BOMBING SERBIA NOT THE ANSWER 

By Stephen Zunes, Univ. of San Francisco

 

The ongoing threats of NATO air strikes against Serbia to end the 
Milosevic regime's repression against Kosovo's Albanian majority is a 
prime example of the wrong policy at the wrong time.

The cause is certainly just: The Serbian authorities have imposed an 
apartheid-style system on the country's ethnic Albanian majority and 
have severely suppressed cultural and political rights. However, this 
suppression has been ongoing since Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy 
in 1989. Until a year ago, the Kosovars waged their struggle 
nonviolently, using strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, and 
alternative institutions--indeed, it was one of the most widespread, 
comprehensive and sustained nonviolent campaigns since Gandhi's struggle 
for Indian independence earlier this century. However, the world chose 
to ignore the Kosovars' nonviolent movement. 

Only after a shadowy armed group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army 
emerged about a year ago did the world media, the Clinton Administration 
and other Western governments finally take notice.. 

By waiting for the emergence of a guerrilla group before seeking a 
solution, the West gave Slobodan Milosevic the opportunity to crack down 
with an even greater level of savagery than before. The delay has 
allowed the Kosovar movement to be taken over by armed 
ultra-nationalists who are far less ready to compromise or guarantee the 
rights of the Serbian minority in an autonomous or independent Kosovo.

It is a tragedy on which the West squandered a full eight years when 
preventative diplomacy could have worked. It has also given oppressed 
people around the world a very bad message: in order to get the West to 
pay attention to your plight, you need to take up arms

There are problems with current NATO strategy that run deeper than its 
belated response to the problem. 

The threatened bombing has led to the withdrawal of the unarmed OSCE 
monitors, which served as at least a partial deterrent to the worst Serb 
atrocities. As predicted, violence against the civilian population has 
dramatically increased with their departure. Unable to effectively 
challenged NATO air power, the Serbs will likely take their vengeance on 
the unarmed ethnic Albanian population should the bombing commence. 

The root of the Kosovar crisis, as was the root of the Bosnian tragedy, 
is the extreme Serb ethno-nationalism that emerged from the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. The paranoid view of Serbia as a besieged, isolated, and 
threatened nation put forward by Milosevic and other Serbian demagogues 
has brought untold tragedy to a once peaceful--if mildly 
autocratic--multi-ethnic federated system. The best way to undermine 
such dangerous ideologues is through supporting the growth of a more 
pluralistic Serbian society, such as encouraging Serbia's burgeoning 
pro-democracy movement. 

Instead, the threat of military action only reinforces the Serb's 
self-perception that they are a people under siege, playing right into 
the hands of Serbian ultranationalists. 

Furthermore, as any authority on conflict resolution can attest, 
workable conflict resolution cannot come from a pre-packaged 
"settlement" imposed from the outside through threat of force. True 
conflict resolution can only come from the interested parties t
hemselves. At best, an imposed Western formula on Kosovo will result in 
an uneasy truce in a badly divided society that will not heal the 
wounds, encourage democracy, or lead to real peace. 

There are also questions about the Clinton administration's motivations. 
One does not have to be a Serb apologist to wonder why the U.S. so 
forcefully pushes for the same rights for Kosovars in Serbia that they 
oppose for the similarly suppressed Kurds in Turkey. Indeed, the record 
of both the current and previous U.S. administrations of supporting 
repressive armies against occupied and indigenous peoples is scandalous. 


This has led to uncharitable speculation that Clinton may be motivated 
less out of concern for human rights than by a desperate search for a 
post-cold war mission for NATO or perhaps even an effort to destroy what 
remains of Yugoslavia, one of the last European holdouts to an 
neo-liberal global order. This has prompted some on the American and 
European left to make an unfortunate alliance with Serbian 
ethno-fascists. 

There are still other choices besides bombing and doing nothing. 

There could be the deployment of a large-scale, unarmed multinational 
force to both monitor the situation and physically intervene to 
discourage bloodshed. Direct contact between the Albanian and Serbian 
communities within Kosovo could be facilitated to work out a settlement 
that would meet the legitimate needs of both. Greater support could be 
given to democratic forces within Serbia. A more creative and flexible, 
yet rigorous, enforcement of economic sanctions against Serbia could be 
imposed, as well as re-enforcing the arms embargo against both sides. 

On the eve of a new century, the people of the United States and Europe 
should not be forced by their governments to choose between abandoning 
an entire people to terror and repression or the unwise utilization of 
military power.

Stephen Zunes, recent author of In Focus briefs on Morocco and Western 
Sahara and International Terrorism, is an assistant professor of 
politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the 
University of San Francisco.