And another voice raised in strong castigation of Thomas Friedman !

Bob
*************

The Crisis in Palestine
by Stephen R. Shalom
ZNET; April 02, 2002

The basic problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict today remains what it's
been for decades: the denial of self-determination to the Palestinian
people. Palestinians have been living under a brutal and humiliating
occupation since 1967 and no solution to the crisis is likely unless this
fundamental reality is addressed.

Some Palestinians have turned to terrorism as their answer. Targeting
civilians is immoral and it is likely to be extremely counter-productive as
well. But it is not hard to understand the rage that motivates the suicide
bombers. As Carl W. Ford, Jr., the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, testified this past February 6:

"Many who join groups that practice terrorism face a life of joblessness
and poverty. Often living under oppressive governments with little prospect
of a better life, young people -- especially those whose exposure to
education has made them even more frustrated and embittered -- are prone to
seek a way out, perhaps by attempting to migrate, perhaps by joining a
movement that promises change through violence, perhaps by immersing
themselves in religion. When unemployment hovers around 40% and nearly 45%
of the population is under the age of 15 (as in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip), people find it difficult to wait for a brighter future."

And this quote may understate the Palestinian unemployment rate; the
Palestinian Authority puts it at 51 percent (see PECDAR, People Under
Siege: Palestinian Economic Losses September 2000 September 2001, available
at http://www.pecdar.org/).

The New York Times's Thomas L. Friedman declares that it is a "huge lie" to
consider desperation a motive for the suicide bombings (March 31, 2002).
Friedman argues that in fact the Palestinians could have had their state
without any need for the current Intifada because in July 2000 Clinton
offered the Palestinians a peace plan that would have ended the occupation,
but Arafat turned it down. This has been an argument long-promoted by
Friedman, impervious to the counter-evidence presented by a member of
Clinton's negotiating team, Robert Malley (see Robert Malley and Hussein
Agha, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," New York Review of Books, August
9, 2001).

Malley first notes the context: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to
Camp David in July 2000 having reneged on various agreements with the
Palestinians and having substantially increased the number of Israeli
settlers in the Occupied Territories during his year in office.
Palestinians were understandably wary of Israeli peace offers, given that
after six years of Oslo "there were more Israeli settlements, less freedom
of movement, and worse economic conditions." Then at Camp David Barak
offered -- but never in writing and never in detail; in fact, says, Malley,
"strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer" -- to give the
Palestinians land equivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank (unspecified,
but to be chosen by Israel) in return for 9 percent of the West Bank which
housed settlements effectively dividing the West Bank into separate
regions. It's a myth, Malley wrote in the New York Times (July 8, 2001),
that "Israel's offer met most if not all of the Palestinians' legitimate
aspirations" and a myth as well that the "Palestinians made no concession
of their own."

The standard story goes that with the failure of Camp David, Arafat opted
for war. But consider what followed. In September 2000 Barak approved a
provocative visit by Ariel Sharon, then a member of Parliament, to the site
of the Al Aqsa mosque. Given the growing Palestinian rage at the
occupation, the results were entirely predictable. The next day some
Palestinians threw rocks and the heavily-augmented police responded with
lethal fire, killing four and wounding hundreds. Thus began the second
Intifada.

Israeli police and soldiers -- under Barak's authority -- continued to use
lethal force in situations where their lives were not in danger. Some
Palestinians proceeded to arm themselves, and the killing escalated, with
deaths on both sides, though the victims were disproportionately
Palestinians. It is sometimes claimed that Palestinians intentionally try
to kill Israeli civilians (which some certainly do) while the unarmed
civilians killed by the Israelis are all unintended "collateral damage."
But numerous reports by international (and Israeli) human rights groups
belie this claim. Recent reports, for example, have documented Israeli
security forces firing on ambulances and medical personnel, and preventing
wounded Palestinians from receiving medical treatment.

In December 2000 and January 2001, talks between the Barak government and
Arafat resumed and considerable headway was made. Yossi Beilin, Barak's
Justice Minister, summarizes what ensued: "instead of accepting the
successful talks that had taken place between Israel and the Palestinians
... as a way toward a final settlement, Ariel Sharon decided, after being
elected prime minister, to terminate the peace process" (New York Times,
March 30, 2002). Thus when commentators (such as CBS's resident Middle East
expert, Fouad Ajami) declare that the current Intifada is "Arafat's war,"
they are grossly distorting reality.

One might note too the pattern of escalating terror. In November 2001,
there was a week-long lull in the fighting. Sharon then ordered the
assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, which, as everyone
predicted, led to a rash of terror bombings, which in turn Sharon used as
justification for further assaults on the Palestinian Authority. (Hanoud's
case is interesting in another respect: despite Israeli claims that Arafat
refused to arrest terrorists, or else arrested them only to release them
shortly thereafter, Hanoud had been in a Palestinian jail. He was not
released. Instead, in August 2001, an Israeli F-16 tried to assassinate him
in the jail. The building was destroyed, 11 police officers killed, and
Hanoud escaped.)

None of this justifies terror bombing of civilians. Various Palestinian
commentators -- among them Edward Said, Jonathan Kuttab, and Mubarak Awad
-- have persuasively argued that on moral, political, and pragmatic grounds
the Palestinians would be far better served by a policy of nonviolent
resistance. But when nonviolence is urged on Palestinians by the likes of
Thomas Friedman, who at the same time calls for Israel "to deliver a
military blow that clearly shows terror will not pay," the hypocrisy is
palpable. No doubt the suicide bombers are following the same warped logic
as Friedman, believing that their acts of terror will restrain, rather than
provoke, terror from the other side.

Various arguments have been advanced as to why Israel cannot withdraw from
the Occupied Territories. None of them is compelling. One argument is that
to return to the 1967 borders will leave Israel in a militarily vulnerable
position. This, of course, was the same argument given for why Israel
couldn't return the Sinai to Egypt or pull out of Lebanon. Both of these
were done, however, with no harm whatever to Israeli security. True, the
Oslo Accords, which turned over disconnected swatches of territory to
Palestinian administration, have not enhanced Israeli security. But as
Shimon Peres, one of the architects of the Oslo agreement and currently
Sharon's Foreign Minister, acknowledged, Oslo was flawed from the start.
"Today we discover that autonomy puts the Palestinians in a worse
situation." The second Intifada with all its suffering could have been
avoided, Peres said, if the Palestinians had had a state from the outset.
"'We cannot keep three and a half million Palestinians under siege without
income, oppressed, poor, densely populated, near starvation,' he said,
adding that without a visible political horizon the Palestinians will not
make peace with Israel" (Jason Keyser, "Peres Says Mideast Peace Process
Flawed From Outset," Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2002).

It is simply not credible that the strongest military power in the region
(even apart from its nuclear arsenal) would be indefensible without
occupying neighboring territory. And with the Arab League declaration that
all of its members would establish diplomatic relations with Israel if it
withdrew to its 1967 borders, it is clear that nothing would better
guarantee the Israeli people a peaceful future than pulling out of the
Occupied Territories. The Israeli government, however, rejected the Arab
League offer and the next day launched its latest offensive against
Palestinian cities.

A second argument against withdrawal is that Palestinians insist on the
right of return, which, it is said, is a way to destroy Israel. Allowing
people who have been expelled from their homes the right to return is
hardly an extreme demand. Obviously this can't mean throwing out people who
have been living in these homes for many years now, and would take complex
planning. Both Arafat and the Arab League have indicated that in their view
the right of return should be implemented in a way that would not create a
demographic problem for Israel. Of course, one could reasonably argue that
a Jewish state is problematic on basic democratic grounds, but in any event
neither the Arab League nor Arafat have raised this objection.

A final argument against withdrawal is that Palestinians just view this as
the first step to eliminating Israel entirely. Hamas objects not just to
the occupation but to the very existence of Israel. But the Hamas position
is a distinctly minority sentiment among Palestinians, who are a largely
secular community that has endorsed a two-state settlement. To be sure,
Hamas has been growing in strength. In its early days Hamas was promoted by
Israeli officials to weaken the PLO (see the Richard Sale, "Israel gave
major aid to Hamas," UPI, Feb. 24, 2001), but most of its growth has been a
result of the inability of the Palestinian Authority to deliver a better
life for Palestinians. If there were a truly independent Palestinian state,
one can assume that Hamas would find far fewer volunteers for its suicide
squads. It must be acknowledged, though, that the longer the mutual terror
continues, the harder it will be to achieve long term peace.

The current situation is grim indeed. On March 31, the Los Angeles Times
reported that five Palestinian police officers "appeared to have been shot
in the head or neck at close range. The room where they were found ... was
splattered with blood and pocked with bullet or shrapnel holes. A string of
bloodstains was sprayed across the wall at what would have been about head
level if the men had been sitting when shot." And now, as the international
press is expelled from Ramallah and other Palestinian cities, the prospect
of even more horrific atrocities looms.

Washington has little inclination to restrain Sharon. The Bush
administration's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been
entirely opportunistic. After September 11, when it seemed necessary to put
together a coalition of Muslim nations, Secretary of State Powell declared
the U.S. in favor of a Palestinian state. But as it became clear that Arab
support wasn't particularly needed in the Afghan war, Sharon was given a
free hand again. Then, as Washington hawks hoped for a war against Iraq,
the U.S. again thought it might need Arab allies, and Israel was told its
policies "weren't helpful." But once the Arab League made clear its
unequivocal opposition to a U.S. attack on Iraq, Washington's need for calm
in Palestine receded, and again Sharon was given a green light.

Washington's inclinations won't restrain Sharon, but mass protests in the
United States -- to add to those now sweeping the Arab world -- might make
it politically impossible for the Bush administration to continue its
support for Israel's war on the Palestinians. It is these protests that we
need to build.

____________________

Stephen R. Shalom teaches political science at William Paterson University
in New Jersey.