[Not from the Observer, but....
j.korber]
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Eleven Questions Re Iraq:
An Interview with Noam Chomsky
Originally for the Italian journal "La Repubblica"
The interviewer was Giampaolo Cadalanu
1) The intervention of the U.S. in Irak seems at the momentunavoidable.
Do you think the real reason of this intervention is to impose respect
of U.N. resolutions?
To evaluate the proposal, we can ask how the US itself respects UN
resolutions. There are simple ways to check. For the past 30 years, the
US is far in the lead in vetoing Security Council Resolutions (Britain
second, France a distant third). In the General Assembly, the US
regularly votes against resolutions in virtual isolation -- hence in
effect vetoing them -- on a wide range of issues. The pattern extends to
the World Court, international conventions on human rights, and much
else. Furthermore the US freely disregards violation of UN resolutions
that it has formally endorsed, and often contributes materially to such
violation. The case of Israel is notorious (for example, the 1978
Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw immediately
from Lebanon). To select another example that is quite relevant here, in
December 1975 the Security Council unanimously ordered Indonesia to
withdraw its invading forces from East Timor "without delay" and called
upon "all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as
well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination."
The US responded by (secretly) increasing its shipments of arms to the
aggressors, accelerating the arms flow once again as the attack reached
near-genocidal levels in 1978. In his memoirs, UN Ambassador Daniel
Patrick Moynihan takes pride in his success in rendering the UN "utterly
ineffective in whatever measures it undertook," following the
instructions of the State Department, which "wished things to turn out
as they did and worked to bring this about." The US also cheerfully
accepts the robbery of East Timor's oil (with participation of US-based
companies), in violation of any reasonable interpretation of
international agreements. The analogy to Iraq/Kuwait is close, though
there are differences: to mention only the most obvious, US-backed
atrocities in East Timor were vastly beyond anything attributed to
Saddam Hussein in Kuwait.
It is easy to extend the record. Like other great powers, the US is
committed to the rule of force, not law, in international affairs. UN
Resolutions, World Court Judgments, International Conventions, etc., are
acceptable if they accord with policy; otherwise they are mere words.
2) Which difference do you see between this intervention and Operation
"Desert Storm", with the Bush administration?
There are many differences. "Desert Storm" was allegedly intended to
drive Iraq from Kuwait; today the alleged goal is to compel Iraq to
permit UN inspection of Saddam's weapons programs. In both cases, a
closer look reveals a more complex story. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the
US feared that in "the next few days Iraq will withdraw" leaving in
place a puppet government and "everyone in the Arab world will be happy"
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell). The concern, in brief, was
that Iraq would act much as the US had done a few months earlier when it
invaded Panama (vetoing two Security Council resolutions condemning its
actions). What followed also does not quite conform to standard
versions. Today, it is widely expected that a military strike will leave
Iraq's murderous tyrant in power, continuing to pursue his weapons
programs, while undermining such international inspection as exists.
It may also be recalled that Saddam's worst crimes were committed when
he was a favored US ally and trading partner, and that immediately after
he was driven from Kuwait, the US watched quietly while he turned to the
slaughter of rebelling Iraqis, even refusing to allow them access to
captured Iraqi arms. Official stories rarely yield an accurate picture
of what is happening. Nonetheless, the differences between 1990 and
today are substantial.
3) Do you believe that the so-called "Sexgate", the scandal about sexual
behaviour of president Clinton, had a role in the decision to attack
Iraq?
I doubt that it is much of a factor.
4) Do you see an alternative to the "new world order" of the U.S.?
"World order," like "domestic order," is based on decisions made within
institutions that reflect existing power structures. The decisions can
be changed; the institutions can be modified or replaced. It is natural
that those who benefit from the organization of state and private power
will portray it as inevitable, so that the victims will feel helpless to
act. There is no reason to believe that. Particularly in the
rich countries that dominate world affairs, citizens can easily act to
create alternatives even within existing formal arrangements, and these
are not graven in stone, any more than in the past.
5) Do you see in Irak an alternative to Saddam Hussein?
The rebelling forces in March 1991 were an alternative, but the US
preferred Saddam. There was an Iraqi democratic opposition in exile.
Washington refused to have anything to do with them before, during, or
after the Gulf War, and they were virtually excluded from the US media,
apart from marginal dissident journals. "Political meetings with them
would not be appropriate for our policy at this time," State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher stated on March 14, 1991, while Saddam was
decimating the opposition under the eyes of Stormin' Norman
Schwartzkopf. They still exist. How realistic their programs are, I
cannot judge, and I do not think we can know as long as the US remains
committed -- as apparently it still is -- to the Bush adminstration
policy that preferred "an iron-fisted Iraqi junta," without Saddam
Hussein if possible, a return to the days when Saddam's "iron
fist...held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American
allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not to speak of Washington (NY Times
chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman, July 1991).
6) What would happen if Baghdad suddenly decides to obey the U.N.
resolution?
I am afraid that the probability is slight, and if he did, he would soon
find new ways of evading the resolutions.
7) Why did embargo not work against Saddam's regime?
The effects of the sanctions come as no surprise. They have strengthened
Saddam's position and undermined potential resistance to him among
people struggling to survive. New bombing is likely to have a similar
effect.
8) This time, do you believe it will be again "Exxon's war"?
I do not think it was "Exxon's war" in 1991, or today, at least in a
narrow sense. It is quite true that since World War II, the US has been
firmly committed to maintaining control over Middle East oil, which the
State Department described as "a stupendous source of strategic power,
and one of the greatest material prizes in world history." But there is
no persuasive evidence that in 1990-91, the US was concerned about an
Iraqi threat to this control. There is, however, good reason to believe
that Washington saw the Iraqi invasion as an opportunity to extend its
control -- to demonstrate that "what we say goes," as George Bush
announced triumphantly while the missiles and bombs were falling. In
fact, the US used the opportunity to institute at once the rejectionist
version of the Israel-Arab "peace process" that it had maintained in
virtual international isolation for 25 years, but was now able to
implement.
Previously, the US had been compelled to veto Security Council
resolutions calling for a diplomatic settlement, to vote regularly
against similar General Assembly resolutions (the last in December 1990,
passed 144-2, the US and Israel opposed), and to undermine other
diplomatic initiatives from Europe, the Arab world, and others. But
after the Gulf War, the US was finally able to proceed, unopposed. The
background issue remains control of the world's major energy reserves,
but apart from that, the specific problems of US energy corporations
have not directly motivated the policies we are discussing.
9) Which role did the military play in the decision to attack? And
industry?
Very little, I think.
10) This time, is it possible to link Gaza and the West Bank with
respect of U.N. resolutions?
Highly unlikely, as things now stand. The US government could always
have linked the issues, but has preferred not to. Its goal for the
Israeli-occupied territories is the Bantustan-style settlement that is
now being imposed (Israel's two political groupings are not very
different in this regard). US attitudes towards UN resolutions on these
issues can readily be determined by reviewing the record of US vetoes,
isolated negative votes, and disregard of continuing violations.
11) What can (or: could) be done to avoid (or: to stop) the war?
The usual answer: substantial popular pressure, in this case, from
within the US and in Europe, primarily. Right now, that does not seem
likely.
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