We learn more by investigating the reasons for U.S. rejection of
international law and trade agreements. In the Nicaragua case, State
Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer explained that when the U.S.
accepted World Court jurisdiction in the 1940s, most members of the UN
"were aligned with the United States and shared its views regarding world
order." But now "A great many of these cannot be counted on to share our
view of the original constitutional conception of the UN Charter," and
"This same majority often opposes the United States on important
international questions." It is therefore understandable that the U.S.
should be far in the lead since the 1960s in vetoing UN resolutions on a
wide range of issues including international law, human rights,
environmental protection, and so on (UK second, France a distant third),
precisely contrary to the standard version repeated in the opening
paragraph above. The U.S. advanced its lead another notch shortly after
this account appeared, casting its 71st veto since 1967. When the question
(Israeli settlements in Jerusalem) moved to the General Assembly, the U.S.
and Israel stood alone in opposition, again a standard pattern.

Drawing the natural conclusions from the unreliability of the world, Sofaer
went on to explain that we must now "reserve to ourselves the power to
determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over us in a particular case."
The long-standing principle, now to be enforced in a world that is no
longer obedient, is that "the United States does not accept compulsory
jurisdiction over any dispute involving matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States, as determined by the United
States." The "domestic matters" in question were the U.S. attack against
Nicaragua.

The basic operative principle was stated elegantly by the new Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright, when she lectured the UN Security Council about
its unwillingness to go along with U.S. demands concerning Iraq: The U.S.
will "behave, with others, multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as
we must," recognizing no external constraints in an area deemed "vital to
U.S. national interests"‹as determined by the United States. The UN is an
appropriate forum when its members "can be counted on" to share
Washington¹s views, but not when the majority "opposes the United States on
important international questions." International law and democracy are
fine things‹but as judged by outcome, not process; like free trade.

The current U.S. stand in the WTO case thus breaks no new ground.
Washington declared that the WTO "has no competence to proceed" on an issue
of American national security; we are to understand that our existence is
at stake in the strangulation of the Cuban economy. A WTO ruling against
the U.S. in absentia would be of no significance or concern, a Clinton
administration spokesperson added, because "we do not believe anything the
WTO says or does can force the U.S. to change its laws." Recall that the
great merit of the WTO telecommunications agreement was that this "new tool
of foreign policy" forces other countries to change their laws and
practices, in accord with our demands.

The principle is that the U.S. is exempt from WTO interference with its
laws, just as it is free to violate international law at will; uniquely,
though the privilege may be extended to client states as circumstances
require. The fundamental principles of world order again resound, loud and
clear.

The earlier GATT agreements had allowed for national security exceptions,
and under them, Washingon had justified its embargo against Cuba as
"measures taken in pursuit of essential US security interests." The WTO
agreement also permits a member to take "any action it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests," but only in
relation to three designated issues: fissionable materials, traffic in
armaments, and actions "taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations." Perhaps not wishing to be officially on record
with an utter absurdity, the Clinton administration did not formally invoke
its "national security exemption," though it did make clear that the issue
was "national security."

At the time of writing, the EU and the U.S. are trying to arrange a deal
before April 14, when the WTO hearings are scheduled to begin. Meanwhile,
the Wall Street Journal reports, Washington "says it won¹t cooperate with
the WTO panels, arguing that the trade organization doesn¹t have
jurisdiction over national security issues."

Indecent Thoughts

Polite people are not supposed to remember the reaction when Kennedy tried
to organize collective action against Cuba in 1961: Mexico could not go
along, a diplomat explained, because "If we publicly declare that Cuba is a
threat to our security, forty million Mexicans will die laughing." Here we
take a more sober view of threats to the national security.

There were also no reported deaths from laughter when Administration
spokesperson Stuart Eizenstat, justifying Washington¹s rejection of the WTO
agreements, "argued that Europe is challenging Œthree decades of American
Cuba policy that goes back to the Kennedy Administration,¹ and is aimed
entirely at forcing a change of government in Havana" (NYT). A sober
reaction is entirely in order on the assumption that the U.S. has every
right to overthrow another government; in this case, by aggression,
large-scale terror, and economic strangulation.

The assumption remains in place and apparently unchallenged, but
Eizenstat¹s statement was criticized on narrower grounds by historian
Arthur Schlesinger. Writing "as one involved in the Kennedy
Administration¹s Cuban policy," Schlesinger pointed out that Under
Secretary of Commerce Eizenstat had misunderstood the policies of the
Kennedy administration. Its concern was Cuba¹s "troublemaking in the
hemisphere" and "the Soviet connection." But these are now behind us, so
the Clinton policies are an anachronism, though otherwise, it seems,
unobjectionable.

Schlesinger did not explain the meaning of the phrases "troublemaking in
the hemisphere" and "the Soviet connection," but he has elsewhere, in
secret. Reporting to the incoming President on the conclusions of a Latin
American Mission in early 1961, Schlesinger spelled out the problem of
Castro¹s "troublemaking": it is "the spread of the Castro idea of taking
matters into one¹s own hands," a serious problem, he added shortly after,
when "The distribution of land and other forms of national wealth greatly
favors the propertied classes...[and] The poor and underprivileged,
stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, are now demanding
opportunities for a decent living." Schlesinger also explained the threat
of the "Soviet connection": "Meanwhile, the Soviet Union hovers in the
wings, flourishing large development loans and presenting itself as the
model for achieving modernization in a single generation." The "Soviet
connection" was perceived in a similar light far more broadly in Washington
and London, from the origins of the Cold War in 1917 into the 1960s, when
the documentary record currently ends.

Schlesinger also recommended to the incoming president "a certain amount of
high-flown corn" about "the higher aims of culture and spirit," which "will
thrill the audience south of the border, where metahistorical disquisitions
are inordinately admired." Meanwhile we¹ll take care of serious matters.
Just to show how much things change, Schlesinger also realistically
criticized "the baleful influence of the International Monetary Fund," then
pursuing the 1950¹s version of today¹s "Washington Consensus" ("structural
adjustment," "neoliberalism").

With these (secret) explanations of Castro¹s "troublemaking in the
hemisphere" and the "Soviet connection," we come a step closer to an
understanding of the reality of the Cold War. But that is another topic.

Similar troublemaking beyond the hemisphere has also been no slight
problem, and continues to spread dangerous ideas among people who "are now
demanding opportunities for a decent living." In late February 1996, while
the U.S. was in an uproar over Cuba¹s downing of two planes of a
Florida-based anti-Castro group that had regularly penetrated Cuban
airspace, dropping leaflets in Havana calling on Cubans to revolt (also
participating in the continuing terrorist attacks against Cuba, according
to Cuban sources), the wire services were running different stories. AP
reported that in South Africa, "a cheering, singing crowd welcomed Cuban
doctors" who had just arrived at the invitation of the Mandela government
"to boost medical care in poor rural areas." "Cuba has 57,000 doctors for
its 11 million people, compared to 25,000 in South Africa for 40 million
people." The 101 Cuban doctors included top medical specialists who, if
they were South African, would "very likely be working in Cape Town or
Johannesburg" at twice the salaries they will receive in the poor rural
areas where they go. "Since the program of sending public health
specialists overseas began in Algeria in 1963, Cuba has sent 51,820
doctors, dentists, nurses and other medical doctors" to "the poorest Third
World nations," providing "medical aid totally free of charge" in most
cases. A month later Cuban medical experts were invited by Haiti to study a
meningitis outbreak.

This kind of troublemaking goes back a long way. A leading West German
journal (Die Zeit) reported that Third World countries regard Cuba as "an
international superpower" because of the teachers, construction workers,
physicians, and others involved in "international service." In 1985, it
reported, 16,000 Cubans worked in Third World countries, more than twice
the total of Peace Corps and AID specialists from the United States. By
1988, Cuba had "more physicians working abroad than any industrialized
nation, and more than the UN¹s World Health Organization." Most of this aid
is uncompensated, and Cuba¹s "international emissaries" are "men and women
who live under conditions that most development aid workers would not
accept," which is "the basis for their success." For Cubans, the report
continues, "international service" is regarded as "a sign of political
maturity" and taught in the schools as "the highest virtue." The warm
reception by an ANC delegation in South Africa in 1996, and the crowds
singing "long live Cuba," attest to the same phenomenon.

On the side, we might ask how the U.S. would react to Libyan planes flying
over New York and Washington dropping leaflets calling on Americans to
revolt, after years of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets at home and
abroad. By garlanding them with flowers, perhaps? A hint was given by
Barrie Dunsmore of ABC a few weeks before the downing of the two planes,
citing Walter Porges, former "ABC News" vice president for News Practices.
Porges reports that when an ABC news crew on a civilian plane attempted to
take photographs of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, "it was told
to move immediately or it would be shot down," which "would have been legal
under provisions of International Law defining military air space." A small
country under attack by a superpower is a different matter, however.

A further look at history may be useful. The policy of overthrowing the
government of Cuba does not go back to the Kennedy administration, as
Eizenstat asserted, but to its predecessor: the formal decision to
overthrow Castro in favor of a regime "more devoted to the true interests
of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S." was taken in secret in
March 1960, with the addendum that the operation must be carried out "in
such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention," because of
the expected reaction in Latin America and the need to ease the burden on
doctrinal managers at home. At the time, the "Soviet connection" and
"troublemaking in the hemisphere" were nil, apart from the Schlesingerian
version.

Since Washington is the arbiter of the "true interests of the Cuban
people," it was unnecessary for the Eisenhower administration to attend to
the public opinion studies it received, reporting popular support for
Castro and optimism about the future. For similar reasons, current
information about these matters is of no account. The Clinton
Administration is serving the true interests of the Cuban people by
imposing misery and starvation, whatever studies of Cuban opinion may
indicate: for example, the polls reported in December 1994 by an affiliate
of the Gallup organization that found that half the population consider the
embargo to be the "principal cause of Cuba¹s problems" while 3 percent
found the "political situation" to be the "most serious problem facing Cuba
today"; that 77 percent regard the USA as Cuba¹s "worst friend" (no one
else reached 3 percent); that by 2 to 1, the population feel that the
revolution has registered more achievements than failures, the "principal
failure" being "having depended on socialist countries like Russia which
betrayed us"; and that half describe themselves as "revolutionary," another
20 percent "communist" or "socialist."

Right or wrong, the conclusions about public attitudes are irrelevant,
again a regular pattern, at home as well.

History buffs might recall that the policy actually dates back to the
1820s, when Washington¹s intention to take control of Cuba was blocked by
the British deterrent. Cuba was regarded by Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams as "an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and
political interests of our Union," but he advised patience: over time, he
predicted, Cuba would fall into U.S. hands by "the laws of
political...gravitation," a "ripe fruit" for harvest. So it did, as power
relations shifted enough for the U.S. to liberate the island (from its
people) at the end of the century, turning it into a U.S. plantation and
haven for crime syndicates and tourists.

The historical depth of the commitment to rule Cuba may help account for
the element of hysteria so apparent in the execution of the enterprise; for
example, the "almost savage" atmosphere of the first cabinet meeting after
the failed Bay of Pigs invasion described by Chester Bowles, the "almost
frantic reaction for an action program," a mood reflected in President
Kennedy¹s public statements about how failure to act would leave us "about
to be swept away with the debris of history." Clinton¹s initiatives, public
and indirect, reveal a similar streak of vindictive fanaticism, as in the
threats and prosecutions that ensured that "the number of companies granted
U.S. licences to sell [medicines] to Cuba has fallen to less than 4
percent" of the levels prior to the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of October
1992, while "only a few of the world¹s medical companies have attempted to
brave U.S. regulations" and penalties, a review in Britain¹s leading
medical journal reports.

Considerations such as these carry us from the abstract plane of
international law and solemn agreements to the realities of human life.
Lawyers may debate whether the ban on food and (effectively) medicine
violates international agreements stating that "food must not be used as an
instrument for political and economic pressure" (Rome Declaration, 1996)
and other declared principles and commitments. But the victims have to live
with the fact that the CDA has "resulted in a serious reduction in the
trade of legitimate medical supplies and food donations, to the detriment
of the Cuban people" (Joanna Cameron, Fletcher Forum). A recently released
study of the American Association for World Health concludes that the
embargo has caused serious nutritional deficits, deterioration in the
supply of safe drinking water, and sharp decline in availability of
medicines and medical information, leading to low birth-rate, epidemics of
neurological and other diseases with tens of thousands of victims, and
other severe health consequences. "Health and nutrition standards have been
devastated by the recent tightening of the 37-year-old US embargo, which
includes food imports," Victoria Brittain writes in the British press,
reporting the year-long study by U.S. specialists, which found
"hospitalised children lying in agony as essential drugs are denied them"
and doctors compelled "to work with medical equipment at less than half
efficiency because they have no spare parts." Similar conclusions are drawn
in other current studies in professional journals.

These are the real crimes, far more than the casual and reflexive violation
of legal instruments that are used as weapons against official enemies,
with the cynicism that only the truly powerful can display.

In fairness, it should be added that the suffering caused by the embargo is
sometimes reported here as well. A lead story in the New York Times
business section is headlined: "Exploding Cuban Cigar Prices: Now Embargo
Really Hurts as Big Smokes Grow Scarcer." The story reports the
tribulations of business executives at "a plush smoking room" in Manhattan,
who lament "that it¹s really tough to get a Cuban cigar in the States these
days" except at "prices that catch in the throats of the most devoted
smokers."

While the Clinton administration, exploiting the privilege of the powerful,
attributes the grim consequences of economic warfare without parallel in
current history to the policies of the regime from which it promises to
"liberate" the suffering Cuban people, a more plausible conclusion is more
nearly the reverse: the "American economic strangulation of Cuba" has been
designed, maintained, and in the post-Cold War era intensified, for the
reasons implicit in Arthur Schlesinger¹s report to incoming President
Kennedy. Much as Kennedy¹s Latin American Mission feared, the successes of
programs to improve health and living standards had been helping to spread
"the Castro idea of taking matters into one¹s own hands," stimulating "the
poor and underprivileged" in the region with the worst inequality in the
world to "demand opportunities for a decent living," and with dangerous
effects beyond as well. There is a substantial and compelling documentary
record, accompanied by consistent action based on quite rational motives,
which lends no slight credibility to this assessment. To evaluate the claim
that the policies flow from concern for human rights and democracy, the
briefest look at the record is more than sufficient, at least for those who
even pretend to be serious.

It is improper, however, to have any thoughts or recollections about such
matters as we celebrate the triumph of "American values." Nor are we
supposed to remember that a few months ago, inspired by the same passion
for free trade, Clinton "pressured Mexico into an agreement that will end
the shipment of low-price tomatoes to the United States," a gift to Florida
growers that costs Mexico about $800 million annually, and that violates
NAFTA as well as the WTO agreements (though only "in spirit," because it
was a sheer power play and did not require an official tariff). The
Administration explained the decision forthrightly: Mexican tomatoes are
cheaper and consumers here prefer them. The free market is working, but
with the wrong outcome. Or perhaps tomatoes too are a threat to national
security.

To be sure, tomatoes and telecommunications are in very different leagues.
Any favors Clinton might owe to Florida growers are dwarfed by the
requirements of the telecommunications industry, even apart from what
Thomas Ferguson describes as "the best-kept secret of the 1996 election":
that "more than any other single bloc, it was the telecommunications sector
that rescued Bill Clinton," who received major campaign contributions from
"this staggeringly profitable sector." The Telecommunications Act of 1996
and the WTO agreement are, in a sense, "thank you" notes, though it is
unlikely that the outcome would have been very different if a different mix
of largesse had been chosen by the business world, suffering at the time
from what Business Week had just called "spectacular" profits in yet
another "Surprise Party for Corporate America."

Prominent among the truths that are not to be recalled are the ones briefly
mentioned earlier: the actual record of "Reaganesque rugged individualism"
and the "free market gospel" that was preached (to the poor and
defenseless) while protectionism reached unprecedented heights and the
Administration poured public funds into high tech industry with unusual
abandon. Here we begin to reach the heart of the matter. The reasons for
skepticism about the "passion" that have just been reviewed are valid
enough, but they are a footnote to the real story: how U.S. corporations
came to be so well-placed to take over international markets, inspiring the
current celebration of "American values."

But that, again, is a larger tale, one that tells us a lot about the
contemporary world: its social and economic realities, and the grip of
ideology and doctrine, including those doctrines crafted to induce
hopelessness, resignation, and despair.