You, Jurgen Braungardt, wrote:

>Does anyone know anything on the relationship between Chomsky and Lacan?
From a usenet exchange with NC:

On "theory" and "post-modern cults"

Noam Chomsky
Usenet

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and
found
a collection of messages extending the discussion about "theory" and
"philosophy," a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions --
though
I concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand what is going
on.

As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the
charge
that I, Mike, and maybe others don't have "theories" and therefore fail to
give any explanation of why things are proceeding as they do. We must turn
to "theory" and "philosophy" and "theoretical constructs" and the like to
remedy this deficiency in our efforts to understand and address what is
happening in the world. I won't speak for Mike. My response so far has
pretty much been to reiterate something I wrote 35 years ago, long before
"postmodernism" had erupted in the literary intellectual culture: "if
there
is a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct
of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international
conflict,
its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret," despite much
"pseudo-scientific posturing."

To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains so;
furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally, and
applies
in spades to what has been produced since that time. What has changed in
the
interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and
mutual-admiration
among those who propound what they call "theory" and "philosophy," but
little that I can detect beyond "pseudo-scientific posturing." That little
is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for
the
real world problems that occupy my time and energies (Rawls's important
work
is the case I mentioned, in response to specific inquiry).

The latter fact has been noticed. One fine philosopher and social theorist
(also activist), Alan Graubard, wrote an interesting review years ago of
Robert Nozick's "libertarian" response to Rawls, and of the reactions to
it.
He pointed out that reactions were very enthusiastic. Reviewer after
reviewer extolled the power of the arguments, etc., but no one accepted
any
of the real-world conclusions (unless they had previously reached them).
That's correct, as were his observations on what it means.

The proponents of "theory" and "philosophy" have a very easy task if they
want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a
"secret" to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and
still await an answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some
examples of "a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to"
the kinds of problems and issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact,
most of the world's population, I think, outside of narrow and remarkably
self-contained intellectual circles) are or should be concerned with: the
problems and issues we speak and write about, for example, and others like
them. To put it differently, show that the principles of the "theory" or
"philosophy" that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to
conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and
better)
grounds; these "others" include people lacking formal education, who
typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through
mutual
interactions that avoid the "theoretical" obscurities entirely, or often
on
their own.

Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my
state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.

As for the "deconstruction" that is carried out (also mentioned in the
debate), I can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if
this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the
course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words
that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better
than,
what others had been doing long before and and have continued to do since
without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that
(to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my
deficiencies -- of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a
possibility to which I'll return.

These are very easy requests to fulfill, if there is any basis to the
claims
put forth with such fervor and indignation. But instead of trying to
provide
an answer to this simple requests, the response is cries of anger: to
raise
these questions shows "elitism," "anti-intellectualism," and other crimes
--
though apparently it is not "elitist" to stay within the self- and
mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another
and (to my knowledge) don't enter into the kind of world in which I'd
prefer
to live. As for that world, I can reel off my speaking and writing
schedule
to illustrate what I mean, though I presume that most people in this
discussion know, or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the
"theoreticians" there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In
short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to
see
why mine is "elitist," not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently
the case, though I won't amplify.

To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and
can't possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so I
suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound
"theories" and "philosophy," nor do I come across them, or for that matter
rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience with
popular and activist groups and organizations, general community, college,
church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world women,
refugees,
etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder.

The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and
denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument to
support them, to which the response is more angry charges -- but,
strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why.

It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just
lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have
been
unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their
followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years,
when
similar charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions.
Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an
answer:
if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can
understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is
possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to
things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with
the
kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to
understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now
or
ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these
things, but apparently little else).

Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with
the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly
willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to
remain
suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't
understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or
the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But
from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask
friends
who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can
understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm
interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand
it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. -- even Foucault, whom I
knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest -- write
things
that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says
they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to
proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a)
some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden
genetic mutation, which has created a form of "theory" that is beyond
quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b) ... I
won't
spell it out.

Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of
work of my own in fields called "philosophy" and "science," as well as
intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with
the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and
the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual
life,
which I won't spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you
ask
those who tell you about the wonders of "theory" and "philosophy" to
justify
their claims -- to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics,
and other fields are happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what
are
the principles of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do
they explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for
anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to Hume's
advice in similar circumstances: to the flames.

Specific comment. Phetland asked who I'm referring to when I speak of
"Paris
school" and "postmodernist cults": the above is a sample.

He then asks, reasonably, why I am "dismissive" of it. Take, say, Derrida.
Let me begin by saying that I dislike making the kind of comments that
follow without providing evidence, but I doubt that participants want a
close analysis of de Saussure, say, in this forum, and I know that I'm not
going to undertake it. I wouldn't say this if I hadn't been explicitly
asked
for my opinion -- and if asked to back it up, I'm going to respond that I
don't think it merits the time to do so.

So take Derrida, one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at least
be
able to understand his "Grammatology," so tried to read it. I could make
out
some of it, for example, the critical analysis of classical texts that I
knew very well and had written about years before. I found the scholarship
appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was,
failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with
since
virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but
suspicions remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments,
but
I was asked, and therefore am answering.

Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me)
I've
met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print,
and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues,
and using language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he speaking
French,
me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and
perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was
sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly
during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of
them I
haven't met, because I am very remote from from these circles, by choice,
preferring quite different and far broader ones -- the kinds where I give
talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long
letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of
curiosity,
but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely
pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based
on
extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have
written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary
self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in
complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I
proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the
problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm
referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more
names
if it's not obvious.

For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much the
same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest David Lodge. Pretty
much
on target, as far as I can judge.

Phetland also found it "particularly puzzling" that I am so "curtly
dismissive" of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time
"exposing the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times." So "why
not
give these guys the same treatment." Fair question. There are also simple
answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of opinion,
much of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible prose and
has a
great impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal framework within
which
thought and expression are supposed to be contained, and largely are, in
successful doctrinal systems such as ours. That has a huge impact on what
happens to suffering people throughout the world, the ones who concern me,
as distinct from those who live in the world that Lodge depicts
(accurately,
I think). So this work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one
cares
about ordinary people and their problems. The work to which Phetland
refers
has none of these characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly has
none of the impact, since it is addressed only to other intellectuals in
the
same circles. Furthermore, there is no effort that I am aware of to make
it
intelligible to the great mass of the population (say, to the people I'm
constantly speaking to, meeting with, and writing letters to, and have in
mind when I write, and who seem to understand what I say without any
particular difficulty, though they generally seem to have the same
cognitive
disability I do when facing the postmodern cults). And I'm also aware of
no
effort to show how it applies to anything in the world in the sense I
mentioned earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't already obvious.
Since
I don't happen to be much interested in the ways that intellectuals
inflate
their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and disengage themselves
from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't spend any time on
it.

Phetland suggests starting with Foucault -- who, as I've written
repeatedly,
is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find at least some
of
what he writes intelligible, though generally not very interesting;
second,
he was not personally disengaged and did not restrict himself to
interactions with others within the same highly privileged elite circles.
Phetland then does exactly what I requested: he gives some illustrations
of
why he thinks Foucault's work is important. That's exactly the right way
to
proceed, and I think it helps understand why I take such a "dismissive"
attitude towards all of this -- in fact, pay no attention to it.

What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant,
because everyone always knew it -- apart from details of social and
intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these
are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know
that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust
it, without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know -- this
comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there
is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to
that,
and my own research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and
turn
to the "theoretical constructs" and the explanations: that there has been
"a
great change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms
by which people come to do" what the powerful want, even enthusiastically.
That's true enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a "theory," then all
the criticisms of me are wrong: I have a "theory" too, since I've been
saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and historical
background, but without describing it as a theory (because it merits no
such
term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded),
and
without claiming that it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully
recognized for a long time that as the power to control and coerce has
declined, it's more necessary to resort to what practitioners in the PR
industry early in this century -- who understood all of this well --
called
"controlling the public mind." The reasons, as observed by Hume in the
18th
century, are that "the implicit submission with which men resign their own
sentiments and passions to those of their rulers" relies ultimately on
control of opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become
"a theory" or "philosophy," others will have to explain; Hume would have
laughed.

Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques
of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their
accuracy. But the "theory" is merely an extremely complex and inflated
restatement of what many others have put very simply, and without any
pretense that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in what Phetland
describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35 years, also
giving
plenty of documentation to show that it was always obvious, and indeed
hardly departs from truism. What's interesting about these trivialities is
not the principle, which is transparent, but the demonstration of how it
works itself out in specific detail to cases that are important to people:
like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror, "free market"
scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find plenty of
it
by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand and who
aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as "theoreticians."

To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing:
presenting
what he sees as "important insights and theoretical constructs" that he
finds in Foucault. My problem is that the "insights" seem to me familiar
and
there are no "theoretical constructs," except in that simple and familiar
ideas have been dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric.
Phetland
asks whether I think this is "wrong, useless, or posturing." No. The
historical parts look interesting sometimes, though they have to be
treated
with caution and independent verification is even more worth undertaking
than it usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and
put in much simpler terms are not "useless," but indeed useful, which is
why
I and others have always made the very same points. As to "posturing," a
lot
of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't particularly blame Foucault
for
it: it's such a deeply rooted part of the corrupt intellectual culture of
Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally, though to his credit, he
distanced himself from it. As for the "corruption" of this culture
particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've
discussed
elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this
forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more
important
things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite
intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their
narrow and (to me, at least) pretty unininteresting circles. That's a
broad
brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without
proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific
point
that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give
it,
or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to
undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me.

Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in
the
mind of any reasonable person when claims about "theory" and "philosophy"
are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening,
and to people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.

Johnb made the point that "plain language is not enough when the frame of
reference is not available to the listener"; correct and important. But
the
right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage
and posturing about non-existent "theories." Rather, it is to ask the
listener to question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and
to
suggest alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've
never found that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or
sometimes
any formal education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as
you
move up the educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and
the self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education
has
taken its toll. Johnb says that outside of circles like this forum, "to
the
rest of the country, he's incomprehensible" ("he" being me). That's
absolutely counter to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of
audiences. Rather, my experience is what I just described. The
incomprehensibility roughly corresponds to the educational level. Take,
say,
talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's usually pretty easy to guess
from
accents, etc., what kind of audience it is. I've repeatedly found that
when
the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I can skip lots of the
background and "frame of reference" issues because it's already obvious
and
taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed to matters that occupy all
of
us. With more educated audiences, that's much harder; it's necessary to
disentangle lots of ideological constructions.

It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write.
That's
not because the ideas or language are complicated -- we have no problems
in
informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in the same
words.
The reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my writing style,
partly the result of the need (which I feel, at least) to present pretty
heavy documentation, which makes it tough reading. For these reasons, a
number of people have taken pretty much the same material, often the very
same words, and put them in pamphlet form and the like. No one seems to
have
much problem -- though again, reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement
or
professional academic journals don't have a clue as to what it's about,
quite commonly; sometimes it's pretty comical.

A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a
discussion
in Z papers, and the last chapter of "Year 501"). There has been a
striking
change in the behavior of the intellectual class in recent years. The left
intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class
schools, writing books like "mathematics for the millions" (which made
mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and
speaking for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from
such activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more
radical than thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an
obvious and growing need and even explicit request for the work they could
do out there in the world of people with live problems and concerns.
That's
not a small problem. This country, right now, is in a very strange and
ominous state. People are frightened, angry, disillusioned, skeptical,
confused. That's an organizer's dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also
fertile ground for demagogues and fanatics, who can (and in fact already
do)
rally substantial popular support with messages that are not unfamiliar
from
their predecessors in somewhat similar circumstances. We know where it has
led in the past; it could again. There's a huge gap that once was at least
partially filled by left intellectuals willing to engage with the general
public and their problems. It has ominous implications, in my opinion.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-


_________
Tresy Kilbourne, Seattle WA
"The intellectual tradition is one of servility to power, and if I didn't
betray it I'd be ashamed of myself." --Noam Chomsky, responding to an
accusation of betrayal by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.