Abd al-Razaq al-Na'
if, Chief of Military Intelligence, and Colonel Ibrahim al-Da'ud, Commander
of the Republican Guard.
6. Freedom, socialism, and unity formed the three ideological tenets of the
Ba'th party.
7. See The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, The 1968 Revolution in Iraq:
Experience and Prospects: The Political Report of the Eighth Congress of the
Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Iraq, January 1974 (London: Ithaca Press,
1979).
8. For the RCC decrees see respectively Iraq Research and Documentation
Project-North Iraq Data Set [hereafter IRDP-NIDS] [713267 and 1373111],
available at URL: <http//www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp>.
9. IRDP-NIDS [713218].
10. Among the Ba'thi and Tikriti critics that Saddam dealt brutally with was
Hardan al-Tikriti.
11. For a guide to Iraqi intelligence organizations, see Ibrahim al-Marashi,
"Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network; A Guide and Analysis," Middle
East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.6, No.3
(September 2002).
12. IRDP-NIDS [694310].
13. The pledge, written on official stationary, is usually as follows: "I,
the signatory below, came to Security headquarters and pledged to provide
all available information that might affect the security and welfare of the
Revolution [July revolution] and Regime; otherwise I will be subjected to
legal procedures. I signed voluntarily." IRDP-NIDS [694269].
14. See the following three cases and their respective correspondence. Case
one: Security recommends against employing a construction worker after he
declined to cooperate with the apparatus. See IRDP-NIDS [694316, 694315,
694318, 694314, 694313]. Case two: Security indicates that it does not
object to the employment of an applicant as a fireman after he pledged to
cooperate with the apparatus. See IRDP-NIDS [694263, 694261, 694262, 694264,
694266, 694268, 694269, 694260]. Case three: Security indicates that it does
not object to granting an applicant a Kerosene Sales license after he
pledged to cooperate with the apparatus. See IRDP-NIDS [692254, 692252,
692260, 692255, 692253].
15. IRDP-NIDS [1373810].
16. See register of Sulaimaniya Secondary School in IRDP-NIIDS
[1270813-1270892].
17. IRDP-NIDS [1042115].
18. IRDP-NIDS [1270981].
19. IRDP-NIDS [322102].
20. IRDP-NIDS [322096, 322091, 322092, 322093].
21. IRDP-NIDS [322104].
22. IRDP-NIDS [322099].
23. IRDP-NIDS [1273159, 1273187, 1273159].
24. For detailed information on the Security apparatus and their functions,
see Ibrahim al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide
and Analysis," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2002).
25. See IRDP-NIDS [1346796, 656959].
26. For example, Saddam issued an RCC decree increasing the family's
retirement salary of a martyr, who was a Mukhtar. See IRDP-NIDS [1393768].
Another example involved Saddam's order to defer the promotion of a Security
officer because he committed a "vile action against" a female. See IRDP-NIDS
[671762].
27. IRDP-NIDS [696258, 696259, 1402110].
28. IRDP-NIDS [695816].
29. IRDP-NIDS [1165827, 1165659, 1165932].
30. A chilling account is provided by Zainab Al-Suwaij: "On TV, we watched
Saddam reward fathers with large cash prizes for turning in sons who had
deserted the army. Even children are not spared. When I attended fourth
grade in 1981, my teacher called me to the front of the class and asked: 'Do
your parents say anything bad about the government?' The whole class was
staring at me. Stunned and scared, I answered, 'No.' But when one of my
classmates said in passing that Iran was not so bad, she disappeared the
next day, along with her family." Zainab Al-Suwaij, "Iraqi People Yearn to
Taste Freedom Again," USA Today, January 13, 2003.
31. IRDP-NIDS documents were withheld due to their sensitive nature and
implications.
32. No individual can become a Mukhtar if he refuses to cooperate with
Security.
33. See IRDP-NIDS [328414, 328413].
34. IRDP-NIDS [1430631].
35. IRDP-NIDS [860012-14, 862113-17].
36. For complete details on the regime's 1987-1988 anti-Kurdish campaign,
represented by Operation Termination of Traitors, and the huge bureaucracy
involved in it, see Robert G. Rabil, "Operation "Termination of Traitors":
The Iraqi Regime Through Its Documents," Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2002).
37. IRDP-NIDS [1372984].
38. IRDP-NIDS [713267]. See also IRDP-NIDS [1373111, 1372850, 713218,
1395165].
39. IRDP-NIDS [1165878].
40. IRDP-NIDS [1373970, 657347]. See also translated IRDP-NIDS documents on
IRDP web-site.
41. IRDP-NIDS [1370817, 1343280, 657347].
42. IRDP-NIDS [717546]. This document, bearing record number 54819 and
transmitted to Sulaimaniya Directorate of Security through General
Directorate of Security's telegram number 55156 of October 21, 1982,
instructs the "following measures concerning the families of individuals who
fled to the side of the Persian enemy:
a- If the escapee is married, then his wife and children will be
detained.
b- If the escapee is single, then his father and mother will be
detained. In the event they were deceased, the most influential member in
the family will be detained.
c- To detain the escapee's brothers who are in the military.
d- The above measures must be applied against families who were
detained since the beginning of the war with the Persian foe; continue
applying them?"
43. See Rabil, "Operation "Termination of Traitors"".
44. Ibid.
45. IRDP-NIDS [1395012].
46. The level of the regime's penetration of civil society in general and
the family in particular is revealed in a letter by Sulaimaniya Directorate
of Security in which it congratulates a Security official for surrendering
his military deserter brother. See IRDP-NIDS [1394712].
47. IRDP-NIDS [1372648, 322745].
48. Former Prime Minister and deputy minister Muhammad Hama al-Zubeidi, a
Shi'a, had been infamously known as Saddam's "Shi'a thug." He was central
in brutally suppressing the Shi'a uprising of March 1991 after the Gulf War
with tens of thousands killed.
49. Of the thousands of documents the author has been inspecting, none so
far has dealt with cases of defection from or insubordination in Security.
However, defections did occasionally happen.
50. See Ba'th literature, bearing the title "Valiant Comrade Saddam Hussein,
Leader of the Party, Revolution, and March," in IRDP-NIDS [2168409-16].
51. See Ba'th literature, bearing the title "The Role of Leadership and the
Fashioning of the Perception of the Ba'th Labor," in IRDP-NIDS [690632-41].
52. IRDP-NIDS [1393777, 1393636, 1393914].
53. For example, according to several intelligence reports from the General
Directorate of Security, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) executed a
significant number of prisoners in the Khatay prison in May 1985. See
IRDP-NIDS [749176-9].
54. Personal accounts by Kurds. One of the first Security headquarters to be
attacked and its officials thrown from windows and balconies was Rania's.
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