*Author:*Madawi Al-Rasheed
*Publisher:* Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. 308
*ISBN:* 0-521-85836-4 (HB)
*Reviewer:* M A Sherif

*Good Wahhabi-Bad Wahhabi*

Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed, herself a member of a notable Nejdi clan and
based at Kings College, London, unravels the nexus 'Saudi Wahhabi Salafiyya'
and in so doing provides insights on the domestic situation in Saudi Arabia
today and its wider repercussions.

Her work also helps to resolve some puzzles: how is it that a state with so
many Islamic scholars – all with impeccable Arabic scholarship and access to
sources – should produce a polity with so many regulations in the social
sphere yet no influence on political life? Why is it that so many non-Saudi
Islamic scholars, so adamant on a political project in their own countries,
should have availed themselves of the King's shilling without a hint of a
troubled conscience? How come an intellectually bereft and simplistic
religious world-view should have become so appealing to bright Muslim
university students in the western world?

Professor Al-Rasheed has an anthropologist's faith in history as a
dialectical unfolding. She has no truck with the ahistorical dimensions of a
revealed religion. Thus when Muslim history throws up exceptions it must be
a myth or Muslims' odd way of perceiving the world. So the reference to Umar
ibn Abd Al-Aziz – widely regarded as following the footsteps of the four
caliphs in his brief three year caliphate - is as someone "celebrated in the
historical imagination of Sunni Muslims as a just ruler" (p.227). Jihadis'
feeling of humiliation is "a result of a perceived injustice inflicted on
the Muslim world by superpowers" (p.207). Her account of a dissident,
'Lewis' Atiyat Allah offers a greater insight into mind of the author rather
than the subject: "Lewis is committed to a constant search for a grand
meta-narrative, a historical myth in which he is the central character and
his faith is the motivating force…"(p.208). Would it not be equally feasible
to posit that 'Lewis' is inspired by the hadith, "The most excellent jihad
is the uttering of truth in the presence of an unjust ruler"?
Anthropologists take a 'non-essentialist' view of religion, and regard it as
nothing but a social construct. Thus Islam becomes nothing but the actions
and histories of Muslims, with no free-standing normative dimension.

The term 'Wahhabism' is derived from the name of a sheikh from Nejd – a
region north west of Riyadh. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) initiated
a movement to bring about unity, seek an Islamic order for society and shift
the focus away from religious superstitions and dependence on the power of
intercession of saints. This was in the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328)
who, in the wake of the Mongol invasion, had formulated a powerful reformist
and unifying message, 'return to the Qur'an and sunnah'. Ibn Taymiyya
developed his own philosophical argumentation to assert that sciences and
religious institutions whose origin could not be traced to early Islam
should be rejected, and instead, the Salafiyya way (the practice during the
early period of Islam) adopted. Abd al-Wahab's teachings were also expounded
at a time of crisis – Napolean's invastion of Egypt – but unlike ibn
Taymiyya's, his salafism was anti-intellectual. Abd Al-Wahhab's descendents,
the Al-Shaikh family, provided religious legitimacy to the first
Saudi-Wahhabi emirate from 1744-1818.

At about the same time Shah Waliullah of India (d. 1762) spent formative
years in the Hejaz, where he absorbed ibn Taymiyya's message of rebuilding
socio-political life in line with the basic teachings of Islam. His approach
was both mystical and intellectual, in contrast to the Nejdi Wahhabis. On
his return to India, Shah Waliullah established the Madrasa Rahimiyya in
Delhi, which was closed down after the 1857 insurrection. However many
teachers escaped to establish Deoband and important differences – as well as
many similarities – remain between the Nejdi Wahhabis today and the Deoband
alumni.

For some reason, the Raj adopted the term 'Wahhabi' to describe Indian
Muslims opposed to their rule and the use of Muslim troops to fight the
Ottomans in World War I. Paradoxically, at the very time that the Raj in
India was ostracising and isolating the Indian Wahhabis, the British officer
Captain Shakespear was fighting alongside Abdul Aziz ibn Saud to help the
Saudi consolidation of power! The British were able to prompt the Barelwi
ulama <http://www.salaam.co.uk/bookshelf/index.php?selected_middle_page=15>to
issue fatwas against the Deobandis during World War I. Thus even then, there
were the 'bad Wahhabis' and the 'good Wahhabis'!

In a continuing alliance with the Saud tribe, the 'Nejdi Wahhabis' later
provided religious legitimacy to Abdulaziz ibn Saud's military campaigns
from 1916-1922 which resulted in the emergence of the modern Kingdom.
Professor Madawi is searing in her descriptions of the House of Saud's
manipulation of the religious establishment, its outcomes and reactions.

She notes, "It is in the hands of sheikhs such as Ibn Baz, together with
sheikhs Muhammad al-Uthaymin, Abd al-Muhsin al-Obaykan, Salih al-Fawzan, the
current mufti AbdulAziz Al-Shaikh and many others that the Wahhabi tradition
underwent a transformation beyond genealogy and geography. Under their
guidance Wahhabiya ceased to be a religious revivalist Salafi movement and
became an apologetic institutionalised religious discourse which confirmed
the servitude of religion to the state. Ibn Baz's inability to engage with
the politics of the modern world and the superficiality of his religious
opinions and interpretations contributed to the trivialisation of the
Wahhabi message….in order to survive as traditional religious notables in an
age where the state began to be dominated by technocrats who were mainly
educated abroad, the official Wahhabi ulama, under the religious leadership
of Ibn Baz ceased to be independent mediators between government and the
governed; they confined themselves to being guardians of public morality.
This amounted to enforcing the appearance of a highly Islamised public
sphere, represented by the number of mosque in cities, minarets calling for
prayers, predominance of religious education, segregation of the sexes,
government spending on proselytising inside the country and abroad, and
other related maters of appearance… With state co-optation they developed
into a class in its own right and with its own interests. The majority of
them confirmed political decisions by providing a religious seal of approval
for policy matters. Official ulama sanctioned authoritarian rule and
anchored it in religious interpretations… while twentieth-century Wahhabi
scholars were constantly pre-occupied with questions of ritual performance,
tomb-visiting, intercession and other so-called polytheistic innovations,
they failed to produce a single treatise on the nature of the Islamic state
and political authority…No important theological doctrine was developed in
these areas because of their political sensitivity, which such intellectual
exercise would expose. Wahhabi ulama continued to reiterate opinions of
selected scholars of the medieval period without serious engagement with
contemporary political issues. Their excuse was that they are Salafis,
following in the footsteps of an earlier generation of pious ancestors. The
official ulama failed to reflect on their own rule in the modern Saudi
state. They refrained from critically examining this role and tracing its
evolving nature. Simply content with being guardians of the moral order
while leaving political power in the hands of the ruling family and an
expanding class of technocrats and bureaucrats, they lacked
self-consciousness and awareness. The Saudi ulama accepted the de facto
separation between religion and politics, while adopting a narrow definition
of religion as all matters relating to personal conduct and *ibada*. They
excelled in controlling the social sphere while leaving the political field
in the hands of the state. The Wahhabi ulama contributed to the
consolidation of the state that is politically secular and socially
religious. This enigmatic duality is an important feature of the
contemporary Saudi regime….Wahhabiyya succeeded in Islamising Saudi
authoritarianism rather than society". (p. 32-33; p. 46; p. 57; p.256).
Professor Madawi cites Ibn Baz's fatwa justifying the invitation of foreign
troops to Saudi Arabia during the 1990-1 Gulf War and his 1993 Fatwa
legitimising peace with Israel.

Equally forthright is her analysis of the impact of the export of this Nejdi
Wahhabism across the world thanks to the oil riches of Eastern Arabia.
Students from across the world were drawn to the Islamic university at
Medina, established in 1961 and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University in
Riyadh, granted university status in 1974. These were monocultural
environments and emerging graduates were often deeply loyal to the
established order and equipped to preach rather than debate. From the 1970s
vast amounts of religious literature and *aqida* books also flowed out of
Saudi Arabia, finding its way to even the smallest of prayer rooms in
universities across the UK and the USA. Professor Madawi notes, "Certain
Muslim university students worldwide may appreciate their clarity, purity,
certainty and authenticity. They may also appreciate the absence of
ambiguity and hesitation….Saudi Wahhabi discourse creates the illusion of
empowerment, an empowerment that is achieved by complying with rigid rules
and fatwas that regulate almost every aspect of one's life, body and
relations with others. It is the new 'science' of young Muslims". In the
course of the Afghan War in the 1980s, the unsophisticated theology combined
with the rhetoric of jihad and 'hatred of the kuffar'. The result, to use
Professor Madawi's phrase was "the premature transationalisation of Saudi
religious discourse". In environments where religious discussion has to be
nuanced and sophisticated, the simplistic approach is wrong-footing and
embarrassing Muslim communities.

The book analyses the challenge that emerged from the group of dissident
ulema, the 'Sahwa' (awakening) movement that began to emerge in the 1970s,
though the author considers the motivation provided by Ikhwan activists who
found refuge and livelihood in Saudi universities as "exaggerated". This is
a contentious point, considering these included heavyweights like Muhammad
Qutb. However Madawi is probably correct in her assessment, because some
Islamic movement leaders were refugees and could not rock the boat, while
for others a Saudi association gave them kudos in their own domestic
political struggle for recognition and legitimacy. Prominent indigenous
Sahwi leaders of the early perod included Sheikh Safar al-Hawali, Shaikh
Salman al-Awdah and Aidh al-Qarni. The Sahwis asserted their right "to issue
public advice on current affairs, and openly to criticise government
policies". During the 1990s, Sahwis were imprisoned and some sought asylum
overseas on release.

Saudi Arabia provided "nearly US$4 billion in official aid to Jihadis in
Afghanistan". Madawi records that throughout the 1980s when "Osama bin
Laden….was furthering the US-Saudi project in Afghanistan, he was a 'nice'
Jihadi, to use Khashogi's words. In the 1980s, Saudi Jihadis participated in
the war to liberate Afghanistan from atheist Communism under the blessing of
several sponsors, including the Saudi government and the official Wahhabi
establishment. To contain the rising religious enthusiasm of a whole
generation of young Saudis, the government decided to facilitate the export
of its own young subjects to the land of war". And she then notes wryly, the
opening of the gate of Jihad abroad could not remain compatible with closing
the gate of ijtehad at home. The outcome was "the privatisation of jihad in
an age of globalisation" (p. 155), and the rest is the stuff of history.

Following 9/11, a number of Sahwis were again imprisoned, but on their
release made statements declaring their loyalty to the state. Madawi notes,
"Although senior princes attacked Sahwis in public, the regime enlisted
famous Sahwis to perform two tasks – one intellectual and one practical. The
first involved preaching the religious discourse that denounced Jihadis as
activists who failed to understand the meaning of Jihad. The second task
involved negotiating with Jihadis in the hopes of delivering them to the
regime. Sahwi figures 'volunteered' to bring back those who had gone astray,
mainly Jihadis who used violence against the state and people. Only famous
Sahwi scholars such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah were able to play
the double role of preaching against violence and neutralising violent
actors". The former, in November 2003 declared that "wali al-amr is a father
and we are his sons". In the eyes of their radical opponents, these Sahwis
have become the '*qa'idun*', those who sit, while they remain the '*
murabitun*' – the fighters.

Following the co-optation of the first generation of dissidents, Madawi
highlights two bright stars, who are happy to describe themselves as
Salafis. The first is Professor Abdullah al-Hamid, currently in prison. He
has distanced himself from the conventional Salafist view on dealing with
state authority – that tyranny can be justified if the only other choice is
anarchy or foreign aggression (for an analysis of this idea see Enayat,
'Modern Islamic Political Thought). According to Madawi, "al-Hamid
deconstructs the meaning of wali al-amr, the one who determines and controls
destiny. He laments how this meaning is now loaded with notions of absolute
rule and despotism. Because of the heavy intervention of previous religious
scholars, Muslims have succeeded in 'Islamising oppression and backwardness'
under the guise of returning to the pious ancestors and guarding
authenticity".

Another attempt to reform Nejdi Wahhabism discourse from within is
associated with the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), led by
Saad al-Faqih, in exile in London. While al-Hamid remained loyal to the
royal family ("at least in public", notes Professor Madawi), Saad "gave up
hope and that it will ever respond to demands for political reform or become
capable of reforming itself… the more the rhetoric of the Sahwis moved
towards glorifying the Saudi royal family and its centrality in the
envisaged political reform process, the more that of al-Faqih moved in the
opposite direction….al-Faqih does not believe that the royal family is an
agent of unity…he believes that the umma must elect its leader…the ulama
should be outside the state apparatus altogether. They should derive their
authority from their social base…" (p.240, p.244). After the 7/7 bombings in
London, the Saudi authorities have capitalised on Blair's 'change of the
rules' and are continiously pressing for al-Faqih's deportation. Professor
Madawi is impressed by MIRA's willingness to offer women a platform in the
organisation's media outlets to present their views, analyse the current
situation and "more importantly, mobilise men by appealing to their Islamic,
tribal and masculine honour, described as being regularly violated by the
state and its agents". Saad "unequivocally rejects the connection, made by
the USA, Western scholars and Saudi liberals, between the Saudi religious
curriculum, which draws on Wahhabi interpretations, and terrorism. He takes
the view that the policies of the Saudi government, especially its
unconditional alliance with the West, is at the heart of Jihadi violence"
(p. 242).

While Professor Madawi's anthropological jargon frequently jars, the book is
essential reading to understand the medley of tensions buzzing away in a
society that remains so opaque to outsiders. A hundred years ago the Raj was
able to shape our conceptual vocabulary and succeeded in associating
Wahhabism with malevolence. Today we have a better understanding of
hegemonic discourses and can be wary of the traps.

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