On Mon, 8 May 2000, Ken Stuart wrote:

> But it is certainly arbitrary in its manifestation.
>
> For example, how many bugs suffered in the construction of the PETA headquarters
> building?

Do bugs have enough of a nervous system to be capable of
suffering?  A case can be made that the systems responsible for
pain reside mainly in the limbic system, which bugs lack
altogether.  So what reason is there to believe in the suffering
of bugs?

> Also, to use "similarity to us" as any sort of principle for determining who is
> suffering and who isn't, is exactly the sort of "species-ism" that the PETA
> people are always citing.

Not at all.  To the extent that we can acquire some understanding
of suffering by learning how it works in us, we can then
generalize that knowledge to other creatures.  If you are arguing
that there may be some completely different kind of suffering
that we need to give moral heed to, then the onus is on you to
explain it.  An argument from mere possibility certainly isn't
sufficient.

> Interestingly, the Tibetan Buddhists eat meat, and the principle they cite is
> that just as many creatures are killed in agriculture - no matter how careful
> one is to avoid that.   So, instead they simply pray that the sustenance they
> receive enable them to do good works.

This is a good argument if and only if our moral concern should
be a function of number of deaths caused.  If there are other
variables, then their argument is not a very good one.

Todd Moody
[log in to unmask]