----- Original Message ----- 
From: George Okurapa 
To: [log in to unmask] 
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 3:24 AM
Subject: Fw: APPROACH TO" DARKNESS AT NOON"



----- Original Message ----- 
From: aokwong-okumu 
To: [log in to unmask] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2004 5:05 AM
Subject: Fw: APPROACH TO" DARKNESS AT NOON"



----- Original Message ----- 
From: aokwong-okumu 
To:Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 7:51 PM
Subject: APPROACH TO" DARKNESS AT NOON"


      How did Zizinga mess the music of Museveni's choir?
      Feb 25, 2004

            In the 1980's the most popular modern folk figure in Kampala was Zizinga. Made famous by Jimmy Katumba and The Ebonies, Zizinga was once a star singer.

            With time, his talent waned, but the choir magnanimously tolerated him. 

            Then one day, with his voice famously out of tune, both the choir and Zizinga had to face the inevitable - his time had come. He had to leave. 

            Zizinga then came to represent anyone who did anything that was out of step with the rest, or caused disharmony. If Katumba had to do a remix of Zizinga today, it would strike an interesting political cord.

            With voices saying President Yoweri Museveni should retire, and not amend the constitution to make himself president for life, the similarities with Zizinga are striking. 

            Or indeed, if you flip the coin, you will have many Zizinga's in the person of former presidential bossom buddy and First Deputy Premier Eriya Kategaya, MPs Augustine Ruzindana, Miria Matembe - to name a few in the long list- who are singing out of step with the Museveni choir's tune of "He should live long, he should rule long".

            But forget the Movement insiders who are opposed to the fifth term, and reflect on just two cases. One, the Prof. Frederick Ssempebwa-led Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). The key recommendation the government wanted from the CRC was for a referendum on lifting term limits. 

            There were hardly any public petitions supporting the lifting of the third term or a referendum, except the one from the government. Many commissioners "saw" the wisdom in the government's wishes and granted it. 

            In an unprecedented step, Chairman Ssempebwa disagreed and issued a minority report opposing both the lifting of the third term and the referendum. 

            Commissioner Sam Owor thought it was cynical for the government to throw fundamental issues like "federalism" as a bribe to areas like Buganda. So, he too wrote a minority report in which, among other things, he said well, let us have a referendum on it too, because it is as weighty a matter as the third term.

            Then there was that embarrassing flap at the Commission of Inquiry into Corruption at the Uganda Revenue Authority chaired by Justice Julie Ssebutinde. When Ssebutinde issued the report, hell broke loose.

            Her fellow commissioners, Mr John Kahoza and Ms Fawn Cousens accused her of locking them out of the writing of the report, and "doctoring" it. 

            What is important to remember is that the many Zizingas singing to a different tune in a lot of political projects would hardly have happened before 2001. And before 1996, it was impossible.

            The reason it is happening today is that the consensus among the Ugandan elite (the educated, professionals, bureaucrats, and regular business people - as opposed to traders) about the Movement and General Museveni's rule is that it is collapsing.

            The Movement Project was, for a long time, an Elite Project too. There was general agreement among the elite that the Museveni regime, compared to past ones, was more committed to the rule of law. That it was serious about ending impunity and torture. 

            That it had a progressive policy about growing the economy and making it possible for the elite to grow rich. 

            That its foreign policy engagement brought prestige to the country after many years, and opened the way for Ugandans to be treated with respect abroad. That its clampdown on free multiparty politics was justified, because the trade-off was clearly for more stable politics.

            The elections of 1996 changed a lot of that. A tiny group of the Ugandan elite backed Paul Ssemogerere. The Movement camp not only criticised the pro-Ssemogerere elite, but also persecuted it. 

            Election violence and fraud in places in the 1996 polls also begun to alienate them.

            With continuing rebellion in the north, and breakouts of attacks by groups like Allied Democratic Forces in the west, plus the terrorist attacks that once blighted evening life in Kampala, the government became iron-fisted. 

            Arbitrary arrests of suspects and "enemies" of the regime opened up like a floodgate. The notorious "safe houses" where these people were tortured in a manner reminiscent of the Amin and Obote days mushroomed everywhere.

            This was the environment in which the bitter elections of 2001, that pitted former Movement insider retired colonel Dr Kizza Besigye, amongst others, against Museveni was held. 

            We had arrived where the fall-out had moved from being between the "external" and pro-multiparty elite and the Movement, to an internal feud within the Movement. 

            The secession of the elite that had grown by 2001, widened further after the crude election theft of that year, and the outbreak of the "whip-the-masses-for-votes" campaign of Maj. Kakooza Mutale
            The deal between the Movement and elite was seriously under threat. 

            The torture houses were never part of the deal. The lawlessness by some state agents and election theft was never part of the deal. The unfair distribution of business spoils was never part of the deal.

            There were two reactions. The Movement, particularly the hard-liners, decided that they would not keep up the appearances of a liberal and reformist regime, if they risked losing power simply to appease the elite. 

            The Ugandan elite on their part felt the price that the regime was asking them to pay - by ignoring or justifying torture and the theft of votes for example - was too high for them to pay. 

            Many of them decided that they could no longer go along, because to do so damaged their prestige and long-term interests as a class.

            Thus not all Supreme Court judges could agree as they might have done years back, that Museveni won the 2001 elections fairly. People like Prof. Ssempebwa, could not go along with the claim that the Ugandans they interviewed wanted term limits lifted, and a referendum to decide it, when they did not. 

            It was no longer profitable for Kahoza, or Justice Ssebutinde for that matter, to pretend that the URA probe went well simply in order not to embarrass the government, when the regime itself no longer cared whether it got embarrassed or not. 

            Like the choir Katumba sings of, the two sides can no longer pretend that the other's song is music to its ears. 

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      © 2004 The Monitor Publications

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