Milutin wrote:
[...]
> What appears that Nato (and "the rest of the civilized world") is
>looking for, is a strong excuse to start the ground war. An excuse that is
>supposed to cause widespread outrage and turn reluctant and ambivalent
>public opinion in the West in favour of a ruthless ground war combined with
>round-the-clock air attacks.
Where have you been lately Milutin, they don't need any further
justification. The barbararity going on is Kosovo is all the excuse they
could hope for, the civilised world is staggered by the evil being
perpetrated. I wouldn't even be surprised to see committed pacificists
demanding an invasion, under the circumstances.
>The air raids, from then on, will no longer be concerned with
>"collateral damage" and death of civilians.
I sense that is already happening. News stories here about a few dozen
civilian casualties in Serbia are completely overshadowed by the sight of
tens of thousands of Kosovan refugees and horror stories about Albanian
children seeing their mothers and fathers murdered before their eyes.
The first casualty of war is always truth of course, so either set of
stories may well be exaggerated,. But the expulsion of Kosovan Albanians is
definitely shaping up as one of the all-time propaganda and tactical
blunders of the 20th century. In strategic terms it is a classic case of
allowing tactical objectives to violate the overall strategic plan.
The overall strategy was presumably to avoid US/NATO intervention while
maintaining Yugoslavian authority in Kosova. Having failed to completely
avoid intervention, the Yugoslavian regime's strategy should have been to
at least limit it and survive it, by appealing to European public opinion
(military resistance to the massive US war machine being clearly futile.)
However they appear to have allowed a mere tactical objective, ethnic
cleansing the Kosova Albanians, to violate that strategy. Given the world
media spotlight, this was a mistake of incredible stupidity, they have
exposed themselves to the world as savage monsters, the US/European
intervention is completely vindicated in the eyes of the world, only the
adequacy of the US/European response is under question.
A lesson from history:
"On January 9, 1905, thousands of Russian workers
marched towards the Winter Palace, home of their
beloved Tsar, Nicholas Romonov II, to petition him
for relief and better conditions. The workers
believed the Tsar was unaware of their poor living
conditions. Many were forced to work 16 hours a day,
seven days a week, earn only subsistence wages, live
in cramped accommodations, and had few political or
civil rights. They believed the police and the
bureaucrats were responsible for the problems, and
hid them from their "little father," as they
affectionately called the Tsar.
As they peacefully approached the palace in a spirit
of humble reverence, the last thing they expected
was what they got: the Tsar refused to hear their
petition and ordered the guards to keep the people
out of the palace square. As the masses approached
the palace, guards opened fire on the unarmed
crowds of men, women, and children, killing an
estimated 200 to 4,000 people and wounding many
more. The carnage shattered the workers' former
image of the Tsar as their "little father," and clearly
revealed his tyrannical nature.
The killing of nonviolent petitioners aroused strong
protests from the population. During the rest of
January, more workers were on strike than had been
for the last decade. Numerous medical, legal,
agricultural, and pedagogical societies denounced
the regime, and called for a constituent assembly.
Many soldiers refused to obey orders or actively
mutinied. As historian Charques put it, Bloody
Sunday "did perhaps more than anything else during
the whole regime to undermine the allegiance of the
common people to the throne."
So what happened here? Well, whether the Tsar
recognized it or not, he had sought a tactical victory
at the expense of an operational plan decision. The
Tsar's goal was to rule Russia, his operational plan
to maintain this goal would be to maintain the
people's obedience and cooperation.
However, when the Tsar considered how to respond
to the petitioners, he allowed the tactical goal (a
goal that may be achieved at a single encounter with
the opposition) of keeping the petitioners out of the
palace square to supersede the operational plan's
requirements that he maintain the obedience of the
people. On the tactical level- the Tsar was
victorious that day. His troops successfully kept the
people out of the palace square (achieving his
tactical goal) and his troops easily regained control
of the streets as the shootings broke up the protest
procession. However, this superficial victory on the
subordinate tactical level violated the operational
plan by encouraging his subjects to become defiantly
disobedient. Overall, this action severely weakened
his power and ability to rule."
God help the Serbian people now. Their leaders certainly aren't serving
them well.
Bill Bartlett
Bracknell tas.
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