----- Original Message ----- 
From: George Okurapa 
To: [log in to unmask] 
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 3:24 AM
Subject: Fw: BARLONYO MASSACRE AND UPDF COVER UP



----- Original Message ----- 
From: aokwong-okumu 
To: [log in to unmask] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2004 5:06 AM
Subject: Fw: BARLONYO MASSACRE AND UPDF COVER UP



----- Original Message ----- 
From: aokwong-okumu 
To: Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 7:33 PM
Subject: BARLONYO MASSACRE AND UPDF COVER UP


      Who'll explain mistakes of Lira's death fields?
      This & That By Henry Ochieng
      Feb 25, 2004

            For many years the insurgency in the north has followed a disturbingly predictable pattern. 

            Every year, after months of rebel activity, the dry season sets in, the army burns down the bushes in the countryside, and promptly announces that the rebels' days are numbered.

            Days after such an announcement, the LRA will launch a lightning strike on a camp for displaced people and slaughter tens or hundreds at will. Then denials and recriminations follow. No change.

            Last Saturday, eyewitnesses say a large number of heavily armed and well dressed suspected LRA rebels raided Barlonyo Internally Displaced People's Camp in Erute County, Lira district. In the aftermath, nearly 200 men, women and children lay sprawled on the dusty ground of the camp. 

            Some had been hacked to death, some shot while others were roasted in their makeshift huts, which were set ablaze. 

            The difference this time is not that the army is again disputing the number of victims but that President Museveni swiftly relieved Lt. Col. Mulindwa of his command at 403 Brigade. Barlonyo is under the jurisdiction of UPDF 5 Division's 403 Brigade. 

            President Museveni says the lieutenant colonel is responsible for two tactical mistakes: he allowed an ungazetted camp to develop around a small, poorly equipped militia detachment, and two; this unit somehow failed to call in reinforcements in the heat of battle.

            To his credit, the President recognises that operational oversight led to this massacre. However, this admission does not take away the spotlight.

            For one, after Museveni ordered a probe into the suspected operational mistakes that were blamed for the Abia massacre (51 killed) of February 6, field command should not have left a camp as large as Barlonyo under the care of an ill-equipped militia unit. Much more so, given the remote location of the camp off the Kitgum-Lira road. 

            Most of northern Lira district is effectively a war theatre and the local politicians have repeatedly said the place is teeming with suspected rebels. Otuke County MP, Omara Atubo has revealed that the rebels have switched tactics from moving in small groups to company size bands. 

            He says the army should have changed its order of battle as a countermeasure. But the army says it is sticking to the tactic of "chasing the bandits in the bush", leaving the camps under militia guard.

            The effectiveness of that approach is open to debate seeing that in under one month, a large LRA force has twice evaded detection, overrun the light defences around the Abia and now Barlonyo camps, and killed in cold blood.

            Why and how? The army is also asking where the rebels got the heavy equipment they deployed in the latest attack. 

            This is the same army that was confident that the LRA's activities have been reduced to the "kicks of a dying horse" following months of unrelenting pressure, during which time many of their senior commanders have been reportedly taken out of action. 

            Very unfortunately and sadly, the contradiction that comes here points at both intelligence lapses and an incomprehensible failure to adjust to changed circumstances. 

            The possibility that the rebels could have recently obtained a logistics re-supply is also troubling here because on February 7, the President met with senior editors of The Monitor and New Vision and revealed that arms in their possession are "only 50". 

            In light of the latest incident, Mr Museveni's numbers do not add up, and that cannot be a good thing. Either someone is giving His Excellency very bad situation reports, or something more sinister is afoot. 

            Then you have the growing feeling among the area politicians and the locals that there might be dereliction of duty. Recent evidence of this came on Monday in Lira. At an emergency consultative meeting held in Lira Council Hall, Lt. Col. Mulindwa reported that the army is in "hot pursuit" of the rebels. He was booed and jeered. Evidently, nobody believed him. 

            They did not believe the lieutenant colonel for any number of reasons but one can immediately look at what happened at Barlonyo for an understanding. Reports say the rebels carried out their heinous acts between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. Where was the army for those three hours? 

            One discerns an ill-concealed attempt to pass the buck when we are told that the outgunned militia did not call in reinforcement.

            Civilians in Lira say the militia have not been seen in possession of communication gadgetry. If this is a fact, then we have a serious problem at hand.

            But even more worrying are the reports that when the army finally arrived at the scene, they began burying some of the dead. Army spokesman, Maj. Shaban Bantariza has rejected this allegation. 

            Whether to believe him is a matter for the individual. The same goes for this dispute over how many died. In my book, I would go with the civilian estimation as opposed to the 'official position'.

            Cold-blooded killing is a tactic of choice for the LRA, but when the President met the newspaper editors, he confirmed what we already knew: the UPDF has certain capabilities like the MI-24 ground attack/combat helicopter.

            This chopper was deployed to considerable effect in parts of Teso late last year. May be it is time they are brought into the equation in Lira. 

            Concerns about national security will not allow us discuss troop movements; force strength and level of combat readiness in Lira but these incidents give rather eloquent testimony. 

            Having engaged the LRA for many years, our armed forces should have come to learn the rebel appetite for "soft targets". At the very least, Barlonyo should have had an early warning system, however crude. Because the rebels sneaked in undetected, it is safe to assume that there was no "listening post" or scout out there. 

            May be it is just as well Lt. Col. Mulindwa is back at Army General Headquarters, Bombo for what the President said is "further training". But who will answer the many questions?

            077 501 436 

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      © 2004 The Monitor Publications

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