On Tue, 9 May 2000, Ken Stuart wrote:

> Certainly there is a connection between mind and body.  However, we know that,
> for example, mental stress affects the body.   And...

Of course.  The correlation doesn't have to be perfect to be good
enough to warrant inferences.

> But this is not a point about "animal pain", it is about mind-body causality.
> In the dream, we have mental pain and suffering without any bodily causes.

I agree.  How does that show that it is "arbitrary" to suppose
that some animals, but no plants, feel pain?

> Here is a more concrete example of these concepts... A man saves his money for
> many years to buy a red 1966 Mustang, which he finally succeeds in purchasing.
> A few days later, he goes to the mall to buy something, carefully parking in an
> empty part of the parking lot.   Ten minutes later, he hears "Will the owner of
> a red Mustang please come to the parking lot, your car has been involved in an
> accident." on the PA system.   In considerable anguish, the man runs out to the
> parking lot, only to find that his car is fine, and the accident involved
> someone else's 1979 Mustang.   This makes the man quite happy - more so than
> even before hearing the PA system.   All these states of anguish and happiness
> were caused not by actual events, but by his mental outlook and attachments.

I agree that if he didn't care what happened to the Mustang he
would not have experienced these states.  I'm not so sure that he
would be better off for not caring.  But that's another question,
I suppose.

> >I agree that we should not talk about the suffering of species
> >that lack these capacities.  That's precisely the point.  But I
> >reject the claim that the only way to ascertain it would be by
> >cross-species mind reading.
> >
> >If I apply a glowing coal to my skin, I will reliably feel pain.
>
> Not a good example!  You have never heard of fire walkers?

Of course I have.  That only shows that the correlation isn't
perfect, which everyone already knows.  "Reliably" doesn't mean
perfect.

> >That pain will likely be correlated with certain behaviors on my
> >part, as well as with certain neural processes.  The same
> >stimulus will produce similar responses in other humans, who
> >report that they also feel pain.  If I do the same thing to a
> >dog, the dog will engage in similar behaviors and these will be
> >correlated with similar neural processes.  What reason do I have
> >to doubt that the dog feels pain under this circumstance?  I
> >can't think of any.
>
> We can consider it likely that the dog's nervous system has a similar pain
> response to injury.

Yes.

> Again, what we don't know is whether a dog has a mind and/or self-consciousness
> and/or personal experiences and/or desires.

What reason do we have to deny it?  When my dog barks until I
feed him, why should I doubt that he desires to eat?  When he
yelps when I step on his foot, why should I doubt that he
experiences pain?  Why should I doubt that these things occur in
his consciousness?

Given the reliable (though imperfect) correlation of human mental
states with processes in the human nervous system and the
similarity of the dog's nervous system to the human nervous
system, as well as similarity of behavior, there is good reason
to infer that the dog has mental states.  That shifts the burden
onto you to provide some overriding reason to doubt it.

> >Ethical vegetarians may wish to dispute
> >whether morality requires us to err on the side of caution here
> >or not, but that doesn't show that the whole notion of moral
> >concern over animal suffering is arbitrary or illusory.
>
> [ We're talking about "ethical" concern - morals are simply defined as what is
> customary in society... ]

No.  The adjective "moral" means "pertaining to right conduct or
its principles" and "conforming to those principles, as opposed
to law, custom, etc."  You may be thinking of "mores."

Again, the ethical vegetarian's argument is simple enough.  The
capacity for both happiness and suffering creates interests.
Creatures that can experience pain have an interest in avoiding
it.  Creatures that can experience happiness lose something when
their lives (and thus their opportunities for happiness) are cut
short.  The argument does not depend on a claim that the forms of
suffering and happiness across species are identical, only that
they are similar enough to be the basis of similar interests.

To put it bluntly, a cow's interest in not dying does not have to
be exactly the same as a human's interest, but it is similar
enough to be worthy of our moral consideration.

I think this argument can be answered, but not by skepticism
about whether a cow has mental states.

Todd Moody
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